Reagan v. Vaughn
1990 WL 207498, 804 S.W.2d 463 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A child has a common law cause of action to recover damages for loss of parental consortium when a parent suffers a serious, permanent, and disabling non-fatal injury due to the tortious conduct of a third party.
Facts:
- David Reagan was a patron at K-Jacs Saloon in Pasadena, Texas.
- After the saloon closed, Reagan became involved in a fight with another patron in the parking lot.
- The bar's manager, Vaughn, attempted to break up the fight multiple times.
- During the ongoing altercation, Vaughn retrieved a baseball bat from inside the saloon.
- Vaughn struck Reagan on the head with the baseball bat.
- As a result of the blow, Reagan suffered a severe and permanent brain injury, leaving him with the mental capacity of a six- or seven-year-old child.
- At the time of the injury, Reagan had a minor daughter, Julia Reagan, who was not present at the scene.
Procedural Posture:
- David Reagan and his daughter, Julia Reagan, sued Vaughn, Nichols, and Rosenovac in a Texas trial court.
- A jury found the defendants collectively 60% negligent and David Reagan 40% negligent.
- The jury awarded damages to David Reagan and also awarded Julia Reagan $200,000 for loss of parental consortium and $205,000 for mental anguish.
- The trial court entered a judgment in conformity with the jury's verdict.
- The defendants appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals, as an intermediate appellate court, modified the trial court's judgment by deleting the entire damage award to Julia Reagan, stating it lacked the authority to recognize such a cause of action.
- Julia Reagan, as petitioner, sought review from the Supreme Court of Texas, the state's highest court for civil matters.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a child have a common law cause of action to recover damages for loss of parental consortium and for mental anguish when a parent suffers a non-fatal, but serious and disabling, injury due to the tortious conduct of a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Gonzalez, J.
Yes, as to loss of parental consortium, but no, as to mental anguish. A child has a common law right to recover damages for loss of consortium when a parent is seriously injured by a third party, but may not recover for negligent infliction of mental anguish unless the bystander recovery requirements are met. The court reasons that the common law must evolve to protect significant relationships, and the parent-child relationship is as worthy of protection as the spousal relationship, which is already protected. A severe injury to a parent results in a genuine deprivation of love, care, and guidance for the child. This right is extended to both minor and adult children. However, the court distinguishes a claim for negligent infliction of mental anguish, which is an independent tort requiring the plaintiff to have been located near the scene and to have suffered a direct emotional impact from contemporaneously observing the incident. Because Julia Reagan was not present at the scene of her father's injury, she cannot recover for mental anguish.
Concurring and dissenting - Hecht, J.
No, as to loss of parental consortium, but I concur with the denial of mental anguish damages. A child should not have a cause of action for loss of parental consortium. This decision is an extreme and unwise change in the common law, placing Texas in a small minority of jurisdictions. The majority's 'worthy of protection' test is vague, and creating this new cause of action poses serious problems, including the difficulty of measuring intangible damages, the risk of double recovery, increased litigation, and potential family friction. The ruling represents judicial legislation that expands tort liability without considering the broader societal and systemic costs. The facts of this particular case, involving a father who was 40% negligent and had a somewhat distant relationship with his daughter, do not justify such a sweeping change.
Concurring and dissenting - Doggett, J.
Yes, as to loss of parental consortium, and yes, the child should also be able to recover for mental anguish. While the court correctly recognizes the cause of action for loss of consortium, it errs by denying recovery for mental anguish. Citing Sanchez v. Schindler, the dissent argues that it is unrealistic to separate the injury to the familial relationship from the emotional injury that is a natural byproduct. The 'bystander recovery rule' is a distinct doctrine and should not bar recovery for the emotional damage that arises directly from the destruction of the parent-child relationship itself, regardless of whether the child witnessed the initial injury. The denial of mental anguish damages creates an arbitrary barrier inconsistent with the court's prior efforts to compensate for the full scope of damages in tort cases.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands tort liability in Texas by creating a new common law cause of action for loss of parental consortium in non-fatal injury cases. It analogizes the parent-child relationship to the spousal relationship and the relationships protected under the Wrongful Death Act, continuing a judicial trend of recognizing the value of familial bonds. The ruling impacts all personal injury litigation involving parents by adding their children (both minor and adult) as potential plaintiffs, which complicates settlements and increases potential damages. While creating this new derivative claim, the court carefully maintained the distinction between it and an independent claim for negligent infliction of mental anguish, reinforcing the strict requirements of the bystander recovery rule.
