Quinn v. Turner
155 Ariz. 225, 1987 Ariz. App. LEXIS 501, 745 P.2d 972 (1987)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress if they were within the zone of danger of physical impact and suffered emotional distress that manifested in physical symptoms. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to have been physically impacted or to have witnessed an injury to a close relative.
Facts:
- Three-year-old Courtney Quinn was standing with his mother next to their parked car.
- A car driven and owned by the defendants struck the Quinn's car broadside, just a foot or two from where Courtney and his mother were standing.
- The crash produced a loud noise and knocked the Quinn's car a significant distance.
- Neither Courtney nor his mother was physically hit or touched by either vehicle during the incident.
- Following the accident, Courtney displayed behavioral changes, including fear of being alone, fear of school, and acting out physically against his sister.
- He also developed physical symptoms, including grinding his teeth at night and bedwetting, for which he received psychological and dental treatment.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary E. Quinn, acting as next best friend for her son Courtney Quinn, filed a lawsuit against the driver and owners of the other vehicle in an Arizona trial court.
- The plaintiff claimed damages for personal injuries resulting from fright and shock.
- The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no valid cause of action existed under the facts.
- The trial court judge granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case.
- The plaintiff, as appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to this intermediate court of appeals.
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Issue:
Does a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress exist when a plaintiff, who was in the zone of danger, suffers emotional distress with physical manifestations due to a threat to their own safety, but does not suffer a physical impact and does not witness an injury to another person?
Opinions:
Majority - Kleinschmidt, J.
Yes, a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress exists where the plaintiff's shock or mental anguish develops solely from a threat to the plaintiff’s personal security. The court held that the requirement to witness an injury to a close relative, established in Keck v. Jackson, applies only to bystander liability cases and is not a general limitation on the tort. For a direct victim, the proper test requires only that the plaintiff was within the 'zone of danger' and that their emotional distress resulted in physical manifestations. The court explicitly rejected the need for a direct physical impact, noting that the physical manifestation of emotional distress serves as a sufficient guarantee against fraudulent claims. This approach aligns with the majority of jurisdictions and the principles outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 313 and 436.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) in Arizona by formally distinguishing between 'direct victim' and 'bystander' claims. It establishes that a plaintiff can recover for purely emotional injuries that have physical manifestations based on a reasonable fear for their own safety, even without any physical impact. This holding lowers the barrier for plaintiffs who are nearly harmed by a defendant's negligence and suffer genuine psychological and physical consequences, bringing Arizona law in line with the modern trend and the Restatement. Future NIED cases involving direct victims will focus on proving the plaintiff was genuinely in the zone of danger and that their physical symptoms are a direct result of the emotional trauma.
