Price v. Canadian Airlines
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20862, 2006 DNH 43, 429 F. Supp. 2d 459 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
An original tortfeasor is not liable for a subsequent injury sustained by the plaintiff if that second injury is attributable to a distinct, intervening cause, such as the negligence of a third party, which breaks the chain of causation. A common carrier's special duty of care to a passenger also terminates once the passenger has safely disembarked from the carrier's vehicle.
Facts:
- On May 27, 2000, during a Canadian Airlines flight, a flight attendant struck Donald Price's knee with a food cart, causing an injury.
- Airline staff provided Price with an ice pack and aspirin, and upon landing in Vancouver, Canadian Airlines gave him a wheelchair due to his difficulty walking.
- The flight's captain advised Mrs. Price to secure a wheelchair for her husband for their connecting flight the following day.
- On May 28, 2000, the Prices returned to the Vancouver airport for their next flight.
- At the Canadian Airlines check-in counter, Mrs. Price informed agent Katherine Fenton of the injury and requested a wheelchair for the long walk to the gate.
- Fenton allegedly refused the request, stating no wheelchairs were available and that staff were too busy, telling the Prices to "please go on."
- While Price was walking slowly through a crowded airport concourse, an unknown traveler pushing a luggage trolley struck him from behind.
- As a result of being struck by the trolley, Price fell and sustained further injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald and Dorothea Price filed a negligence lawsuit against Canadian Airlines in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
- The complaint alleged liability for two separate incidents: an injury on a flight on May 27, 2000, and a second injury in the Vancouver Airport on May 28, 2000.
- After discovery, Canadian Airlines filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to have the court dismiss the claim related to the airport accident.
- The Prices filed a memorandum in objection to the defendants' motion.
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Issue:
Is a common carrier liable for a passenger's subsequent injury in an airport caused by a third party, when the carrier's earlier negligence created the physical impairment and the carrier later refused to provide a wheelchair?
Opinions:
Majority - Muirhead, United States Magistrate Judge
No, a common carrier is not liable under these circumstances because the second injury was caused by a distinct intervening act of a third party, and the carrier's duty of care had terminated. The court's reasoning proceeded in three parts. First, the special relationship between a common carrier and passenger, which creates a heightened duty of care, ends once the passenger has safely left the vehicle. At the time of the airport accident, Price was not a passenger on a Canadian Airlines plane and had not been since the previous day. Second, while a tortfeasor can be liable for subsequent harm that is a normal consequence of an impaired condition they created (Restatement § 460), New Hampshire law, per Armstrong v. Bergeron, holds that this liability is cut off by a 'distinct intervening cause.' The negligence of the unknown traveler with the luggage trolley was such a cause, breaking the causal chain to the airline's original negligence. Third, the airline did not have a general duty to protect Price from this specific harm, as the law does not impose a duty to anticipate the careless conduct of another. The failure to provide a wheelchair did not create an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of this particular accident occurring.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the traditional tort principles of proximate cause and the powerful effect of an intervening, superseding cause. It clarifies that a defendant's liability for initial negligence is not infinite and can be severed by a subsequent, independent negligent act by a third party. The case also strictly defines the temporal and spatial limits of a common carrier's heightened duty of care, confining it to the period when the individual is actively a passenger. For future cases, this ruling makes it difficult for plaintiffs to hold an initial tortfeasor liable for a second, distinct accident, even if the first injury made the plaintiff more vulnerable.
