Ran-Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State
608 A.2d 1353, 61 U.S.L.W. 2077, 129 N.J. 141 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The Establishment Clauses of the federal and state constitutions prohibit government regulations that define and enforce substantive religious standards, especially with the assistance of religious authorities, as such actions directly and substantially entangle government in religious matters and have the primary effect of advancing religion.
Facts:
- The Division of Consumer Affairs promulgated regulations under the Consumer Fraud Act to govern the preparation, maintenance, and sale of kosher products.
- The regulations stated that it was an "unlawful consumer practice" to falsely represent food as "Kosher," defining "Kosher" as "prepared and maintained in strict compliance with the laws and customs of the Orthodox Jewish religion."
- The Attorney General brought an enforcement action against Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. (County Kosher) and its principal, Arthur Weisman, alleging violations of these kosher regulations.
- Between 1987 and 1989, investigators from the Bureau of Kosher Enforcement inspected County Kosher and noted possible violations, including calves' tongues not being deveined, non-kosher chicken stored with kosher food, blood and a vein found in meat for hamburger, and improper labeling.
- County Kosher's operations were supervised by an Orthodox rabbi who asserted that the establishment's activities complied with kosher laws.
- The Attorney General created a State Kosher Advisory Committee, consisting of ten rabbis (nine Orthodox, one Conservative), with the Chief of the Bureau of Kosher Enforcement as Chairman, to advise on kosher matters and enforcement.
Procedural Posture:
- The Attorney General initiated an enforcement action against Ran-Dav’s County Kosher, Inc. and Arthur Weisman in state trial court for alleged violations of the state's kosher regulations.
- County Kosher and Weisman denied the allegations and raised constitutional claims, arguing the regulations violated the Religion Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
- The trial court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement action but referred the constitutional claims for review to the Appellate Division.
- The Appellate Division, by majority opinion, upheld the constitutionality of the regulations.
- A dissenting opinion in the Appellate Division contended the regulations were unconstitutional, which allowed County Kosher to appeal the constitutional issue to the Supreme Court of New Jersey as of right.
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Issue:
Do state consumer protection regulations that define "Kosher" as "prepared and maintained in strict compliance with the laws and customs of the Orthodox Jewish religion," and which involve religious officials in their enforcement, violate the Establishment Clauses of the federal and state constitutions by excessively entangling government in religious matters or by having the primary effect of advancing religion?
Opinions:
Majority - HANDLER, J.
Yes, the kosher regulations violate the Establishment Clauses of the federal and state constitutions because they impose substantive religious standards and authorize civil enforcement of those standards with the assistance of clergy, resulting in excessive government entanglement in religious matters. Applying the three-pronged Lemon test, the Court found the regulations failed on both the 'effects' and 'entanglement' prongs. The regulations' primary effect is to advance Orthodox Judaism by adopting and enforcing its religious law as state law, and by employing rabbis in official enforcement and advisory capacities, thereby fostering an unconstitutional identification of government with religion. Most significantly, the regulations cause excessive entanglement by requiring the State to monitor strict adherence to religious practices (e.g., specific slaughtering, deveining, washing, separation rules) and to interpret religious doctrine in resolving disputes, a role forbidden to civil authorities. The Court underscored that such disputes would be "ineluctably religious in tenor and content," compelling the State to assume a religious role and resolve theological disagreements, as forbidden by precedents like Employment Div. v. Smith and Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial. The opinion suggested that permissible consumer protection could be achieved through less intrusive means, such as requiring disclosure of the specific rabbinical supervision or private agency certification for products labeled "kosher," without the state itself becoming an arbiter of religious law.
Dissenting - STEIN, J.
No, the state's kosher regulations are not facially unconstitutional because they serve the secular purpose of preventing consumer fraud, do not necessarily involve the state in furthering a religion, and do not entail excessive entanglement, as the regulations focus on objective, uniform criteria for 'kosher' that courts have historically recognized as enforceable. Justice Stein emphasized that as a facial challenge, the regulations should only be struck down if they are unconstitutional in every application. He argued that the regulations' primary purpose is the secular goal of preventing consumer fraud in a significant commercial market, a purpose that is not undermined by referencing a religious definition. He contended that the regulations do not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion, as they protect a broad base of consumers (many non-Jewish) and do not require religious officials in enforcement roles. Furthermore, the dissent asserted that the regulations do not foster excessive entanglement, as they focus on objective, verifiable aspects like display, labeling, and separation of foods, which do not require religious training to inspect. Drawing on precedents like Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, Justice Stein argued that "kosher" has a sufficiently definite and objective meaning in trade for neutral legal enforcement, and that most enforcement actions would not involve theological disputes. The dissent concluded that while 'as-applied' challenges might arise in specific instances involving complex doctrinal disagreements, the regulations are facially valid because they can be applied neutrally in the vast majority of cases without violating the Establishment Clause.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the Establishment Clause's prohibition against government entanglement in religious doctrine, even when framed as consumer protection. It draws a clear line, preventing the state from adopting, defining, and enforcing substantive religious standards, particularly if it involves religious experts or personnel in that process. The decision serves as a crucial guide for future legislation concerning religiously-defined products or services, highlighting that permissible regulation should focus on disclosure and verifiable certifications from private religious bodies rather than direct state interpretation of religious law. The ruling also underscores the high bar for facial challenges, demonstrating that even with a strong secular purpose, the methodology of regulation can lead to constitutional infirmity.
