No, the city can't pass that law because it violates free speech. The problem with the law is that it was too specific. It only banned 'fighting words' (insults meant to start a fight) if they were about race, religion, or gender. It didn't ban fighting words about other things, like politics or sports teams. The government isn't allowed to play favorites and say 'you can't use insults about these topics, but you can about those topics.' That's called 'content discrimination,' and it's a big no-no under the First Amendment.

No, the law is unconstitutional, but the majority's reason is too complicated and new. The law should be struck down simply because it was written too broadly. It banned any speech that causes 'anger, alarm, or resentment.' That could include a lot of things that are just offensive but are still protected by free speech. The law wasn't just limited to true 'fighting words,' so it was unconstitutional for being 'overbroad.'

No, the law is unconstitutional. I agree with Justice White that the law is bad because it's way too broad. I'm worried the majority's new rule will either mess up free speech protections for everyone or is just a one-time trick to get the result they wanted in this specific case. It's a shame communities can't specifically punish racist threats.

No, the law is unconstitutional because it's too broad. But I don't like the majority's super-strict rule against any 'content-based' laws. I think the city should be able to make special rules for speech that causes special harm, like race-based threats which are worse than other kinds of insults. But this particular law was written poorly and banned too much protected speech.

No, the city law is not okay. It's wrong because it only bans speech about certain topics. The First Amendment means you can't stop people from saying things just because of what they're talking about. The Court also pointed out that even though some types of speech like obscenity can be limited, they can't be used to unfairly target specific ideas or viewpoints. Plus, political speech gets the most protection because it's super important for a free society. The law lets people use fighting words about some things but not others, which isn't fair - the city can't let one side say whatever it wants while making the other side play by the rules.

The city law bans too much speech, including speech that should be protected by the First Amendment, not just 'fighting words'. The Court's new theory doesn't fit with previous decisions and will probably confuse lower courts. The case should have been decided based on the law being too broad, because even read narrowly, it makes it illegal to say things that just hurt feelings or offend people, which is protected by free speech.

The Court's decision is unfortunate and will either relax protections against laws that ban speech based on content or be seen as a one-time thing. By saying a state can't ban really harmful speech unless it also bans less harmful speech, the Court seems to be giving up its normal approach and will end up lowering free speech protections overall. The case could have been decided using existing free speech rules, since the law is invalid for punishing protected speech that just hurts feelings or causes offense.

The law would be okay except it is not specific enough in what it regulates. Laws cannot be very general (overbroad) and this one is.

—a municipal ordinance made it a misdemeanor to place on public or private property any "symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti... which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."

"From 1791 to the present,..., our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are `of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.'"

—in order to "protect [] individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur."

Another way of saying this is that obscene speech is one of those "areas of speech [that] can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination …

Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core political speech occupies the highest, most protected position; commercial speech...[is] regarded as a sort of second-class expression

—stating that the first amendment "generally prevents government from proscribing speech*** because of disapproval of the ideas expressed

—the Court declared unconstitutional a criminal ordinance that prohibited the display of burning crosses, Nazi swastikas, and other symbols that the perpetrator had reasonable grounds to know would arouse "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."

One could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all `anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all `papists' are, for that would insult and provoke violence `on the basis of religion.'St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.

—a unanimous court struck down a municipal ordinance and in doing so overturned the conviction of the teenaged accused for burning a cross on the lawn of an African-American family

Although the First Amendment broadly protects `speech,'it does not protect the right to... extort "(internal quotation marks and citation omitted

Yes. The ordinance violates the First Amendment because it imposes a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction on speech. While the government can regulate entire categories of unprotected speech, such as 'fighting words,' it cannot selectively prohibit speech within that category based on the subject it addresses. The St. Paul ordinance unconstitutionally singles out fighting words that express messages of intolerance on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender, while permitting abusive invective on other topics like political affiliation or homosexuality. This content discrimination raises the specter that the government is seeking to suppress disfavored ideas. Furthermore, the ordinance constitutes viewpoint discrimination by licensing one side of a debate to use fighting words while silencing the other, which is precisely what the First Amendment forbids.

Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutional, but the Court should have invalidated it on traditional overbreadth grounds rather than creating a novel and confusing doctrine. The majority's holding that the government cannot regulate subsets of unprotected speech is a radical departure from established First Amendment jurisprudence. The correct approach is to find that the ordinance, as construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit speech that 'arouses anger, alarm or resentment,' is fatally overbroad because it criminalizes a substantial amount of constitutionally protected expression that merely causes offense, rather than being limited to 'fighting words' that incite imminent violence.

Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutional because, as Justice White explains, it reaches beyond fighting words to punish speech protected by the First Amendment. The majority's novel analysis is regrettable, as it either weakens First Amendment protections for all speech by abandoning the categorical approach or stands as an aberration where the Court manipulated doctrine to strike down a law addressing race-based threats. I see no First Amendment value in prohibiting communities from punishing race-based fighting words that cause great harm, but I agree this specific ordinance is overbroad.

Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad for the reasons stated by Justice White. However, I disagree with the majority's creation of a near-absolute ban on content-based regulations, which is inconsistent with precedent and the complex nature of First Amendment law. A government should be able to create special rules for conduct that causes special harms, and it is reasonable for St. Paul to determine that threats based on race cause more severe trauma than other threats. The majority's absolutist rule perversely gives fighting words greater protection than commercial speech. Nevertheless, because this particular ordinance was construed too broadly, it is facially invalid.

No. The ordinance is facially unconstitutional because it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. The Court emphasized that while certain categories of speech such as obscenity and defamation can be regulated, they cannot be used as vehicles for content discrimination. The Court also noted that the First Amendment generally prevents the government from proscribing speech because of disapproval of the ideas expressed, and that core political speech is afforded the highest level of protection under the Constitution. The ordinance goes beyond mere content discrimination to actual viewpoint discrimination because it allows fighting words that do not invoke race, color, creed, religion or gender while prohibiting those that do. St. Paul has no authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.

The ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes not only unprotected 'fighting words' but also protected speech. The Court's new 'underbreadth' theory lacks support in First Amendment jurisprudence and needlessly departs from established precedent. The Court's revision of the categorical approach to First Amendment analysis is mischievous and will likely confuse lower courts. The case should have been decided on overbreadth grounds because the ordinance, even as narrowly construed, makes criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment and is protected by the First Amendment.

The majority's decision is regrettable and will serve either as precedent to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws or will be regarded as an aberration. By deciding that a State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not, the Court seems to abandon the categorical approach and inevitably reduce across-the-board protection for speech. The case could have been resolved under settled First Amendment principles, as the ordinance is invalid because it criminalizes protected speech that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment.

The St. Paul ordinance is not an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech. It regulates expressive activity that is wholly proscribable (fighting words) and does so not on the basis of viewpoint but based on the different harms caused by such activity. The ordinance is narrowly tailored and does not ban all 'hate speech' but only a subset of fighting words that cause injuries based on race, color, creed, religion or gender. The regulation is evenhanded and does not favor one side of a debate. Taken together, these considerations suggest the ordinance should be upheld.

Yes. The ordinance is facially unconstitutional because it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses. The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on speakers who express views on disfavored subjects. I emphasize that while certain categories of speech such as obscenity and defamation can be regulated, they cannot be used as vehicles for content discrimination. I also note that the First Amendment generally prevents the government from proscribing speech because of disapproval of the ideas expressed, and that core political speech is afforded the highest level of protection under the Constitution. The ordinance goes beyond mere content discrimination to actual viewpoint discrimination because it allows fighting words that do not invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender while prohibiting those that do. St. Paul has no authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.

Yes. The ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes not only unprotected 'fighting words' but also protected speech. The majority's new 'underbreadth' theory lacks support in First Amendment jurisprudence and needlessly departs from established precedent. This revision of the categorical approach to First Amendment analysis is mischievous and will likely confuse lower courts. The case should have been decided on overbreadth grounds because the ordinance, even as narrowly construed, makes criminal expressive conduct that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment and is protected by the First Amendment.

Yes. The majority's decision is regrettable and will serve either as precedent to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws or will be regarded as an aberration. By deciding that a State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates speech that does not, the Court seems to abandon the categorical approach and inevitably reduce across-the-board protection for speech. The case could have been resolved under settled First Amendment principles, as the ordinance is invalid because it criminalizes protected speech that causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment.

The St. Paul ordinance (as construed by the Court) regulates expressive activity that is wholly proseribable and does so not on the basis of viewpoint, but rather in recognition of the different harms caused by such activity. Taken together, these several considerations persuade me that the St. Paul ordinance is not an unconstitutional content-based regulation of speech. Thus, were the ordinance not over-broad, I would vote to uphold it.

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota

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