Reavis v. Slominski
250 Neb. 711, 551 N.W.2d 528 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
In a civil action for sexual battery, when a party introduces evidence that consent was ineffective due to lack of mental capacity or economic duress, the trial court commits reversible error by refusing to provide the jury with specific instructions on the legal standards governing those defenses.
Facts:
- Mary Reavis was employed by Dr. James Slominski as a receptionist in his dental clinic.
- From 1969 to 1975, during a previous term of employment, Slominski frequently fondled Reavis and they began engaging in sexual intercourse, which Reavis claimed she submitted to out of fear for her job.
- In 1988, Reavis accepted re-employment with Slominski after he promised to 'leave her alone.'
- On December 31, 1991, after an office party where both had been drinking, Slominski and Reavis were alone in the clinic.
- Slominski locked the door and began kissing Reavis. Reavis testified she pushed him away and said 'no,' to which he laughed and replied, 'You know you want it.'
- Reavis then said, 'Oh, hell,' walked towards Slominski’s office, threw off her sweater, and engaged in sexual intercourse with him.
- Reavis testified that she felt she would lose her job if she did not comply with his advances.
- A few days later, on the night of January 3, 1992, Reavis attempted suicide.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Reavis filed a civil action against James Slominski in the district court for Richardson County, Nebraska (a trial court), alleging sexual assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- At the close of Reavis’ case, the trial court overruled Slominski's motion for a directed verdict.
- At the close of all evidence, the trial court again overruled Slominski's renewed motion for a directed verdict.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Reavis on the sexual assault cause of action and in favor of Slominski on the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action.
- Slominski (as appellant) appealed the sexual assault verdict to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, and Reavis (as cross-appellant) appealed the verdict on her emotional distress claim.
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Issue:
Does a trial court commit reversible error by refusing to give specific jury instructions on the effectiveness of consent, including the concepts of mental capacity and economic duress, after admitting evidence pertaining to those theories?
Opinions:
Majority - Lanphier, J.
Yes. The trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury on the law regarding effective consent constitutes reversible error. Reavis presented two main theories: that she did not actually consent, and alternatively, that any apparent consent was ineffective due to her lack of capacity to resist (stemming from childhood abuse) and economic duress (fear of job loss). The court admitted expert testimony on these issues. Once such evidence was admitted, the court was obligated to provide the jury with the correct legal framework for evaluating it. The court’s failure to give Slominski’s requested instructions explaining how a defendant's knowledge of a plaintiff's abnormality or how duress affects consent was prejudicial, requiring a new trial on the sexual assault claim.
Dissenting - Caporale, J.
No. The trial court should have granted a directed verdict for Slominski because Reavis consented as a matter of law. The expert testimony regarding Reavis's alleged incapacity was irrelevant and should have been excluded. The proper legal test for capacity to consent to sexual intercourse is whether one can understand the nature and consequences of the act, a test Reavis clearly met. An alleged inability to resist due to past trauma or fear of job loss does not constitute legal incapacity. Furthermore, economic duress is insufficient to vitiate consent in a battery claim. Therefore, there was no factual foundation for the claim of ineffective consent, and Reavis's actions of disrobing and participating constituted unambiguous consent.
Dissenting - Wright, J.
No. The trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of Slominski because there was valid consent. The evidence presented did not support a claim of lack of capacity to consent. A threat of job loss does not legally impair one's ability to refuse sexual contact. Since the evidence demonstrated valid consent, there was no issue for the jury to decide.
Concurring - Connolly, J.
Yes, a new trial is warranted, but the majority's reasoning is flawed. The trial court erred by admitting the expert testimony regarding Reavis's childhood abuse because it was not relevant to the legal test for capacity. The proper test for incapacity is whether an abnormality substantially impairs one's ability to understand and weigh the harms and benefits of the conduct, not merely whether it makes it difficult to say 'no.' Because the expert testimony did not meet this standard, its admission was prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Gerrard, J.
Yes, a new trial is required, but the majority wrongly approved a jury instruction that would prevent economic duress from invalidating consent. While I agree the expert testimony on capacity was improperly admitted, I strongly dissent from the principle that a threat of job loss can never invalidate an employee's consent to sexual contact from an employer. In the modern workplace, a threat to one's livelihood can be as coercive as a threat of physical force. A jury should be permitted to consider whether, under all the circumstances, it was reasonable for the defendant to believe the plaintiff's conduct constituted genuine consent, and the threat of unemployment is a critical part of that context.
Analysis:
This case is significant for exploring the complex issue of consent in civil battery claims, particularly within the power-imbalanced employer-employee relationship. It establishes that when a plaintiff's capacity or the presence of duress is at issue, the jury must be specifically instructed on the legal standards for evaluating whether consent was effective. The fractured opinions highlight a deep judicial conflict between traditional tort law, which is hesitant to recognize economic pressure as duress sufficient to vitiate consent, and evolving public policy that recognizes the coercive nature of workplace sexual harassment. Justice Gerrard's opinion, in particular, signals a potential shift toward recognizing economic coercion as a legally valid basis for negating consent in tort actions.
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