Pueblo of Jemez v. United States
350 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (2018)
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Rule of Law:
Evidence of land use by other Indian tribes and substantial interference by non-Indian settlers with traditional uses after 1848 is relevant to determining the establishment or extinguishment of aboriginal title, as aboriginal title requires continuous and exclusive use and may be gradually extinguished by authorized non-Indian settlement and governmental actions.
Facts:
- The ancestral Jemez people have used and occupied the Valles Caldera National Preserve and surrounding Jemez Mountains in New Mexico since at least 1200 CE, using it for agriculture, sacred areas, ceremonial sites, hunting, gathering, and critical resources.
- In 1848, the United States acquired the territory of New Mexico, including the Valles Caldera, through the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, agreeing to respect pre-existing property rights.
- In 1860, Congress passed an Act authorizing the Baca heirs to select 'vacant land' in New Mexico; the Baca heirs selected 'Baca location No. 1,' encompassing approximately 99,289 acres in and adjacent to the Valles Caldera, and began using it primarily for grazing.
- The Jemez Pueblo alleges that Baca location No. 1 was exclusively possessed and used by them in 1860 and that the Baca heirs took title subject to the Pueblo's continuing aboriginal title, with no opposition or interference from the Baca family.
- In 1946, Congress enacted the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA) to resolve Indian claims against the United States, which included a five-year statute of limitations for pre-1946 claims.
- In 2000, Congress passed the Valles Caldera Preservation Act, authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to purchase the 94,761-acre ranch on Baca Location No. 1 from the Dunnigan family (successors to the Baca heirs) to create the Valles Caldera National Preserve.
Procedural Posture:
- In 2012, Jemez Pueblo filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico against the United States under federal common law and the Quiet Title Act, seeking a judgment for exclusive right to the Valles Caldera National Preserve based on continuing aboriginal title.
- The United States filed a motion to dismiss Jemez Pueblo's complaint.
- The U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico (Judge Robert C. Brack) granted the United States' motion to dismiss, holding that the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA) barred the claim because it accrued before 1946 and Jemez Pueblo's sole remedy was through the ICC.
- Jemez Pueblo appealed the district court's dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
- The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that the 1860 land grant to the Baca heirs did not automatically extinguish aboriginal title and remanded the case to the district court for factual determination of whether Jemez Pueblo had, and still has, aboriginal title to the land.
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Issue:
Does evidence of land use by other Indian tribes or substantial interference by non-Indian settlers with traditional uses after 1848 constitute relevant evidence for determining the establishment or extinguishment of the Jemez Pueblo's aboriginal title to the Valles Caldera?
Opinions:
Majority - James O. Browning
Yes, evidence of land use by other Indian tribes and substantial interference by non-Indian settlers after 1848 is relevant to determining the establishment or extinguishment of the Jemez Pueblo's aboriginal title to the Valles Caldera. The Tenth Circuit expressly instructed the District Court on remand to consider such evidence. To establish aboriginal title, the Jemez Pueblo must prove 'actual, exclusive, and continuous use and occupancy' for a long period of time. The 'exclusive' prong of this test, as clarified by the Tenth Circuit, means exclusion of other Indian groups, making evidence of other tribes' use of the Valles Caldera after 1848 relevant. Furthermore, for the 'actual and continuous use' requirement, the Pueblo must demonstrate continuous use for traditional purposes without substantial interference by others before 1946. The Tenth Circuit cited cases such as United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, suggesting that aboriginal title can be gradually extinguished by 'white settlement and use, authorized by the federal government,' even without explicit Congressional intent. The court identified five factors that could support a finding of such a 'gradual taking' by implied Congressional action. Dr. Kehoe's expert report, which details the use of the Valles Caldera by various Pueblos and the restrictions imposed during private ownership, contains relevant evidence under these directives. While the court expresses discomfort with the 'gradual taking' theory and would prefer a standard requiring 'plain and unambiguous Congressional intent' to extinguish aboriginal title, it is bound by the Tenth Circuit's mandate to consider evidence of substantial interference as relevant to extinguishment.
Analysis:
This case underscores the complex and often contradictory nature of aboriginal title law, particularly the tension between the Supreme Court's 'plain and unambiguous' extinguishment standard and lower courts' recognition of 'gradual taking' theories. The ruling means that proving aboriginal title is not merely about historical use but also about ongoing exclusivity against other tribes and the absence of significant, government-authorized interference by non-Indians over time. It signals that future cases involving aboriginal title will likely require extensive factual development regarding historical land use by all parties and governmental actions, pushing litigation beyond strict statutory interpretation to a broader historical inquiry into possession and control. This approach could make it more challenging for tribes to assert unextinguished aboriginal title if historical records show shared use or government-sanctioned encroachment.
