Price v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.
32 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1034, 26 A.3d 162, 2011 Del. LEXIS 351 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
An employer's failure to prevent an employee from transporting hazardous substances from the worksite to their home, thereby exposing a third party, constitutes nonfeasance, which is not actionable in negligence without a special relationship between the employer and the third party.
Facts:
- Bobby Price worked as a maintenance technician for E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (DuPont) at its Chestnut Run facility from 1957 until 1991.
- During his employment, Bobby Price worked with and around products containing asbestos.
- DuPont did not provide facilities like locker rooms or laundry, nor did it warn employees of the dangers of take-home asbestos exposure.
- Bobby Price allegedly transported asbestos fibers home on his clothing, vehicle, and skin.
- His wife, Patricia Price, alleges that years of living with her husband and handling and washing his work clothes exposed her to the asbestos fibers.
- Patricia Price developed bilateral interstitial fibrosis and bilateral pleural thickening of the lungs as a result of the asbestos exposure.
Procedural Posture:
- Patricia Price filed a complaint against DuPont in the Superior Court.
- Price filed a Motion to Amend her complaint to reframe her claim as one for misfeasance.
- DuPont opposed the motion, arguing that the proposed amendment would be legally futile.
- A Special Master reviewed the motion and issued a written ruling finding the motion to be futile.
- Price filed an Exception to the Special Master's report with the Superior Court.
- A Superior Court judge affirmed the Special Master's judgment in a Memorandum Opinion and Order, denying the Motion to Amend.
- The Superior Court certified its order for an interlocutory appeal.
- Price (appellant) appealed the Superior Court's judgment to the Supreme Court of Delaware, with DuPont as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does an employer's failure to prevent an employee from bringing asbestos fibers home from the workplace constitute affirmative misfeasance, thereby creating a duty of care to the employee's spouse who was subsequently injured by exposure?
Opinions:
Majority - Steele, C.J.
No. An employer's failure to prevent an employee from bringing asbestos fibers home from the workplace constitutes nonfeasance, for which a duty of care is owed only if a special relationship exists between the employer and the injured third party. The court's reasoning is that the core of the complaint alleges a failure to act—specifically, DuPont's failure to prevent Mr. Price from taking asbestos home or its failure to warn the Prices of the associated dangers. Following the precedent set in Riedel v. ICI Americas Inc., which involved nearly identical facts, this conduct is properly characterized as nonfeasance. Simply relabeling these omissions as 'affirmative misconduct' in an amended complaint does not change their fundamental nature. Since this is a claim for nonfeasance, Patricia Price must allege a 'special relationship' with DuPont to establish a duty of care. The court found that being the spouse of an employee, receiving health benefits from the company, or attending company picnics does not create such a legally significant special relationship. Therefore, DuPont owed no duty to Mrs. Price.
Dissenting - Berger, J.
Yes. The employer's conduct should be characterized as misfeasance because it created a new risk of harm. The dissent argues that the majority misinterprets Riedel, which did not decide the substantive issue but was resolved on procedural grounds. The central negligent act was DuPont's affirmative conduct of releasing asbestos in its workplace, which created the initial peril. The failure to warn or contain the asbestos is part of this larger affirmative act of misfeasance, not a separate act of nonfeasance. This affirmative act created a foreseeable risk of harm to employees' family members. Therefore, the analysis should focus on whether the harm to Mrs. Price was a foreseeable result of DuPont's affirmative act of using asbestos, not on whether a 'special relationship' existed.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a significant barrier for plaintiffs in 'take-home' or secondary toxic tort cases within this jurisdiction. By classifying the employer's conduct as nonfeasance, the court requires plaintiffs who are not employees to establish a 'special relationship'—a very high standard that is rarely met in this context. This ruling effectively insulates employers from liability for foreseeable harm to their employees' family members, shifting the legal analysis away from foreseeability and toward the formal relationship between the parties. The dissent's focus on the 'affirmative act' of introducing the toxin represents a competing analytical framework that many other jurisdictions have adopted, highlighting a major split in tort law on this issue.
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