Reed et al. v. Ross
468 U.S. 1 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
A state prisoner establishes "cause" to excuse a procedural default, thereby permitting federal habeas corpus review, if the constitutional claim that was defaulted was so novel at the time of the state court proceeding that its legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel.
Facts:
- Daniel Ross was involved in an altercation that resulted in a killing.
- At his 1969 murder trial in North Carolina, Ross claimed he lacked malice and acted in self-defense.
- Ross testified that he had been stabbed in the neck immediately prior to the shooting and that he "turned around shooting."
- A witness corroborated Ross's testimony, stating that Ross was bleeding from the neck when he left the scene.
- Following a North Carolina legal practice that was over a century old, the trial judge instructed the jury that the burden was on Ross to prove both lack of malice and self-defense to the jury's satisfaction.
Procedural Posture:
- In March 1969, Daniel Ross was convicted of first-degree murder in a North Carolina trial court.
- Ross appealed his conviction to the North Carolina Supreme Court, but his attorney did not challenge the constitutionality of the jury instructions on the burden of proof.
- After the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) and Hankerson v. North Carolina (1977), Ross filed for postconviction relief in state court, challenging the instructions for the first time.
- The state trial and appellate courts summarily rejected his petition.
- Ross then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
- The District Court denied the petition, holding that Ross's claim was barred by his procedural default of failing to raise the issue on his initial appeal.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit initially dismissed his appeal, but on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, it reversed the District Court.
- The Fourth Circuit held that Ross had satisfied the 'cause and prejudice' test to overcome the procedural bar, finding 'cause' in the novelty of the constitutional claim at the time of his 1969 appeal.
- The State (petitioners) sought and was granted certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Fourth Circuit's finding of 'cause'.
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Issue:
Does a state prisoner establish "cause" for failing to raise a constitutional claim in state court, thereby excusing the procedural default for federal habeas corpus purposes, when the legal basis for the claim was so novel at the time that a reasonably competent attorney would not have been aware of it?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. A defendant has cause for his failure to raise a constitutional claim in accordance with applicable state procedures where the claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel. Here, the legal landscape in 1969 did not provide Ross's counsel with a reasonable basis to challenge the well-established North Carolina jury instruction. The prevailing Supreme Court precedent, Leland v. Oregon, arguably sanctioned the practice of shifting the burden of proof for affirmative defenses to the defendant. The constitutional claim that the prosecution must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt had not yet been fully developed in the context of affirmative defenses, as it would be in the later cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur and In re Winship. Forcing counsel to raise every conceivable, far-fetched claim to avoid future procedural defaults would overburden appellate courts and dilute meritorious arguments. Therefore, Ross's failure to raise the claim was not a tactical decision or inexcusable neglect, but a result of the claim's novelty, which constitutes sufficient cause.
Dissenting - Justice Rehnquist
No. A defendant does not establish cause for a procedural default when the fundamental legal principles for the claim were well-established, even if their specific application was not yet decided. The principle that the Due Process Clause requires the State to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, confirmed in In re Winship just a year after Ross's trial, was based on a long line of earlier decisions. Competent counsel should have been able to formulate an objection based on this established principle. The majority's decision creates an anomalous situation where a conviction, obtained in a trial that was proper by then-prevailing standards, is overturned fifteen years later. This holding contradicts the Court's own suggestion in Hankerson that states could use procedural default rules to protect past convictions from retroactive application of new rules, undermining the finality of state court judgments.
Concurring - Justice Powell
Yes. While agreeing with the Court's opinion on the issue of "cause," this concurrence is written to reiterate the view that new constitutional rules should generally not be applied retroactively on collateral review (like federal habeas corpus). However, the State in this case did not challenge the retroactive application of the Mullaney rule. Assuming that Mullaney must be applied retroactively, Ross has shown sufficient "cause" for his attorney's failure to raise the claim in a timely fashion for the reasons set forth by the majority.
Analysis:
This decision establishes the "novelty" of a constitutional claim as a basis for satisfying the "cause" prong of the cause-and-prejudice test for overcoming procedural defaults in federal habeas corpus cases. It provides a significant, though narrow, exception to the general rule that a defendant is bound by their attorney's failure to raise issues in state court. The analysis creates a framework for determining novelty, distinguishing between foreseeable legal developments and true 'clear breaks with the past.' This holding balances the interests of finality and comity with the federal courts' role in vindicating fundamental constitutional rights, ensuring that defendants are not penalized for their attorneys' inability to predict groundbreaking shifts in constitutional law.
