Quick v. City of Austin
7 S.W.3d 109, 1999 Tex. LEXIS 110, 42 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1217 (1999)
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Rule of Law:
Municipal legislative acts, such as water pollution control ordinances enacted by home-rule cities, are presumed valid and subject to a deferential judicial review standard, not a de novo review, and are effective without state agency pre-approval unless explicitly required by statute; moreover, such ordinances are generally proper subjects for citizen initiative if not clearly precluded by the city charter.
Facts:
- A group of Austin citizens, concerned about the protection of Barton Springs, initiated the Save Our Springs Ordinance and placed it on a municipal ballot.
- In August 1992, Austin voters overwhelmingly approved the Save Our Springs Ordinance in a local referendum election.
- Two days after voter approval, the Austin City Council enacted the Ordinance, which aimed to ensure water quality control in Barton Creek, Barton Springs, and the Barton Springs Edwards Aquifer by limiting impervious cover on land, requiring new developments not to increase pollution, and prohibiting construction in critical water quality zones.
- Jerry J. Quick, Kaira G. Quick, John M. Bryant, Ruth E. Bryant, Joe Cox, Dolores Cox, Florence Turck, and Circle C Land Corporation (Petitioners) owned land within Austin's extraterritorial jurisdiction, meaning any development on their property had to comply with the new Ordinance.
- Petitioners presented evidence that the Ordinance would significantly decrease property values (estimated $229-$379 million) and was practically impossible to comply with due to requirements for runoff water to be purer than natural rainfall.
- The City of Austin presented counter-evidence, including testimony that the Ordinance was more efficient than prior measures, that prior ordinances were ineffective due to excessive variances, that compliance was possible and profitable for some developers, and that its impervious cover limitations are a nationally recognized method for water quality protection.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners (landowners) sued the City of Austin in Hays County (trial court) seeking a declaratory judgment that the Save Our Springs Ordinance was void and challenging it under Texas Water Code section 26.177(d).
- Save Our Springs Alliance, Inc. moved to intervene in the suit, but the trial court struck its plea for intervention.
- The case was tried to a jury, which found the Ordinance to be unreasonable, arbitrary, inefficient, not a proper subject for initiative/referendum, and in violation of Texas Local Government Code section 212.003.
- Based on the jury's findings, the trial court rendered judgment for the Petitioners, declaring the Ordinance null and void, and concluding it was ineffective without Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission approval and void for lack of public hearing (violating Local Government Code section 212.002).
- The trial court also ruled that any permits for Petitioner Circle C Land Corporation would be subject to the law in effect when the original application for preliminary subdivision approval was filed, which pre-dated the Ordinance in some instances.
- The City of Austin appealed the trial court's judgment to the court of appeals (intermediate appellate court).
- The court of appeals reversed and rendered in part and modified in part the trial court’s judgment, finding the Ordinance valid; it upheld the striking of the Alliance's intervention, concluded Water Code section 26.177(d) was unconstitutional, and held the Ordinance was legally enacted (not requiring TRNCC approval, not subject to Local Government Code sections 212.002/212.003, and proper for initiative/referendum).
- The court of appeals modified the trial court's ruling on Circle C's permits, holding that permits would be considered under regulations in effect when original applications were filed, but only if filed after September 1, 1987.
- Petitioners filed an application for writ of error with the Supreme Court of Texas, challenging the court of appeals' judgment.
- The Save Our Springs Alliance also filed its own application for writ of error, challenging the court of appeals' affirmation of the striking of its intervention.
