No to the first part, Yes to the second. A property owner does not have to meet strict federal standards to make a polluter pay for cleanup under Indiana's law. And yes, the company's owner can be held personally responsible. The court explained that Indiana's environmental law is more straightforward than the big federal one (CERCLA). The state law just requires that the cleanup costs be 'reasonable.' It doesn't force people to do extra-scientific tests or follow a complex federal rulebook. For the owner, Edward Reid, the court said he was clearly in charge, knew about the plan to get rid of the factory waste, and let it happen. Under a rule called the 'responsible corporate officer doctrine,' a boss who could have stopped an environmental problem can't hide behind the company name to avoid being held accountable.

Yes, the lower court made a mistake on several parts of Reed's lawsuit. We're saying that the case about the environmental cleanup costs (called an ELA claim) should not have been decided without a trial. The law says Reed can ask for money to clean up his land, even if he allowed the dumping. The steel company didn't prove that the harmful stuff came from somewhere else or that it wasn't dangerous. We're also saying that other parts of Reed's lawsuit about illegal dumping, lying, being a nuisance, and trespassing should go to trial too. But we agree with the lower court that Reed can't sue for unjust enrichment or intentional harm. We're also saying that Edward Reid, who owned the steel company, can be personally responsible for the cleanup costs. The case needs to go back to the lower court for more proceedings.

No as to the first part, Yes as to the second. Indiana's Environmental Legal Action (ELA) statute does not require a plaintiff to prove contamination exceeds background levels or that cleanup costs comply with federal standards; it only mandates that recoverable costs be 'reasonable.' Furthermore, the responsible corporate officer doctrine does permit holding a corporate owner personally liable for environmental violations. The court reasoned that the plain language of the ELA statute only requires that a release 'poses a risk to human health and the environment' and that costs be 'reasonable.' It explicitly declined to import the stricter requirements of the federal CERCLA statute, such as consistency with the National Contingency Plan, viewing that as a policy decision for the legislature. Regarding corporate liability, the court applied the established three-part test for the responsible corporate officer doctrine, finding that Edward Reid's position as a controlling shareholder who was actively involved in management, participated in the decision to dispose of the waste, and took responsibility for the violation with IDEM was sufficient to impose personal liability for the ELA claim. The court also reversed summary judgment for the defendants on Reed's claims of illegal dumping, nuisance, fraud, and trespass, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained for trial.

Yes, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Defendants on several of Reed's claims, including the environmental legal action (ELA) claim. We reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the ELA claim because the Defendants failed to demonstrate they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The ELA statute allows recovery of reasonable remediation costs regardless of whether the plaintiff caused or contributed to the contamination. The Defendants did not prove the hazardous substances originated from a source other than Forge waste or that the waste did not pose a risk to human health and the environment. We also reverse summary judgment on claims of illegal dumping, fraud, nuisance, and trespass, finding genuine issues of material fact exist. We affirm summary judgment for Defendants on claims of unjust enrichment and intentional torts. On corporate liability issues, we reverse summary judgment for Reid Metals on personal jurisdiction and for Jennings Manufacturing on successor liability, finding factual disputes. We affirm denial of summary judgment on piercing the corporate veil but find Edward Reid liable as a responsible corporate officer for the ELA claim. This case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reed v. Reid

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