Procanik v. Cillo
478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984) 97 N.J. 339 (1984) (1984)
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Rule of Law:
An infant plaintiff in a wrongful life action may recover special damages for the extraordinary medical expenses attributable to his affliction, but may not recover general damages for pain and suffering or an impaired childhood.
Facts:
- During the first trimester of her pregnancy with her son, Peter, Rosemary Procanik consulted with her obstetricians, Drs. Cilio, Langer, and Greenberg.
- On June 9, 1977, Mrs. Procanik informed Dr. Cilio that she had recently been diagnosed with measles and was concerned it might be German measles (rubella).
- Dr. Cilio ordered a rubella titer test, the results of which were 'indicative of past infection of Rubella.'
- Dr. Cilio negligently misinterpreted the results as showing immunity and told Mrs. Procanik she had nothing to worry about, when in fact the test indicated a current infection.
- Relying on this incorrect medical advice, Mrs. Procanik continued her pregnancy.
- Peter Procanik was born on December 26, 1977, and was subsequently diagnosed with congenital rubella syndrome.
- As a result of the syndrome, Peter was born with multiple severe birth defects, including eye lesions, heart disease, and auditory defects.
Procedural Posture:
- The infant plaintiff, Peter Procanik, and his parents sued the defendant doctors in the New Jersey Law Division (trial court).
- The defendant doctors filed a motion to dismiss the infant's 'wrongful life' claim for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.
- The Law Division granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the infant's claim.
- The trial court also ruled that the parents' separate claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
- The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the infant's claim to the Appellate Division (intermediate appellate court).
- The Appellate Division affirmed the Law Division's judgment.
- The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which granted certification.
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Issue:
In a 'wrongful life' action, may an infant plaintiff recover damages for his pain and suffering, impaired childhood, and the extraordinary medical expenses he will incur due to his birth defects?
Opinions:
Majority - Pollock, J.
No as to general damages, but yes as to special damages. An infant plaintiff in a wrongful life action may recover special damages for the extraordinary medical expenses attributable to his affliction, but not general damages for emotional distress or for an impaired childhood. The court found that calculating general damages for pain and suffering would require a jury to compare the value of an impaired life with non-existence, a task that is speculative, irrational, and beyond the competence of the judicial system. However, extraordinary medical expenses are a readily calculable and certain form of damages. Permitting recovery for these special damages is not premised on the idea that non-life is preferable, but on the practical needs of the living child to bear the financial burden of his affliction. The right to recover these crushing expenses should not depend on the 'wholly fortuitous circumstance' of whether the parents' own claim is still valid.
Dissenting - Schreiber, J.
No. An infant plaintiff should not be able to recover any damages in a 'wrongful life' action. The majority correctly acknowledges that a child has no valid claim for general damages because it is impossible to know whether non-existence is preferable to an impaired life. If the underlying cause of action for being 'wrongfully born' is invalid for general damages, it is illogical and unjust to then allow a recovery for special damages. The defendant doctors did not proximately cause the infant's birth defects; they merely failed to provide information that would have led to the termination of the pregnancy. To charge a defendant for damages they did not cause violates the fundamental principles of tort law.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Handler, J.
Yes. An infant plaintiff should be able to recover not only special damages for medical expenses but also general damages for an impaired childhood and pain and suffering. The majority is wrong to deny a full recovery for the infant. The cognizable injury is not the affliction itself, but the 'diminished childhood' that results from being born to parents who were deprived of a choice and are thus less equipped to cope. The court need not decide if non-existence is preferable to life; it need only recognize that the wrongful deprivation of the parents' right to make that choice on the child's behalf is a tort that injures the child. Damages for such an injury are difficult to measure but are no more speculative than other damages routinely awarded in tort cases, and to deny them is a 'perversion of fundamental principles of justice.'
Analysis:
This case marked a significant evolution in 'wrongful life' jurisprudence by creating a split-recovery rule, allowing special damages while denying general damages for the infant plaintiff. This pragmatic approach addressed the injustice of leaving a child without financial means for care when the parents' own claim was barred, as it was here by the statute of limitations. The decision grounds the infant's recovery in concrete, calculable expenses, thereby avoiding the profound philosophical dilemma of valuing an impaired life against non-existence. While creating a legal fiction by finding a cognizable injury for special damages but not for general damages, the ruling provided an influential, equitable solution that balanced traditional tort principles with the need for just compensation.
