Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park District
971 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2020) (2020)
Rule of Law:
Federal courts lack Article III standing to hear state law claims based on generalized grievances, even if such claims are recognized in state courts, and the public trust doctrine in Illinois does not create a private property interest protected by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Facts:
- In 2014, the Barack Obama Foundation initiated a nationwide search for the site of the future presidential library for the 44th President.
- The Foundation ultimately selected Jackson Park on Chicago’s South Side as the location for the Obama Presidential Center.
- The City of Chicago acquired 19.3 acres from the Chicago Park District for the Center.
- The City enacted ordinances to approve the Center's construction and entered into a use agreement with the Obama Foundation to govern its construction, ownership, and operation.
- Construction of the Center will necessitate the removal of mature trees, closure and diversion of roadways, and will require the City to incur significant expenses for site preparation, though the Foundation will bear the costs of building and operating the Center itself.
- Protect Our Parks, Inc., and several individual Chicago residents were unhappy with the project's environmental and financial impact.
- Plaintiffs alleged that the City negotiated with the Obama Foundation under the leadership of Mayor Rahm Emmanuel, who, as President Obama’s former chief of staff, was eager to give the Foundation a favorable deal.
- The plaintiffs did not allege that they use the affected area, or that the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened for them personally by the challenged activity.
Procedural Posture:
- Protect Our Parks, Inc., and Maria Valencia (plaintiffs) sued the City of Chicago and the Chicago Park District (defendants) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, alleging violations of Illinois's public trust doctrine, ultra vires actions under Illinois law, and violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the City and Park District on all four claims.
- The plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (first appeal).
- While the first appeal was pending, the federal government issued a provisional report regarding the project's potential environmental effects, prompting the plaintiffs to move for relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in the district court.
- The district court denied the plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion.
- The plaintiffs appealed the denial of their Rule 60(b) motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (second appeal).
- The Seventh Circuit consolidated the two appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
1. Does Article III standing permit plaintiffs to bring state law public trust and ultra vires claims in federal court based on a generalized grievance or a municipal taxpayer claim when the municipality's alleged illegal action is not funded by tax revenues? 2. Do members of the public possess a protected private property interest in public parkland, derived from the state's public trust doctrine, that is enforceable under the Takings Clause or Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Barrett, Circuit Judge
1. No, Article III standing does not permit plaintiffs to bring state law public trust and ultra vires claims in federal court based on a generalized grievance or an unsubstantiated municipal taxpayer claim. The Court explained that Article III standing is a matter of federal law, requiring a concrete and particularized injury, and is not determined by state law standing rules, which may permit suits for generalized grievances. While Illinois courts might allow plaintiffs to sue under the public trust doctrine without showing 'special damage,' federal courts demand a 'separate concrete interest' and reject 'generalized grievances.' Plaintiffs did not allege the kind of concrete environmental injury recognized for Article III standing (e.g., lessened use or aesthetic value). The Court also rejected municipal taxpayer standing because plaintiffs failed to show that the City spent tax revenues on the allegedly illegal elements of the project (i.e., the construction and operation of the Center, which the Foundation funded), and the City's spending on site preparation (which was not challenged as illegal) was not definitively linked to tax dollars as opposed to other revenue sources. 2. No, members of the public do not possess a protected private property interest in public parkland, derived from the state's public trust doctrine, that is enforceable under the Takings Clause or Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court found that Illinois cases clearly establish that the public trust doctrine functions as a restraint on government action, not as an affirmative grant of private property rights to individuals. Even if such an interest were conferred, federal constitutional law determines if it rises to a 'legitimate claim of entitlement.' Regarding the Takings Clause claim, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, implying a challenge to the project's 'public use,' which is typically afforded deference to legislative judgment under Kelo v. City of New London. The court found it difficult to 'second-guess' the City's determination that the Center serves a public purpose. For the Due Process claim, plaintiffs failed to identify what greater process was due, as the City enacted four ordinances after multiple public hearings, and the Illinois General Assembly amended an act to authorize such centers, providing sufficient legislative determination.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the strict application of federal Article III standing, particularly in relation to state law doctrines. It reinforces that state-level justiciability rules do not automatically satisfy federal standing requirements, emphasizing the need for a concrete and particularized injury in federal court. Furthermore, it firmly establishes that the public trust doctrine, at least under Illinois law, serves as a governmental restraint rather than conferring individual property rights protectable under the U.S. Constitution, which will make it challenging for future plaintiffs to use this doctrine as a basis for federal constitutional claims against public land use changes.
