Ranard Ex Rel. Ranard v. O'Neil

Montana Supreme Court
531 P.2d 1000, 1975 Mont. LEXIS 616, 166 Mont. 177 (1975)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

The determination of a child's capacity for contributory negligence is a subjective question of fact based on their age, experience, intelligence, and capabilities. A child's violation of a safety statute does not constitute negligence as a matter of law if the violation can be excused due to the child's incapacity to comply.

Facts:

Jerry Ranard was one day shy of his eighth birthday.
On the evening of December 7, 1972, Ranard's boxing instructor double-parked his car across the street from Ranard's home.
The street was snow-packed and icy.
Ranard's older brother exited the car and ran across the street.
Ranard followed his brother almost immediately, running into the street without looking for traffic.
Upon seeing the headlights of a vehicle driven by Kathy O'Neil, Ranard stopped and then ran in an attempt to avoid being struck.
O'Neil applied her brakes but was unable to avoid hitting Ranard, who suffered a broken leg.
Ranard had received some prior instruction on pedestrian safety but could not recall specific details.

Procedural Posture:

Jerry Ranard (plaintiff) sued Kathy O'Neil (defendant) in the district court of Lewis and Clark County for personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident.
O'Neil denied negligence and asserted the affirmative defense that Ranard's own negligence was the proximate cause of his injury.
Following discovery, which included the deposition of Ranard, O'Neil moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted O'Neil's motion for summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that Ranard was contributorily negligent.
Ranard (plaintiff-appellant) appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Supreme Court of Montana.

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Issue:

Is a child who is nearly eight years old contributorily negligent as a matter of law for running into a street without looking, thereby entitling the defendant to summary judgment?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Haswell

No. A child's capacity for contributory negligence is a subjective question of fact for a jury and cannot be decided as a matter of law on summary judgment based on this record. To determine if a child was contributorily negligent, a court must conduct a dual inquiry: first, into the child's capacity to be negligent, and second, into whether the child's conduct was in fact negligent. The capacity of a child is determined by their specific age, experience, intelligence, and capabilities, not by the standard of a reasonable adult. Here, the record, consisting only of pleadings and a deposition, was insufficient to establish as a matter of law that Ranard possessed the capacity to be contributorily negligent. Furthermore, a child's violation of a pedestrian safety statute is not negligence per se; the violation may be excused if the child lacked the capacity for compliance. Because reasonable people could differ as to Ranard's capacity, summary judgment was improper.

Analysis:

This decision reinforces the legal principle that children are not held to the same standard of care as adults. It solidifies that a child's capacity for negligence is a highly fact-specific inquiry, making it very difficult for defendants to win on summary judgment by claiming a child plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The ruling clarifies that even a direct violation of a safety statute, which would typically be negligence per se for an adult, does not automatically bar a child's claim. Instead, the child's capacity to understand and comply with that statute must first be assessed by a jury, thereby preserving access to the courts for young plaintiffs.

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