Price v. Johnston
334 U.S. 266 (1948)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
When the government claims a successive habeas corpus petition constitutes an abuse of the writ, it must plead the abuse with clarity and particularity, shifting the burden to the petitioner to prove the filing is justified. Additionally, Circuit Courts of Appeals have discretionary power under the All Writs Act to issue a writ compelling a prisoner's presence to argue their own appeal.
Facts:
- In 1938, Price was tried for bank robbery in a federal district court.
- The prosecution's chief witness, Fred T. Donner, gave testimony.
- During an interval in the trial, Donner went to the District Attorney's office and spoke with the prosecuting attorneys.
- After this meeting, Donner was recalled to the witness stand.
- Upon being recalled, Donner's testimony changed, supplementing his earlier statements with new details, including that he saw pistols during the robbery.
- Price and his attorney were present at the trial when this occurred and were aware of the meeting between Donner and the prosecutors.
- Price was convicted and sentenced to 65 years in prison at Alcatraz.
Procedural Posture:
- Price was convicted of bank robbery in a U.S. District Court in Michigan in 1938.
- In 1940, Price filed his first pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California; the court denied the petition without a hearing.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial.
- In 1942, Price filed a second habeas petition in the same district court. After a hearing, the court discharged the writ.
- The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the discharge of the second writ.
- Price filed a third habeas petition, which the district court denied on August 22, 1945, as an abusive use of the writ.
- On January 2, 1946, Price filed his fourth habeas petition, later amending it to allege the government knowingly used false testimony.
- The district court denied the fourth petition without a hearing.
- Price appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's denial.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
When a prisoner files a successive habeas corpus petition raising a new claim based on facts known at the time of prior petitions, is the petition properly dismissed as an abuse of the writ without a hearing, or must the government first plead abuse with particularity, thereby shifting the burden to the prisoner to justify the delay?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Murphy
No, the petition is not properly dismissed without the government first pleading abuse of the writ. The government bears the initial burden of pleading that a successive habeas petition is an abuse of the writ, after which the burden shifts to the petitioner to prove otherwise. The court reasoned that prisoners, often unlearned in the law and proceeding pro se, cannot be held to high pleading standards. The primary goal of habeas corpus is to prevent unjust imprisonment. Therefore, if the government wishes to claim abuse of the writ, it must do so with clarity and particularity in its return. Only after the government has made such a claim does the burden shift to the prisoner to answer the allegation and prove they have not abused the writ, for example, by showing a justifiable reason for the delay. The court also held that Circuit Courts of Appeals possess the discretionary power under § 262 of the Judicial Code to issue a writ to bring a prisoner to court to argue their own appeal, as such an order can be 'reasonably necessary in the interest of justice.'
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Frankfurter
Yes, the petition was justifiably found to be without merit on its face and was properly dismissed. A petitioner filing a fourth habeas petition should be required to state, however informally, that the petition is based on newly discovered matter or explain why the claim could not have been fairly raised in the three prior petitions. While agreeing that an appellate court should not be wholly foreclosed from ever bringing a prisoner to argue an appeal, it should be a rigorous rule of practice against it, reserved only for compelling circumstances, not a matter of ordinary judicial discretion.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Jackson
Yes, the District Court did not err in dismissing the unsupported fourth petition. When a prisoner files a belated petition making a serious charge, it is not too much to require them to allege with particularity the conduct at issue and provide facts excusing the failure to raise the issue earlier. The majority's holding opens the door to endless litigation based on the prisoner's ingenuity and imagination. Furthermore, an appellate court lacks the power under § 262 of the Judicial Code to order a prisoner's presence for oral argument, as it is neither 'necessary for the exercise' of appellate jurisdiction nor 'agreeable to the usages and principles of law.' Legal arguments can be made effectively in writing or through appointed counsel, making the prisoner's physical presence unnecessary.
Analysis:
This case establishes a significant procedural safeguard for habeas corpus petitioners by creating a burden-shifting framework for the 'abuse of the writ' doctrine. Instead of placing the initial onus on often-uncounseled prisoners to justify a successive petition, it requires the government to first specifically allege abuse. This holding liberalized habeas procedure, making it more difficult for courts to summarily dismiss successive petitions and ensuring that potentially valid constitutional claims receive fuller consideration. The decision reflects a judicial philosophy prioritizing substantive justice over rigid procedural formalities, especially for incarcerated individuals with limited legal resources.
