Prigg v. Pennsylvania
16 Pet. 539 (1842)
Rule of Law:
The power to legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves is exclusive to the U.S. Congress, and any state law that interferes with, qualifies, or adds to the rights of slave owners to reclaim fugitive slaves under the U.S. Constitution is unconstitutional and void.
Facts:
- Margaret Morgan was held as a slave for life in Maryland under the ownership of Margaret Ashmore.
- In 1832, Morgan escaped from Maryland and fled to Pennsylvania.
- While living in Pennsylvania, Morgan had several children, including one born more than a year after her escape.
- In 1837, Edward Prigg was legally constituted as the agent and attorney for Ashmore to secure Morgan's return.
- Prigg, with the help of a state constable, apprehended Morgan in Pennsylvania under a warrant from a local magistrate.
- The Pennsylvania magistrate, after Morgan was brought before him, refused to take any further cognizance of the case.
- Following the magistrate's refusal, Prigg forcibly removed Morgan and her children from Pennsylvania and delivered them to Ashmore in Maryland.
Procedural Posture:
- Edward Prigg was indicted for violating a Pennsylvania anti-kidnapping statute in the Court of Oyer and Terminer for York County.
- At trial, the jury found a special verdict, establishing the facts of the case but leaving the determination of guilt to the court.
- The Court of Oyer and Terminer, the trial court, entered a judgment of guilty against Prigg.
- Prigg appealed via a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's judgment on a pro forma basis to allow for an appeal.
- Prigg then brought a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a Pennsylvania statute that criminalizes the act of forcibly removing a Black person from the state for the purpose of enslavement violate the Fugitive Slave Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Story
Yes. The Pennsylvania statute is unconstitutional because the U.S. Constitution grants the federal government exclusive power to legislate on the subject of fugitive slaves. The Fugitive Slave Clause (Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3) creates a positive, unqualified constitutional right for a slave owner to recapture their slave in any state. While this right is partly self-executing, allowing an owner to seize a slave without violence, it requires legislation to be fully effective. To ensure uniform application and prevent hostile state action, the power to create such legislation rests exclusively with Congress. The federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 is a constitutional exercise of this power. Therefore, the Pennsylvania law, which punishes the very act of removal protected by the Constitution, directly obstructs this federal authority and is void.
Concurring - Chief Justice Taney
Yes. The Pennsylvania law is unconstitutional because it conflicts with a master's right to recapture a fugitive slave. While I agree the state law is void because it obstructs this constitutional right, I do not agree that Congress's power to legislate on this subject is exclusive. The Constitution prohibits states from impairing the right but does not prohibit them from passing laws to aid in the recovery of slaves. I believe states are not only permitted but are enjoined by duty to pass laws that protect and support the owner's right to his property.
Concurring - Justice Thompson
Yes. The judgment should be affirmed because the Pennsylvania law conflicts with the supreme federal law on the subject. However, I do not believe the power of Congress is exclusive. States should have concurrent power to legislate on this matter, especially in the absence of federal legislation. If Congress were to repeal the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, state laws designed to enforce the constitutional provision would be valid.
Concurring - Justice Wayne
Yes. The law of Pennsylvania is unconstitutional, and I concur entirely with the majority opinion's reasoning. The power of legislation by Congress upon the Fugitive Slave Clause is exclusive. This exclusivity is necessary to enforce the constitutional compromise that was essential to the formation of the Union and to ensure a uniform remedy for slave owners across all states.
Concurring - Justice Baldwin
Yes. The act of the legislature was unconstitutional. Because the person removed was admitted to be a slave, the removal could not be kidnapping. However, I dissent from the principles laid down by the Court as the grounds of their opinion.
Concurring - Justice Daniel
Yes. The statute of Pennsylvania is invalid, but I dissent from the reasoning that the federal power is exclusive. I view the federal power as dormant; states may legislate in areas of federal authority as long as Congress has not acted or when the state law is strictly ancillary to the federal objective. States can and should pass laws to aid in the recovery of fugitive slaves, as this assistance is essential for the practical enforcement of the owner's constitutional right.
Concurring - Justice M'Lean
Yes. The law is unconstitutional because power over this subject is vested exclusively in the federal government. However, I disagree that a master can use force to remove a slave without following the legal process outlined in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. A state retains its police power to prohibit the forcible removal of any person from its territory, and a master must use the prescribed federal judicial process to prove ownership before such removal is lawful.
Analysis:
This decision established the doctrine of exclusive federal power over the rendition of fugitive slaves, significantly strengthening the position of slaveholders. By striking down state personal liberty laws, the Court invalidated Northern efforts to provide due process protections to alleged fugitives. Paradoxically, the Court's holding that states could not be compelled to assist in enforcement led many Northern states to pass new laws forbidding state officials from cooperating with slave catchers, thereby shifting the entire burden of enforcement onto a small number of federal officials and exacerbating sectional tensions leading up to the Civil War.
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