Prince v. Massachusetts
321 U.S. 158 (1944)
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Rule of Law:
A state's interest in protecting the welfare of children through child labor laws outweighs a parent's and a child's First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion when the religious practice involves children engaging in commercial or proselytizing activities in public places.
Facts:
- Sarah Prince was the legal custodian of her nine-year-old niece, Betty Simmons.
- Prince and Simmons were both Jehovah's Witnesses and considered themselves ordained ministers.
- As part of their religious practice, Prince would take Simmons onto the public streets of Brockton, Massachusetts, to distribute religious magazines such as 'Watchtower' and 'Consolation'.
- On the evening of December 18, 1941, Prince took Simmons to a downtown street corner where Simmons held up the magazines for passers-by.
- Simmons wore a canvas bag with the text 'Watchtower and Consolation 5¢ per copy' printed on it.
- Though Simmons received no money that particular evening, she had received funds for magazines on prior occasions.
- Prince had previously been warned by a school attendance officer against having the child engage in this activity.
- When confronted that evening, Prince asserted that the child was exercising her 'God-given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel.'
Procedural Posture:
- Sarah Prince was charged with violating Massachusetts child labor laws in the District Court of Brockton.
- After being convicted in the District Court, Prince appealed and received a new trial (trial de novo) in the Superior Court for Plymouth County, where she was again convicted.
- Prince, the appellant, then appealed the convictions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court reversed one conviction on state constitutional grounds but affirmed the two convictions at issue related to furnishing magazines for sale and permitting a minor to work.
- Prince then appealed the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the application of a state child labor law, which prohibits minors from selling merchandise in public places, to a guardian who permits her nine-year-old ward to distribute religious literature on a public street, violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Rutledge
No. The application of the Massachusetts child labor law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The state's authority to regulate the activities of children for their welfare is broader than its authority over adults. While parents possess a fundamental right to direct the religious upbringing of their children, this right is not absolute and does not include the liberty to expose a child to the potential harms of public proselytizing. The Court reasoned that the state, acting as 'parens patriae,' has a compelling interest in protecting children from the 'crippling effects of child employment' and the 'diverse influences of the street.' Citing precedents that allow states to mandate vaccination and school attendance over religious objections, the Court held that a parent's right to practice religion does not extend to making 'martyrs' of their children before they reach the age of legal discretion.
Dissenting - Justice Murphy
Yes. The application of the statute unconstitutionally infringes on the child's religious freedom. The child was engaged in a genuine act of missionary evangelism, not a commercial enterprise. When a law restricts a fundamental freedom like religion, the state bears the heavy burden of proving that the activity constitutes a 'grave and immediate danger' to the state or the child's welfare. Massachusetts failed to provide any evidence that the child's orderly and supervised religious activity posed such a danger. The dissent argued that the majority's reasoning relies on vague possibilities of harm and that the law was being used as an instrument of oppression against an unpopular religious minority.
Dissenting - Justice Jackson
No. Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment that the conviction should be affirmed but dissented from the majority's reasoning. He argued that the Court's distinction should not be based on age, but on the nature of the activity. Religious activities that are private or concern only members of the faith are nearly absolutely free from state regulation. However, when a religious group engages in secular, public activities like soliciting funds or selling literature to the general public, those activities are 'Caesar's affairs' and may be regulated by the state, so long as the regulation is non-discriminatory. He believed the majority's age-based rationale created a dangerous precedent for state intervention in the religious indoctrination of children.
Analysis:
This decision firmly establishes the principle that the state's 'parens patriae' power can justify restrictions on a child's religious activities that would be unconstitutional if applied to adults. It subordinates parental and child religious freedom to the state's compelling interest in protecting child welfare. The case creates a significant precedent for state intervention in family and religious matters, serving as a cornerstone for legal arguments in subsequent cases involving conflicts between parental rights and state child protection laws, such as those concerning compulsory education and medical treatment for minors.
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