Raven v. Deukmejian
276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
An initiative measure that attempts to vest a critical portion of state judicial power, regarding the interpretation of fundamental criminal defense rights under the state constitution, in the United States Supreme Court constitutes a qualitative constitutional revision beyond the scope of the initiative process, even if it does not violate the single-subject rule.
Facts:
- Proposition 115, entitled the “Crime Victims Justice Reform Act,” was adopted at the June 5, 1990, Primary Election.
- The stated purpose of Proposition 115 was to adopt "comprehensive reforms...needed in order to restore balance and fairness to our criminal justice system" by making changes and additions to the state Constitution and statutes.
- The preamble to Proposition 115 explicitly stated that "the people...find that it is necessary to reform the law as developed in numerous California Supreme Court decisions...[that] have unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused criminals."
- Proposition 115 introduced various procedural changes in criminal cases, including restrictions on discovery, preliminary examination rules (e.g., excluding postindictment preliminary hearings and allowing hearsay testimony), and trial procedures (e.g., promoting joinder, limiting voir dire, regulating counsel appointment, and limiting continuances).
- The measure also created the new offense of torture and revised both the felony-murder and special circumstance statutes to achieve more severe punishment for criminal defendants.
- Specifically, Proposition 115 amended Article I, Section 24 of the California Constitution to provide that certain enumerated criminal law rights "shall be construed by the courts of this state in a manner consistent with the United States Constitution" and "shall not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United States."
- Petitioners, who were taxpayers and voters, challenged Proposition 115, claiming it violated both the single-subject rule of the California Constitution and the rule requiring constitutional revisions to be accomplished by more formal procedures than mere amendments.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners, taxpayers and voters, filed a petition seeking an original writ of mandate or prohibition in the Court of Appeal.
- Respondent Attorney General moved to transfer the cause from the Court of Appeal to the California Supreme Court.
- The California Supreme Court granted the motion to transfer, exercising its original jurisdiction due to the great public importance and need for prompt resolution of the issues.
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Issue:
Does Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," violate the California Constitution's single-subject rule or constitute an improper constitutional revision by mandating that enumerated state constitutional criminal rights be construed consistently with the United States Constitution and not afford greater rights than the federal Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Lucas, C. J.
No, Proposition 115 does not violate the single-subject rule, but yes, its amendment to Article I, Section 24, constitutes an invalid constitutional revision. The Court found that Proposition 115 did not violate the single-subject rule, consistent with Brosnahan v. Brown (1982), because its various elements were "reasonably germane" to each other and to the general purpose of "promoting the rights of actual or potential crime victims" and strengthening "procedural and substantive safeguards for victims in our criminal justice system." A subsidiary unifying theme was the abrogation of prior California Supreme Court decisions that the framers deemed unduly expansive of criminal defendants' rights. The Court rejected arguments that the measure constituted logrolling or was unconscionably complex, assuming voters duly considered official pamphlet materials. However, the Court concluded that the amendment to Article I, Section 24, constituted an impermissible qualitative constitutional revision. While quantitatively the measure affected only one constitutional article and added/amended a few sections, which was not extensive enough to be a revision under Amador v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978), qualitatively, its effect was devastating. By mandating that enumerated state criminal defense rights be construed consistently with the U.S. Constitution and not afford greater rights than the federal Constitution (as construed by the U.S. Supreme Court), the amendment would "vest all judicial interpretive power, as to fundamental criminal defense rights, in the United States Supreme Court." This fundamentally alters the substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect, contradicting the established jurisprudential principle that the judiciary has the ultimate right to construe its own constitution as a court of last resort. The Court distinguished voluntary deference to federal interpretation from a mandate of blind obedience. The invalid provision, Article I, Section 24, was deemed severable from the rest of Proposition 115 because it was grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.
Concurring_and_dissenting - Mosk, J.
Yes, Proposition 115's amendment to Article I, Section 24, constitutes an invalid constitutional revision, and yes, the entire Proposition 115 violates the single-subject rule. Justice Mosk concurred with the majority's holding that section 3 of Proposition 115 effected an unconstitutional revision of the California Constitution. However, he dissented on the single-subject issue, arguing that the majority's reliance on Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) was flawed and that the decision should be overruled. He contended that Proposition 115, with its 31 sections making numerous and diverse changes across various codes and the Constitution, was a "monumental complexity and diversity" and a "veritable 'grabbag' of enactments." He asserted that the single-subject rule requires an initiative measure to be a "coherent enactment in and of itself" and that merely giving it a broad label like "promotion of the rights of actual or potential crime victims" or a "subsidiary unifying theme" of abrogating court decisions was insufficient to satisfy this requirement. Such broad labels, he argued, would effectively nullify the single-subject rule. He would have invalidated the measure in its entirety due to its violation of the single-subject rule.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark decision regarding the scope of the initiative power in California, particularly concerning constitutional amendments versus revisions. It reinforces the qualitative dimension of the revision doctrine, holding that even a seemingly isolated change can be a revision if it fundamentally alters the "nature of our basic governmental plan," such as stripping state courts of their independent interpretive authority over state constitutional rights. While upholding the controversial "single subject" rule interpretation from Brosnahan, the case significantly limits the ability of initiatives to curtail judicial independence, demonstrating the California Supreme Court's role in preserving the state's constitutional structure. Future initiatives seeking to limit state judicial power must navigate this qualitative revision standard, which prevents broad delegations of interpretive authority.
