Price v. Huntsman
1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2468, 430 S.W.2d 831 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
An instrument is not a valid will or codicil unless it is executed with testamentary intent (animus testandi), meaning the maker intended that specific instrument to be a final, revocable disposition of their property taking effect after death, rather than mere instructions for a future document.
Facts:
- On June 16, 1961, Velma B. Lorenz executed a formal will prepared by her attorney, E. B. Grimes, leaving all her property to relatives of her deceased husband.
- Lorenz was a school teacher with no children or close relatives of her own.
- In May 1964, Lorenz became ill and missed several days of work.
- On May 17, 1964, Lorenz wrote and signed two pages entirely in her own handwriting.
- The first page was a letter to her attorney, Mr. Grimes, stating she was ill and would 'like to make some changes in my will.'
- The second page was titled 'Changes to be made in my will' and listed new dispositions for her government bonds and various savings accounts.
- Lorenz placed these writings, along with savings account books and other items, into a partially sealed envelope addressed to her attorney.
- On May 18, 1964, Lorenz was found unconscious; she was hospitalized and died on May 23, 1964, without regaining consciousness, and the envelope was found on her desk.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellee, Mrs. Louise Lorenz Huntsman, offered Velma B. Lorenz's 1961 will for probate in the County Court of Nueces County.
- Appellants, Price, Philbrick, and Simmons, offered the 1964 handwritten documents for probate as a codicil in the same court.
- The County Court entered a judgment probating the 1961 will and denying probate of the 1964 writings.
- Appellants appealed the County Court's decision to the 117th District Court of Nueces County.
- In the District Court, both parties filed motions for summary judgment.
- The District Court granted summary judgment for Appellee Huntsman, affirming the probate of the 1961 will, and denied Appellants' motion.
- Appellants appealed the District Court's summary judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.
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Issue:
Do handwritten documents, addressed to an attorney and describing 'changes to be made' in a will, constitute a valid holographic codicil expressing present testamentary intent?
Opinions:
Majority - McDonald, Chief Justice
No, the handwritten documents do not constitute a valid holographic codicil because they lack the necessary testamentary intent. To be effective as a will or codicil, the writer must intend for the specific instrument itself to be the final disposition of property after death. Here, the language used by Velma B. Lorenz clearly and unambiguously demonstrates that the writings were not intended to be a codicil, but rather instructions for her attorney to prepare a future codicil. The phrasing 'I would like to make some changes,' the title 'Changes to be made in my will,' and the act of enclosing them in a letter to her attorney all indicate a future-looking intent, not a present dispositive act. The court's duty is to construe the instrument from the words used, and those words show she was directing her attorney to act, not creating a final testamentary document herself.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the strict requirement of present testamentary intent (animus testandi) for a document to be probated as a will or codicil. It establishes a clear distinction between a document that is itself a testamentary disposition and one that merely communicates instructions for the future preparation of such a disposition. The case serves as a precedent that courts will closely scrutinize the language within the 'four corners' of a document to determine intent. Future cases involving informal, holographic writings will likely use this case to argue that forward-looking language (e.g., 'to be made') is strong evidence against the existence of the required testamentary intent.
