PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins
(1980)
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Rule of Law:
A state may interpret its own constitution to provide broader free speech rights than those conferred by the U.S. Constitution, including requiring owners of large, privately-owned shopping centers to permit individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on their property, so long as the restriction does not amount to an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment or violate the owner's First Amendment rights.
Facts:
- PruneYard, a large, privately-owned shopping center covering approximately 21 acres in Campbell, California, was open to the public for commercial purposes.
- The PruneYard had a strict, non-discriminatory policy prohibiting any visitor or tenant from engaging in publicly expressive activity, including circulating petitions, not directly related to its commercial purposes.
- A group of high school students, appellees, set up a card table in a corner of PruneYard's central courtyard to solicit signatures for petitions opposing a United Nations resolution.
- The students' activity was peaceful, orderly, and did not appear to generate objections from PruneYard's patrons.
- A PruneYard security guard informed the students that they had to leave because their activity violated the shopping center's regulations.
- The students immediately complied with the guard's request and left the premises.
Procedural Posture:
- The students (appellees) filed a lawsuit in the California Superior Court of Santa Clara County seeking to enjoin the PruneYard Shopping Center from denying them access.
- The Superior Court (trial court) held that the students were not entitled to exercise their asserted rights on the shopping center property.
- The students appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed the trial court's decision.
- The students then appealed to the California Supreme Court.
- The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the California Constitution protects speech and petitioning in privately owned shopping centers.
- The PruneYard Shopping Center and its owner, Fred Sahadi (appellants), appealed the California Supreme Court's decision to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a state constitutional provision, which permits individuals to exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center, violate the shopping center owner’s property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No. A state's interpretation of its own constitution to protect speech and petitioning in a privately owned shopping center does not violate the owner's federal constitutional rights. The court's reasoning has three parts. First, this state requirement is not a 'taking' of property without just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. While the 'right to exclude' is a fundamental stick in the bundle of property rights, its limitation here does not unreasonably impair the value or use of the property as a shopping center, nor does it interfere with the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, especially since the owner can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Second, it does not violate due process because the state has a legitimate interest in promoting more expansive free speech rights. Third, it does not violate the owner's First Amendment right against compelled speech. Unlike cases like Wooley v. Maynard, the state is not dictating a specific message, the property is a large public commercial forum where the public's views are unlikely to be imputed to the owner, and the owner can post signs to disclaim any endorsement of the message.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Marshall
Yes, a state can permit such activity. While joining the majority, this opinion emphasizes that states are free to provide more expansive protections under their own constitutions and applauds this trend. It rejects the appellant's argument as a return to the Lochner era, where common law rights were seen as immune from legislative revision. The opinion argues that the common law of trespass can be modified by a state to adapt to modern circumstances, such as the shopping mall replacing the traditional town square. However, it notes there are limits to abolishing 'core' common-law rights, but this case, involving a large public space with minimal intrusion, does not approach that limit.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Mr. Justice White
No, on these facts, the owner's rights were not violated. This opinion concurs in the judgment but warns that the majority's First Amendment reasoning is overly broad. It argues that in different circumstances, forcing a property owner to host third-party speech could present serious First Amendment questions, especially if customers would likely identify the speech with the owner (e.g., in a small, freestanding store) or if the owner is forced to host messages they find morally repugnant. In such cases, the owner would be unconstitutionally compelled to either affirm or disavow a belief. However, in this specific case, given the vast and impersonal nature of the PruneYard, it is unlikely that the students' speech would be attributed to the owner, and thus no cognizable First Amendment harm was demonstrated.
Analysis:
This landmark decision solidifies the principle of independent state constitutionalism, affirming that states can serve as sources of individual rights protections that are broader than the floor established by the U.S. Constitution. It clarifies that while the First Amendment does not grant a right of access to private shopping centers for expressive activity (Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner), state constitutions can. This creates a dual-track system for rights, where the scope of free speech on private property can vary significantly from state to state, depending on the interpretation of each state's constitution. The case directs future legal challenges in this area toward state courts and state constitutional law, rather than relying solely on the First Amendment.
