Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc.
855 F.2d 888 (1988)
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Rule of Law:
Under Massachusetts law, an artistic organization is not liable under the state's Civil Rights Act for cancelling a performance contract in response to third-party pressure over a performer's political speech, as the organization's own state-law rights to artistic control and freedom from compelled speech preclude liability.
Facts:
- In March 1982, the Boston Symphony Orchestra (BSO) contracted with actress Vanessa Redgrave to narrate a series of 'Oedipus Rex' concerts.
- After the engagement was announced, the BSO received numerous telephone calls from subscribers and community members protesting Redgrave's hiring due to her public support for the Palestine Liberation Organization.
- Some callers threatened protests and potential violence at the concert hall if Redgrave were to perform.
- On or about April 1, 1982, citing these pressures and concerns about potential disruptions and safety, the BSO cancelled its contract with Redgrave and the scheduled performances.
- As a result of the cancellation, Theodore Mann, a Broadway producer, decided not to offer Redgrave a role in the play 'Heartbreak House,' fearing similar negative effects on his organization.
Procedural Posture:
- Vanessa Redgrave sued the Boston Symphony Orchestra (BSO) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA).
- A jury found the BSO liable for breach of contract, awarding $27,500 in performance fees and $100,000 in consequential damages for harm to Redgrave's career.
- The same jury, acting in an advisory role, found for the BSO on the MCRA claim.
- The district court judge upheld the $27,500 award but overturned the $100,000 consequential damages award, granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) for the BSO on the grounds that the First Amendment barred such damages.
- The district court also entered judgment for the BSO on the MCRA claim, ruling that acquiescing to third-party pressure does not constitute 'threats, intimidation, or coercion' under the statute.
- Redgrave, as appellant, appealed the JNOV on consequential damages and the judgment on the MCRA claim to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit; the BSO, as appellee, cross-appealed.
- A panel of the First Circuit certified two questions regarding the MCRA to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which provided answers.
- The First Circuit panel then withdrew its opinion and the case was reheard by the court en banc.
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Issue:
Does the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) impose liability on an artistic organization for cancelling a performer's contract in acquiescence to third-party pressure stemming from the performer's political speech, when the organization asserts its own free expression rights?
Opinions:
Majority - Coffin, Circuit Judge.
No. As a matter of Massachusetts law, the BSO is not subject to liability under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act in these circumstances. While a state civil rights act can apply to private actors, the court deferred to the opinions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC), which strongly indicated that state law would protect the BSO's right not to perform. The SJC justices suggested, through various opinions, that liability would be foreclosed either by construing the MCRA to avoid constitutional problems or by recognizing a state constitutional right not to be compelled to perform. By deciding the case on these state-law grounds, the court avoids reaching the difficult federal First Amendment question of whether an artistic organization has a right to cancel a performance to protect its artistic expression from disruption.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Bownes, Circuit Judge
Yes. The BSO should be held liable under the MCRA because its asserted First Amendment right of 'artistic integrity' does not outweigh the Commonwealth's compelling interest in protecting a citizen from economic coercion based on her political speech. The majority improperly relies on dicta and minority views from the SJC to avoid deciding the federal constitutional issue, which it should have addressed. The BSO's cancellation was not an act of its own expression but an act of 'caving in to third-party pressure,' which amounts to a heckler's veto. The state's interest in preventing discrimination based on political views is just as compelling as its interest in preventing race or sex discrimination, and the BSO's asserted artistic rights are not absolute.
Analysis:
This case is significant for its application of the constitutional avoidance doctrine and its complex handling of the federal-state judicial relationship through the certification process. The court's decision to resolve the dispute based on its interpretation of various state court opinions—rather than the direct answers to certified questions—demonstrates a strong preference for avoiding novel and difficult federal First Amendment questions. This ruling provides a framework for how an organization's state-law artistic freedom rights can shield it from liability under a state civil rights statute, particularly when the organization is responding to external pressures rather than acting on its own discriminatory animus. It leaves unresolved the core federal constitutional conflict between one private party's statutory free speech rights and another's constitutional right to be free from compelled expression.
