Purkett v. Elem
514 U.S. 765 (1995)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Batson framework for challenging peremptory strikes, the proponent's race-neutral explanation at step two does not need to be persuasive or even plausible. Any facially valid reason not inherently based on race is sufficient to shift the burden to the opponent of the strike to prove purposeful discrimination at step three.
Facts:
- In a Missouri state court, Jimmy Elem was tried for second-degree robbery.
- During the jury selection process, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to remove two prospective black jurors from the panel.
- The prosecutor stated his reason for striking juror #22 was his 'long, unkempt hair' and a 'mustache and a goatee type beard.'
- The prosecutor's reason for striking juror #24 was also his 'mustache and goatee type beard.'
- The prosecutor added a general comment about both jurors: 'I don’t like the way they looked... And the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me.'
- The prosecutor gave an additional reason for striking juror #24: because he had previously been the victim of a robbery involving a shotgun, the prosecutor feared he would expect a gun in the present case, which did not involve one.
Procedural Posture:
- Elem was convicted of second-degree robbery in a Missouri state trial court after his Batson objection to the striking of two black jurors was overruled.
- The Missouri Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the conviction, finding the prosecutor's explanation was a 'legitimate 'hunch.''
- Elem filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.
- The District Court denied the petition, concluding the state court's finding of no purposeful discrimination was entitled to a presumption of correctness.
- Elem, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, with Purkett (the prison superintendent) as appellee.
- The Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that the prosecutor's explanation for striking one of the jurors was pretextual and not a legitimate, race-neutral reason.
- Purkett petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory strike have to be persuasive, plausible, and related to the case to satisfy the second step of a Batson analysis, or is any facially race-neutral reason sufficient?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A prosecutor's proffered reason for a peremptory strike is sufficient at the second step of the Batson inquiry as long as it is race-neutral on its face and does not need to be persuasive or even plausible. The Court clarified the three-step Batson process: (1) the opponent makes a prima facie case of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent offers a race-neutral explanation; and (3) the trial court determines if the opponent has proven purposeful discrimination. The Court of Appeals erred by collapsing steps two and three, requiring the step-two explanation to be 'plausible.' The persuasiveness of the justification is only evaluated at step three, where the trial judge assesses the prosecutor's credibility. An implausible or 'silly or superstitious' reason is permissible at step two; the trial court may then find it to be pretextual at step three. The prosecutor's reasons here—long hair and facial hair—are not characteristics peculiar to any race and are therefore facially race-neutral, satisfying step two.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. A prosecutor’s explanation must be more than merely facially neutral; as established in Batson, it must be 'related to the particular case to be tried.' The majority's decision effectively overrules this part of Batson without full briefing or argument. By allowing any 'implausible or fantastic' or 'silly or superstitious' explanation to suffice at step two, the Court renders that step a meaningless charade and makes it too easy for prosecutors to conceal discriminatory motives. An explanation that a juror has a beard or long hair is just as evasive as a prohibited 'hunch' and is insufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. This ruling demeans the values protected by Batson and makes meaningful appellate review of such claims nearly impossible.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies, and arguably weakens, the second step of the Batson framework. By holding that any facially neutral reason, regardless of its plausibility or relevance, is sufficient to defeat a prima facie case, the Court shifts the primary focus of the inquiry to step three. This places a greater burden on the opponent of the strike to prove the prosecutor's subjective discriminatory intent, often without direct evidence. The ruling gives trial courts broad discretion to accept seemingly arbitrary justifications, potentially making it more difficult to successfully challenge peremptory strikes that may be rooted in racial bias.
