Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
490 U.S. 228 (1989)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In a Title VII mixed-motive case, if a plaintiff proves that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, the employer may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even absent the discriminatory motive.
Facts:
- Ann Hopkins was a senior manager at the accounting firm Price Waterhouse.
- In 1982, the partners in her office proposed her for partnership based on her strong performance, including securing a $25 million contract with the Department of State.
- Of the 88 candidates for partnership that year, Hopkins was the only woman.
- During the evaluation process, some partners praised Hopkins's work but criticized her interpersonal skills as "overly aggressive" and "unduly harsh."
- Several partners' comments were based on sex stereotypes; one described her as "macho," another suggested she take "a course at charm school," and a third objected to her profanity because "it's a lady using foul language."
- A partner advising Hopkins, Thomas Beyer, told her that to improve her chances for partnership, she should "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."
- The firm's Policy Board, after reviewing all partner comments, decided to place Hopkins's candidacy on hold for reconsideration the following year.
Procedural Posture:
- Ann Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
- The District Court, a trial court, ruled in favor of Hopkins on the issue of liability, finding that Price Waterhouse had impermissibly considered sex stereotypes in its decision.
- The court held that Price Waterhouse could avoid equitable relief by proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would have made the same decision anyway, a burden it found the firm did not meet.
- Price Waterhouse appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of liability but held that an employer's successful proof that it would have made the same decision would be a complete defense to liability, not just a limitation on remedies, though it agreed the standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuit courts regarding the burdens of proof in mixed-motive cases.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
In a Title VII case where an employment decision was based on both legitimate and illegitimate motives, does the burden of persuasion shift to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even without the discriminatory motive in order to avoid liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. Once a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account. The words "because of" in Title VII mean that gender was a factor in the decision at the moment it was made, not that it was the 'but-for' cause. When an employer allows a discriminatory motive to play a role, it has acted wrongfully and must bear the risk of being unable to separate the legitimate from illegitimate motives. This establishes an affirmative defense for the employer, not a change in the plaintiff's initial burden. Evaluating employees based on their failure to conform to sex stereotypes is a form of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The proper standard of proof for the employer's affirmative defense is a 'preponderance of the evidence,' not the higher 'clear and convincing evidence' standard, in keeping with conventional rules of civil litigation.
Concurring - Justice White
Yes. The standard from Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle is the proper approach. Under that precedent, once the plaintiff shows that an unlawful motive was a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision in the absence of the protected conduct. This framework applies to mixed-motive cases and does not conflict with the pretext framework of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. However, there should be no special requirement for the employer to present 'objective' evidence; credible testimony that the action would have been taken for legitimate reasons alone should suffice.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
Yes. To shift the burden of persuasion to the employer, a plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the adverse employment decision. While Title VII does require a finding of 'but-for' causation for liability, the burden of proving it can shift when an employer has created uncertainty by giving substantial weight to an impermissible criterion. This burden-shifting is a supplement to the McDonnell Douglas framework, justified only when there is direct evidence of discriminatory animus, not merely stray remarks or statements by nondecisionmakers. Once the plaintiff meets this higher threshold, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made for legitimate reasons.
Dissenting - Justice Kennedy
No. The established evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, which keeps the ultimate burden of persuasion on the plaintiff at all times, should govern all individual disparate-treatment cases. The statutory phrase 'because of' requires the plaintiff to prove but-for causation. Creating a new, complex burden-shifting mechanism for a vaguely defined category of 'mixed-motive' cases will only create confusion for lower courts and juries. The Burdine framework is flexible enough to handle cases with direct evidence of discrimination. The District Court found that Hopkins failed to prove that discrimination was a but-for cause of the decision, and its judgment should have been reversed in favor of Price Waterhouse.
Analysis:
This landmark decision established the 'mixed-motive' framework as a distinct theory of liability in Title VII disparate treatment cases, supplementing the pretext analysis of McDonnell Douglas. It formally recognized that acting on sex stereotypes—such as criticizing a woman for being aggressive while valuing that trait in men—is a form of sex discrimination. By shifting the burden of persuasion to the employer upon a showing that discrimination was a 'motivating factor,' the Court provided plaintiffs with a more favorable path to proving their case. The lack of a majority consensus, particularly Justice O'Connor's influential call for 'direct evidence,' created ambiguity that led to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified a modified version of the mixed-motive standard.
Unlock the full brief for Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins