Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc.
748 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 18, 240 Ariz. 517, 382 P.3d 75 (2016)
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Rule of Law:
An employer does not owe a duty of care to an employee's family member who is harmed by secondary, or "take-home," exposure to hazardous substances carried from the workplace on the employee's clothing. In Arizona, such a duty does not arise from a special relationship or public policy considerations.
Facts:
- From 1952 to 1966, Ernest V. Quiroz lived in a house with his father.
- During this time, his father was an employee of Reynolds Metal Company (Reynolds).
- Quiroz's father was allegedly exposed to asbestos at his job, which contaminated his work clothes, tools, and car with asbestos fibers.
- Quiroz alleged he was exposed to these asbestos fibers through direct and indirect contact with his father's contaminated clothing and surroundings at home.
- In 2013, Quiroz was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a form of cancer frequently associated with asbestos exposure.
- Quiroz passed away from the disease in 2014.
Procedural Posture:
- Ernest and Mary Quiroz (Plaintiffs) filed a negligence lawsuit against Reynolds Metal Company (Defendant) in the Maricopa County Superior Court, which serves as the trial court.
- After Ernest Quiroz passed away, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for wrongful death.
- Reynolds moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not owe a duty of care to Dr. Quiroz.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Reynolds, finding no duty of care existed as a matter of law.
- The Quirozes (Appellants) appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Arizona Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does an employer owe a duty of care to an employee's child who contracts mesothelioma from asbestos fibers carried home on the employee's work clothes?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Thompson
No. An employer does not owe a duty of care to an employee's child for take-home asbestos exposure. In Arizona, a duty arises either from a special relationship between the parties or from public policy, and neither exists here. The court found no special or categorical relationship between Reynolds and Dr. Quiroz, viewing them as 'legal strangers.' The court declined to adopt Restatement (Third) § 54 or Restatement (Second) § 371 to create a duty, as both are contrary to Arizona's established negligence framework. Section 54 is an application of a general duty of care Arizona has rejected, and Section 371 relies on foreseeability, which the Arizona Supreme Court in Gipson v. Kasey explicitly removed from the duty analysis. Furthermore, public policy considerations weigh against creating a new duty, as it would lead to a proliferation of claims from an indeterminate class of plaintiffs and create unlimited, 'insurer-like' liability. The court distinguished out-of-state cases that found a duty, noting they were based on a foreseeability analysis that Arizona law does not use.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Arizona's strict adherence to the principle established in Gipson v. Kasey that foreseeability is not a factor in determining the existence of a legal duty. By declining to extend an employer's duty to non-employees harmed by off-premises, take-home exposure, the court set a clear precedent limiting the scope of tort liability in Arizona. This ruling acts as a significant barrier for future plaintiffs in similar secondary exposure cases involving workplace toxins, reinforcing the court's role as a gatekeeper to prevent the 'proliferation of claims' and the expansion of liability to indeterminate classes of people.
