No. To complain about a search, you must show that your own privacy was invaded. Just being a passenger doesn't give you a right to privacy in your friend's glove box or under their car seat. Since it wasn't their car and they didn't own the stuff found, their rights weren't violated, so they can't challenge the search.

Yes. This decision wrongly says your rights depend on owning property, not on being a person. If you are legally in a private place, like a friend's car, you should be protected from a random police search. This ruling tells police they can search cars full of people without a good reason, because only the owner can complain.

No. The main question is whether you had a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.' People just don't have a strong expectation of privacy for the glove box or under the seat of a car they are just a passenger in. It's very different from being in your own house. So, their complaint isn't reasonable.

No, the passengers can't challenge the search because Fourth Amendment rights only apply to your own property and privacy. The passengers didn't show that they had any expectation of privacy in the areas of the car that were searched, like the glove compartment or under the seat. Passengers normally don't have an expectation of privacy in those areas, just like they wouldn't in the trunk of a car.

The Court's ruling means police can search passengers in cars however they want. The Court's logic would let police search a car without a warrant whenever they think there's evidence of a crime, no matter who the passengers are. That goes against what the Court has said before, what the Fourth Amendment is about, and the privacy we expect in everyday life. The passengers were in the car with the owner's permission, so they should be able to expect some privacy and challenge the search.

I agree with the Court, but want to point out that the main question is whether expecting privacy from the government is reasonable based on the whole situation. The passengers' Fourth Amendment rights weren't violated here because nothing shows their expectation of privacy was reasonable. We expect less privacy in cars than at home or other places. It's unrealistic to think these passengers could expect the car wouldn't be searched after they were lawfully stopped and made to get out.

Yes, passengers in a car can challenge a police search of the car even if they don't own the car or the items found in the search. The majority's ruling means police can search passengers in cars however they want. The majority's logic would let police search a car without a warrant whenever they think there's evidence of a crime, no matter who the passengers are. That goes against what we have said before, what the Fourth Amendment is about, and the privacy we expect in everyday life. The passengers were in the car with the owner's permission, so they should be able to expect some privacy and challenge the search.

An accused has standing to contest a search under the Fourth Amendment only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place that government officials or agents invaded.

It is settled law that a defendant does not have standing to challenge the search of a vehicle if he does not assert either a proprietary or possessory interest in it nor has any legitimate expectation of privacy in it.

—capacity to claim the protection of the fourth amendment depends upon whether the person who claims the protection has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place).

"Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which like other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted."

A defendant aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by the search of a third person's premises has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.

To have standing to challenge a search, a defendant must show that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched and that his personal expectation of privacy was violated.

"The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure."

Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society

—and that the exclusionary rule's benefits run only to those whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated.

However, even if a search is unreasonable, a defendant must have a privacy interest that was invaded by the search in order to suppress evidence discovered in the search.

No. A passenger in an automobile who does not own the vehicle or the property seized lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched and therefore cannot challenge the search's legality under the Fourth Amendment. The court rejected the 'legitimately on premises' test from Jones v. United States as an overly broad standard for Fourth Amendment protection. Instead, the controlling inquiry, derived from Katz v. United States, is whether the person challenging the search had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted; a defendant must show that their own rights were violated. Here, the petitioners, as mere passengers, made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or the area under the seat of the car. These are areas where a passenger would not normally have a privacy interest, and their presence in the car with the owner's permission was not enough to establish one.

Yes. A person legitimately present in a private place, such as a passenger in an automobile, should have their right to privacy protected from unreasonable governmental interference. The majority's decision erroneously ties the application of the Fourth Amendment to property law concepts, effectively holding that it protects property, not people. This holding abandons the workable principle from Jones v. United States that legitimate presence on the premises is sufficient to challenge a search. This new, vague standard declares an 'open season' on automobiles with multiple occupants, as it invites police to conduct unreasonable searches knowing that passengers will likely be unable to challenge the search, thereby undermining the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.

No. The proper standard for determining the scope of Fourth Amendment rights is whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The 'legitimately on the premises' test is flawed because not all who are legitimately present have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The expectation of privacy in an automobile is significantly lower than in a home. In this case, the petitioners, as passengers with no control over the vehicle or its locked compartments, had a minimal privacy interest that is not comparable to that of an individual in their home or one who secures belongings in a locked footlocker. Therefore, their claim that their expectation of privacy was reasonable must fail.

No, petitioners do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched vehicle. Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Petitioners made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy.

The Court's opinion declares an 'open season' on automobiles so far as passengers are concerned. The rationale of the Court's opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would permit a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to believe a car contains evidence of a crime, regardless of the relationship of the auto's occupants to the evidence. The Court's holding is contrary to the Court's own prior decisions, to the logic of the Fourth Amendment, and to the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. The Court should hold that petitioners, as occupants of the car with permission of the owner, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the car and could challenge the constitutionality of the search.

I join the opinion of the Court, but write separately to emphasize that the ultimate question is whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights were not abridged here because none of the factors relied upon by this Court on prior occasions supports petitioners' claim that their alleged expectation of privacy from government intrusion was reasonable. Automobiles carry a lesser expectation of privacy than homes or other locales. It is unrealistic to suggest that these passengers had any reasonable expectation that the car in which they had been riding would not be searched after they were lawfully stopped and made to get out.

No, passengers in an automobile who assert neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile nor an interest in the property seized do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy entitling them to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the vehicle. Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which may not be vicariously asserted. A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Petitioners made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy.

Yes, passengers in an automobile who assert neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile nor an interest in the property seized have a legitimate expectation of privacy entitling them to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the vehicle. The Court's opinion declares an 'open season' on automobiles so far as passengers are concerned. The rationale of the Court's opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would permit a warrantless search of an automobile whenever the police have probable cause to believe a car contains evidence of a crime, regardless of the relationship of the auto's occupants to the evidence. The Court's holding is contrary to the Court's own prior decisions, to the logic of the Fourth Amendment, and to the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share. The Court should hold that petitioners, as occupants of the car with permission of the owner, had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the interior of the car and could challenge the constitutionality of the search.

No, petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights were not abridged here. I join the opinion of the Court, but write separately to emphasize that the ultimate question is whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights were not abridged here because none of the factors relied upon by this Court on prior occasions supports petitioners' claim that their alleged expectation of privacy from government intrusion was reasonable. Automobiles carry a lesser expectation of privacy than homes or other locales. It is unrealistic to suggest that these passengers had any reasonable expectation that the car in which they had been riding would not be searched after they were lawfully stopped and made to get out.

Rakas v. Illinois

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