Radovich v. National Football League
1 L. Ed. 2d 456, 352 U.S. 445, 1957 U.S. LEXIS 1749 (1957)
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Rule of Law:
The business of professional football is a business engaged in interstate commerce and is subject to federal antitrust laws. The judicially created antitrust exemption for professional baseball is a unique anomaly based on stare decisis and is not to be extended to other professional sports.
Facts:
- William Radovich began his professional football career with the Detroit Lions, a National Football League (NFL) club, in 1938.
- In 1946, Radovich requested a transfer to an NFL club in Los Angeles to be near his ailing father, but the Lions refused his request.
- Radovich then broke his contract with the Lions and signed with the Los Angeles Dons, a team in the rival All-America Conference, playing for them during the 1946 and 1947 seasons.
- In 1948, the San Francisco Clippers, a team in the Pacific Coast League (which was affiliated with the NFL), offered Radovich a position as a player-coach.
- The NFL informed the Clippers that Radovich was on a 'black-list' for breaking his contract and that any club signing him would face severe penalties.
- As a result of the black-listing, the Clippers withdrew their offer and refused to hire Radovich, effectively preventing his employment in organized professional football.
- The NFL's business involves scheduling games across various states and relies heavily on revenue from the interstate transmission of games via radio and television.
Procedural Posture:
- William Radovich filed a lawsuit against the National Football League and others in a federal district court (trial court), seeking treble damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
- The district court granted the motion, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- Radovich appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that the antitrust exemption for baseball should be applied to all 'team sports,' including football.
- Radovich then petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the business of professional football fall within the scope of federal antitrust laws, or is it exempt from such laws under the precedent established for professional baseball in Federal Baseball Club v. National League and Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Clark
No, the business of professional football is not exempt and does fall within the scope of federal antitrust laws. The Court held that the antitrust exemption created for baseball in Federal Baseball and Toolson was a unique aberration that should not be extended to any other sport. The Court acknowledged that the baseball exemption was of 'dubious validity' but upheld it for baseball alone on the grounds of stare decisis, citing the significant reliance interests that had developed in the industry and Congress's continued acquiescence. However, the Court explicitly limited that exemption to the business of professional baseball, reasoning that the volume of interstate commerce involved in professional football, particularly through national radio and television broadcasts, places it squarely within the Sherman Act's purview. The Court concluded that any perceived inconsistency or discrimination should be addressed by Congress through legislation, not by judicial expansion of an anomalous precedent.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Yes, professional football should be exempt under the same precedent that applies to baseball. Justice Frankfurter argued that there is no legally significant distinction between the business of baseball and football that would justify applying antitrust laws to one but not the other. He believed that the principle of stare decisis, as applied in the Toolson case which upheld baseball's exemption, compelled the same result for football. To rule otherwise creates an inconsistency that undermines the stability of the law.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes, professional football should be exempt based on stare decisis. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Brennan, could not distinguish football from baseball under the rationale of Federal Baseball and Toolson. He argued that the majority's decision effectively makes baseball 'sui generis' (in a class by itself) without a logical basis, attributing to Congress an intent to treat baseball differently that cannot be found. He contended that it is better for Congress to rectify the anomalous baseball decisions than for the Court to create 'untenable distinctions' and issue a 'discriminatory fiat in favor of baseball.'
Analysis:
This decision is significant for establishing the 'baseball anomaly' in antitrust law, confirming that the sport's exemption is unique and will not be extended. By refusing to apply the exemption to football, the Court ensured that virtually all other professional sports leagues would be subject to antitrust scrutiny. This ruling has had a profound impact on the structure of professional sports, influencing league rules on player drafts, free agency, and broadcasting rights, as subsequent challenges to these practices could be brought under the Sherman Act. The case firmly placed the power to create further sports-related antitrust exemptions in the hands of Congress, not the courts.
