Randall v. Sorrell

Supreme Court of the United States
548 U. S. (2006)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

Mandatory campaign expenditure limits violate the First Amendment's free speech guarantees. While campaign contribution limits are generally permissible to prevent corruption or its appearance, they are unconstitutional if they are so low and restrictive as to prevent candidates from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy, thereby disproportionately burdening First Amendment interests.

Facts:

In 1997, the Vermont Legislature enacted Act 64, a comprehensive campaign finance reform law.
Act 64 imposed mandatory limits on the total amount of money a candidate for state office could spend during a two-year election cycle, ranging from $2,000 for a state representative to $300,000 for governor.
The expenditure limits for incumbent candidates were set even lower, at 85-90% of the amounts for challengers.
The Act also established very low contribution limits per two-year election cycle: $400 for statewide office, $300 for state senator, and $200 for state representative.
These contribution limits applied equally to individuals, political action committees, and political parties (with all local, state, and national party affiliates treated as a single entity).
The Act's contribution limits were not indexed for inflation, causing their real value to decrease over time.
The law's broad definition of a contribution included unreimbursed expenses incurred by volunteers during campaign activities.

Procedural Posture:

Petitioners, a group of candidates, voters, and political parties, filed suit against Vermont state officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, challenging the constitutionality of Act 64.
The District Court held that the Act's expenditure limits and limits on political party contributions were unconstitutional, but upheld the contribution limits for individuals and political committees.
Both parties appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
A divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed in part, holding that all of the Act's contribution limits were constitutional and that the expenditure limits might be constitutional.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether the expenditure limits were narrowly tailored to compelling state interests.
Before the remand occurred, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari at the request of both parties to review the Second Circuit's decision.

Premium Content

Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief

You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture

Issue:

Does Vermont's campaign finance law, Act 64, which imposes both mandatory expenditure limits and substantively low contribution limits on candidates for state office, violate the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and association?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Breyer

Yes, Vermont's law violates the First Amendment. Well-established precedent from Buckley v. Valeo, which holds that mandatory expenditure limits are a direct and substantial restraint on political speech, remains controlling under the principle of stare decisis. The state's proffered interest in freeing candidates from fundraising burdens is insufficient to overrule this precedent. The law's contribution limits are also unconstitutional because they are so low that they are not closely drawn to the state's interest in preventing corruption. Several 'danger signs' lead to this conclusion: the limits are the lowest in the nation and far below those previously upheld; they severely restrict the ability of political parties to support their candidates; they burden volunteer activities by counting unreimbursed expenses; and they are not indexed for inflation. Taken together, these factors demonstrate that the limits disproportionately burden First Amendment rights by threatening the ability of candidates, especially challengers, to mount effective campaigns.

Concurrence - Justice Alito

Yes, the law is unconstitutional. The judgment is correct and the reasoning of Justice Breyer's opinion is sound, except for the portions that extensively discuss whether to overrule Buckley. It is unnecessary to reach the issue of stare decisis because the respondents did not properly argue for overruling Buckley, making only a passing request without engaging in a serious analysis of the doctrine. Therefore, the case should be decided simply by applying existing precedent, under which Vermont's law clearly fails.

Concurrence - Justice Kennedy

Yes, the law is unconstitutional. Established precedent correctly holds that expenditure limitations are intolerable under the First Amendment. While skeptical of the Court's entire campaign finance jurisprudence and its lenient review of contribution limits, Vermont's limits are particularly stifling and unconstitutional even under that framework. The Court's decisions in this area have created a complex regulatory universe that weakens political parties and may cause more problems than it solves.

Concurrence - Justice Thomas

Yes, the law is unconstitutional. The Court should overrule Buckley v. Valeo entirely because its distinction between contributions and expenditures is illegitimate and provides insufficient protection for core political speech. Both types of limits should be subject to strict scrutiny, which Act 64 could not survive. The plurality's multifactor test for evaluating contribution limits is unworkable and subjective, demonstrating that Buckley is not a principled rule of law and is not entitled to stare decisis.

Dissenting - Justice Stevens

No, the law is not unconstitutional. The Court should overrule Buckley's holding on expenditure limits, which was wrongly decided. The equation of money with speech is a mistake; expenditure limits are permissible regulations that serve compelling interests, such as ensuring equal access to the political arena and freeing candidates from the 'interminable burden of fundraising.' A legislative judgment that 'enough is enough' in campaign spending deserves judicial deference.

Dissenting - Justice Souter

No, the Court should have upheld the contribution limits and remanded the expenditure limits issue for further proceedings. Buckley did not foreclose the possibility that some expenditure limits might be constitutional, particularly when justified by the state's interest in preventing candidates from spending excessive time fundraising—an interest Buckley did not fully consider. The contribution limits, though low, are not 'so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective' and are consistent with limits in other states. The Court should defer to the Vermont legislature's empirical judgment that these limits are appropriate for the state's political environment.

Analysis:

This case is significant for strongly reaffirming the unconstitutionality of mandatory campaign expenditure limits as established in Buckley v. Valeo, resisting arguments to reconsider that precedent. More importantly, it established for the first time that while contribution limits are subject to a lower level of scrutiny, there is a constitutional floor below which they cannot fall. The plurality's multi-factor 'danger signs' analysis creates a new, albeit flexible, framework for courts to determine if contribution limits are so low as to unduly burden First Amendment rights, shifting the focus beyond a simple anti-corruption rationale to the practical impact on the ability to run a competitive campaign.

Gunnerbot

AI-powered case assistant

Loaded: Randall v. Sorrell (2006)

Try: "What was the holding?" or "Explain the dissent"