Price v. Kitsap Transit
1994 Wash. LEXIS 773, 125 Wash. 2d 456, 886 P.2d 556 (1994)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Washington's tort reform act, RCW 4.22.070(1), fault cannot be apportioned to a child under the age of six because children of that age are conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence or recklessness as a matter of law.
Facts:
- Carl Price was a passenger on a Kitsap Transit bus, recovering from whiplash injuries sustained in a prior accident on another Kitsap Transit bus.
- On March 4, 1987, Price was again riding a Kitsap Transit bus.
- Nelson Lanchester and his 4-year-old son, Bradley, were also passengers on the bus.
- As they approached the front of the moving bus, Bradley Lanchester, whose left hand was free while his father held his right, reached into the driver's area.
- Bradley unexpectedly engaged an emergency stop switch.
- The bus stopped abruptly, which aggravated Price's pre-existing injuries.
- As a result of the aggravated injuries, Price took an early retirement from his job as a welder.
Procedural Posture:
- Carl Price and his wife sued Kitsap Transit and the Lanchesters in a Washington state trial court.
- Prior to trial, the Prices settled with the Lanchesters for $3,000; the court held a reasonableness hearing and dismissed the case against the Lanchesters.
- The suit against Kitsap Transit proceeded to a bench trial.
- The trial court found total damages of $259,535 and apportioned fault: 80% to 4-year-old Bradley Lanchester, 10% to Nelson Lanchester, and 10% to Kitsap Transit.
- The Prices, as appellants, appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Two.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's apportionment, holding it was improper to assign fault to a 4-year-old, and remanded the case for reapportionment.
- Kitsap Transit, as petitioner, petitioned the Supreme Court of Washington for review.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does Washington's tort reform act, RCW 4.22.070(1), permit the apportionment of fault to a 4-year-old child whose actions contributed to causing an injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Utter, J.
No. Under Washington's statutory scheme, fault cannot be apportioned to a 4-year-old child because a child under the age of six is legally incapable of fault. The court reasoned that the apportionment statute, RCW 4.22.070(1), applies to every 'entity' that caused a claimant's damages, but an 'entity' must be a juridical being capable of 'fault.' The statute defines 'fault' in terms of negligence or recklessness. Based on long-standing precedent, Washington law conclusively presumes that children under six lack the mental capacity to be negligent or reckless. The court distinguished this legal incapacity from immunity, which applies to entities capable of fault but excused from liability for policy reasons. Because a 4-year-old is incapable of fault, fault cannot be apportioned to him, just as it cannot be apportioned to an animal or an inanimate object.
Concurring - Durham, J.
No. While the majority's conclusion is legally correct based on the statute and precedent, the result is inequitable and contrary to the spirit of the tort reform act. The concurring opinion agrees that the Legislature's definition of 'fault' as negligence, combined with the common law rule that children under six cannot be negligent, compels the conclusion that fault cannot be apportioned to the child. However, this creates an anomalous outcome where the party found factually responsible for 80% of the harm cannot be held legally at fault, forcing the two parties deemed 10% at fault to absorb 100% of the liability. The concurrence urges the Legislature to review this inequity, as the court is bound to follow the law as written.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the traditional common law rule that very young children are incapable of negligence and clarifies its application within a modern comparative fault framework. It establishes that Washington's apportionment statute, despite its broad language covering 'every entity,' does not override this common law incapacity. The case creates a crucial distinction between legal incapacity (being unable to commit a tort) and immunity (being shielded from liability for a tort), preventing defendants from shifting fault to actors who cannot legally be at fault. This increases the potential liability for other minimally-at-fault defendants in cases involving injuries caused by very young children, as they must absorb the share of fault attributable to the child.
Unlock the full brief for Price v. Kitsap Transit