Quisenberry v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.
296 Va. 233, 818 S.E.2d 805 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
An employer owes a duty of care to an employee's family member who is harmed by take-home exposure to a hazardous substance from the employee's work clothes. This duty arises when the employer's conduct creates a recognizable risk of harm to a class of persons, such as household members, who are placed within a foreseeable zone of danger.
Facts:
- From approximately 1942 to 1977, Bennie Plessinger was employed by Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock ('the Shipyard').
- During his employment, Plessinger was routinely exposed to asbestos, causing asbestos dust to adhere to his work clothes and contaminate his car.
- Plessinger's daughter, Wanda Quisenberry, lived in his home and was exposed to the asbestos fibers he brought home.
- Beginning in 1954 and continuing until she moved out in 1969, Wanda regularly laundered her father's asbestos-covered work clothes, shaking them out and inhaling the dust.
- In the years of Wanda's exposure, the Shipyard allegedly knew or had reason to know of the dangers that asbestos posed to workers' family members.
- In 2013, Wanda Quisenberry was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma caused by asbestos exposure, and she later died from the disease.
Procedural Posture:
- Wesley Quisenberry, as administrator of Wanda Quisenberry's estate, filed a negligence action against Huntington Ingalls Inc. in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News (a state trial court).
- The Shipyard removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (a federal trial court).
- In the federal district court, the Shipyard filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing Virginia law did not recognize a 'take-home' duty of care.
- The Shipyard then moved to certify the dispositive question of law to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
- The U.S. District Court granted the motion and certified the question to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
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Issue:
Does an employer owe a duty of care to an employee's family member who alleges exposure to asbestos from the work clothes of an employee, where the family member alleges the employer's negligence allowed asbestos fibers to be regularly transported away from the place of employment to the employee's home?
Opinions:
Majority - Senior Justice Millette
Yes. An employer owes a duty of care to an employee's family member harmed by take-home asbestos exposure because general negligence principles require a person to exercise due care to avoid injuring others who are foreseeably placed within reach of the person's conduct. A specific, pre-existing 'special relationship' is not required; the duty arises from the creation of a recognizable risk of harm to a class of persons, such as household members, within a 'given area of danger.' The fact that the harm occurred off-site is a 'distinction without a difference' because the hazard was mobile, and the employee was effectively a 'vehicle or carrier' for the asbestos dust created by the Shipyard. This decision does not create a new duty but applies long-standing common law principles to the specific facts alleged.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Lemons
No. The majority improperly expands the concept of duty to an undefined and potentially limitless class of plaintiffs, returning to an outdated concept of a 'duty owed to all the world.' This decision conflates the legal question of duty with the factual question of foreseeability, which is properly an element of proximate cause to be determined by a jury. Recognizing such a 'take-home' duty is a significant policy decision that should be made by the legislature, not the judiciary, as it undermines the careful balance of the Workers' Compensation Act and introduces instability into the Commonwealth's tort law.
Dissenting - Justice McClanahan
No. The majority misapplies precedent from landowner liability cases, like RGR, LLC v. Settle, which are inapplicable here because the plaintiff's claim arises from an employment context, not a condition on land. Even under the RGR analysis, the test requiring a 'sufficient juxtaposition of the parties in time and space' is not met, as Wanda was never in physical proximity to the Shipyard's property. The majority erroneously uses foreseeability of harm as the source of the duty, which directly contradicts established Virginia precedent that separates the legal analysis of duty from the factual analysis of foreseeability.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the scope of an employer's duty of care in Virginia to non-employees who are foreseeably harmed by workplace hazards that migrate beyond the physical premises. The court established that a duty can exist to a class of persons, such as household members, who are foreseeably placed in a 'zone of danger' by the employer's conduct, even without a direct relationship to the employer. This precedent opens the door for similar 'take-home' liability claims involving other toxic substances and may prompt the legislature to intervene and statutorily limit this judicially-recognized duty.
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