Putterman v. Putterman
1997 Nev. LEXIS 64, 113 Nev. 606, 939 P.2d 1047 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
Under Nevada Revised Statute 125.150, a court must divide community property equally unless there is a 'compelling reason' for an unequal division. Compelling reasons are limited to instances of financial misconduct, such as wasting assets, hiding finances, or lying to the court, and do not include general equitable factors like one spouse having contributed more to the community during the marriage.
Facts:
- During their marriage, Barbara Putterman was the principal acquirer of the community property, while her husband, Mitchell Putterman, was 'less of a contributing member.'
- Barbara Putterman, through her employment at a closely-held corporation, was able to purchase stock in the company.
- After the parties separated, Mitchell Putterman charged several thousand dollars on community credit cards, which Barbara Putterman later paid.
- During the divorce proceedings, Mitchell Putterman refused to provide an accounting to the court for the finances under his control, including his earnings.
- Mitchell Putterman lied to the family court, claiming he had no income.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Putterman initiated a divorce action against Mitchell Putterman in a Nevada family court (the trial court).
- The family court entered a decree of divorce and divided the community property unequally, awarding a greater share to Barbara Putterman.
- Mitchell Putterman, as appellant, appealed the family court's property division to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
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Issue:
Under Nevada Revised Statute 125.150, which mandates an equal division of community property absent a 'compelling reason,' can an unequal division be justified by general equitable considerations like one spouse contributing more to the community, or are 'compelling reasons' limited to specific instances of financial misconduct?
Opinions:
Majority - Springer, J.
No, an unequal division cannot be justified by general equitable considerations, but it is permissible where compelling reasons in the form of specific financial misconduct exist. The court first held that the trial court erred by applying a 'fair and equitable' standard and considering which party acquired the property, as the 1993 amendment to NRS 125.150 explicitly requires an 'equal' disposition and removed such equitable factors. Retrospective accounting of who contributed more during the marriage is not a 'compelling reason' for an unequal split. However, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment because its factual findings revealed other, valid compelling reasons. These reasons included Mitchell Putterman's financial misconduct: refusing to account for his finances, lying to the court about his income, and misappropriating community credit for personal use after separation. The court reasoned that this type of misconduct—akin to wasting or hiding assets as discussed in 'Lofgren v. Lofgren'—constitutes a 'compelling reason' justifying a departure from a strictly equal division of property.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the 'compelling reasons' exception to Nevada's default rule of equal community property division. It firmly establishes that the exception is narrow and fault-based, rather than a broad license for judges to pursue general fairness. By rejecting 'who contributed more' as a valid reason, the court reinforces the principle of marriage as a shared enterprise and shifts the focus to punishing and remedying specific financial misconduct related to the divorce process. This precedent constrains trial court discretion, forcing a more rigorous, evidence-based inquiry into actions like hiding assets or lying to the court, rather than subjective evaluations of marital contributions.
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