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Issue:
Is the City of Austin's Save Our Springs Ordinance, a water pollution control measure, invalid because (1) a state statute unconstitutionally allowed de novo judicial review, (2) it violated state local government code provisions regarding public hearings or extraterritorial zoning, (3) it lacked state commission approval, or (4) it was an improper subject for direct citizen initiative?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Abbott
No, the City of Austin's Save Our Springs Ordinance is not invalid on any of the grounds presented. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment upholding the Ordinance's validity. First, Section 26.177(d) of the Texas Water Code, which allows judicial review of water pollution control ordinances, does not violate the separation of powers doctrine by mandating a de novo review. The court must interpret statutes to avoid constitutional infirmities. While the Texas Constitution prohibits de novo judicial review of legislative functions, Section 26.177(d) uses terms like "unreasonable" and "arbitrary," which connote a deferential standard of review for city ordinances. Under this standard, an ordinance is presumed valid, and the challenger bears an "extraordinary burden" to show that no reasonable minds could differ on its invalidity. The inclusion of "inefficient" and "ineffective" does not change this deferential standard, nor does the power to "modify" an ordinance, which allows for severing invalid portions. Applying this deferential standard, the Petitioners failed to meet their burden to prove the Ordinance was invalid, arbitrary, unreasonable, inefficient, or ineffective, given the conflicting evidence on its necessity, feasibility of compliance, and the city's rational relation to its goal of protecting water quality. Potential claims of unconstitutional takings are a separate legal matter not addressed in this suit. Second, the Ordinance is not invalid under sections 212.002 and 212.003 of the Texas Local Government Code. These sections, requiring public hearings and limiting extraterritorial regulation of building use, bulk, height, or number, apply specifically to zoning statutes, not water pollution control measures. The legislative history of these sections confirms they were not intended to affect a municipality's ability to apply water control requirements. The Ordinance's primary goal is water quality protection, and its impervious cover limitations, while affecting land use, are a recognized method of achieving that goal, making it a water control measure rather than a zoning regulation. Third, the Ordinance is effective without pre-approval from the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, as required by Water Code section 26.177(c). As a home-rule city, Austin's ordinances are effective under its city charter unless the Legislature limits this authority with "unmistakable clarity." Section 26.177(c) requires programs to be submitted for "review and approval" but is silent on whether they are effective pending approval. The Legislature has explicitly required pre-approval in other Water Code sections, demonstrating its ability to do so when intended. This omission, combined with legislative history indicating an information-gathering purpose and the Commission's own interpretation, shows that pre-approval is not a prerequisite for effectiveness. Fourth, the Ordinance was a proper subject for the initiative and referendum process under Austin's city charter. Charter provisions are liberally construed in favor of direct legislation, and limitations must be "clear and compelling." The charter's provisions for a comprehensive plan and planning commission review of land development do not clearly and compellingly withdraw water pollution regulations from citizen initiatives; these powers can coexist. Finally, the court dismisses Circle C's challenge regarding the court of appeals' modification of the trial court's judgment concerning the application of former Section 481.143 of the Government Code. This statute, which would have locked in regulations at the time of initial permit application, was repealed while the case was pending without a savings clause for pending litigation. Therefore, the Supreme Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review claims based on its prior effect. However, the portion of the court of appeals' judgment that was not challenged on this point (that permits filed after September 1, 1987, were covered by 481.143) stands as final relief.
Concurring - Justice Enoch
Yes, I join the Court’s opinion and judgment. However, I write separately to express a concern regarding the potential disenfranchisement of citizens in Austin’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Legislature's grant of authority to Austin to control land use outside its boundaries allows Austin citizens to impose land use restrictions on residents of neighboring communities who cannot vote on these measures. This situation may very well violate the “one man, one vote” principle inherent in the right to participate in the political process, as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the U.S. Supreme Court in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa upheld extraterritorial jurisdiction, that case involved substantial municipal benefits (like police/fire protection) for the affected residents, which is not clearly present here. Moreover, Holt indicated that broader powers could raise constitutional issues. Although the Petitioners did not properly brief this issue, it remains a serious question that warrants consideration.
Dissenting - Justice Hankinson
No, I dissent from the Court’s impermissible and unnecessary retroactive application of Texas Government Code Section 481.143. Statutes are strongly presumed to apply prospectively unless "expressly made retroactive," as codified in Texas Government Code § 311.022. The Court's interpretation of the 1987 version of Section 481.143 to apply to permit applications originally filed in 1985 creates an unconstitutional retroactive effect. Before 481.143, permit applications were subject to intervening ordinances, including those related to public safety. The Court's reading changes the legal consequences of past acts, making ordinances passed over many years ineffective for existing projects. The Legislature specifically amended Section 481.143 in 1995 to expressly apply to projects "in progress on or commenced after" September 1, 1987, which demonstrates that the 1987 version was not intended to be retroactive. Ignoring the Code Construction Act and creating a retroactive effect without clear legislative intent is tantamount to legislating and carries unknown implications given the statute's broad scope. Therefore, I would hold that Section 481.143 only applied to initial permits filed after its effective date of September 1, 1987.
Analysis:
This case is highly significant for Texas local government law, particularly concerning the extent of home-rule cities' powers and the standard for judicial review of municipal ordinances. It solidifies the principle that courts must defer to local legislative judgments on matters of public health and welfare, limiting judicial interference to situations where ordinances are clearly arbitrary or irrational. The ruling also clarifies that state agency approval is not a prerequisite for municipal ordinance effectiveness unless explicitly and unmistakably required by state statute, reinforcing the autonomy of home-rule cities. The dissent, while not prevailing, highlights an important statutory interpretation principle regarding the presumption against retroactive laws, emphasizing the judiciary's role in upholding legislative intent.
