Read v. Webster

Supreme Court of Vermont
16 A.L.R. 1068, 113 A. 814, 95 Vt. 239 (1921)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

When a landowner conveys a portion of their land by a warranty deed without express reservation, an easement may be impliedly reserved for the benefit of the retained land if the easement is one of strict necessity and its use was apparent, continuous, and intended to be permanent at the time of conveyance.


Facts:

  • Initially, R.S. Read owned a single large property that included both a farm and a sawmill powered by a dam on Black Creek.
  • The dam created a mill pond which continuously flooded a portion of the farm land.
  • In March 1866, R.S. Read conveyed the farm portion of the property to his brother, Ephraim S. Read, by a warranty deed that contained no express reservation of flowage rights.
  • R.S. Read retained ownership of the sawmill and its associated mill privilege.
  • R.S. Read and his successors continued to operate the sawmill and maintain the dam after the 1866 conveyance.
  • In 1902, the defendants acquired the sawmill and privilege from R.S. Read's estate.
  • In 1915 or 1916, the defendants repaired the dam, which the plaintiff (administrator of Ephraim Read's estate) claimed raised its height by approximately twelve inches, causing additional flooding.
  • The defendants contended they were merely maintaining the dam at its historical height, which was necessary for the mill's operation.

Procedural Posture:

  • The plaintiff, administrator of Ephraim S. Read's estate, sued the defendants in a trial court for tort, alleging unlawful flooding of his land.
  • The case was tried by a jury.
  • The defendants requested a jury instruction on the theory of an implied reservation of an easement, which the trial court denied.
  • The trial court instructed the jury that the defendants could only establish their right to flood the land through a claim of prescription.
  • The jury found for the plaintiff, and the trial court entered a judgment in the plaintiff's favor.
  • The defendants appealed the judgment to this court, arguing the trial court erred in its jury instructions.

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Issue:

Does a warranty deed that severs a commonly-owned property impliedly reserve an easement for the benefit of the retained parcel when the easement is one of strict necessity for the enjoyment of the retained parcel and its use was apparent and continuous at the time of the conveyance?


Opinions:

Majority - Taylor, J.

Yes, a deed can impliedly reserve an easement of strict necessity. The court held that when a property owner imposes an apparent, permanent, and necessary burden on one part of their property for the benefit of another, and then sells the burdened portion, the law may imply a reservation of that benefit (an easement) for the retained portion. The court's reasoning rests on the doctrine of 'quasi easements' or 'visible servitudes,' where the parties are presumed to have contracted in reference to the visible condition of the property at the time of the grant. An implied reservation in a warranty deed requires the easement to be one of strict necessity, which was met here as the evidence tended to show the mill privilege would be 'valueless' without the right to flood the granted land. The trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on this legal theory and limiting the defendants' defense solely to a claim of prescriptive right.



Analysis:

This decision reaffirms the doctrine of implied reservation of an easement by necessity, even against a warranty deed that contains no express reservation. It clarifies that 'strict necessity' is a key element and serves as a strong indicator of the parties' presumed intent at the time of conveyance. The case provides a clear analytical framework (the four essential elements) for determining when such an easement is created, impacting future property disputes involving severed parcels. It solidifies the principle that courts will look beyond the written deed to the physical realities of the property at the time of the transaction to ascertain the parties' unstated intentions.

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