Pressey v. State
25 A.3d 756, 2011 Del. LEXIS 397, 2011 WL 3425618 (2011)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A statement relating to a startling event is admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule if it is made while the declarant is still under the stress and excitement caused by that event, regardless of the amount of time that has passed.
Facts:
- Seventeen-year-old Anthony Calm was walking home when three men, wearing black-and-white checkered scarves, robbed him at gunpoint.
- The men stole Calm's cell phone, house key, school ID, and cash.
- After two of the men left, the third man, Jamour Pressey, stayed and robbed Calm of his coat, pants, and boots, leaving him in his boxers and socks.
- Pressey then directed Calm to sit on a nearby step.
- Once the robbers were gone, Calm ran home and banged on the door until his sister let him in.
- Calm told his mother and sister he had been robbed; his mother, Kimberly Wallace, described him as 'scared,' 'hysterical,' and 'crying.'
- Wallace left to find the robbers, located police officers, and pointed out Pressey, who was wearing a checkered scarf.
- Between 20 and 60 minutes after the robbery, Wallace drove Calm to the scene of Pressey's arrest for an identification.
Procedural Posture:
- Jamour Pressey was charged by indictment with Robbery in the First Degree, Conspiracy in the Second Degree, and Resisting Arrest.
- The State dropped the conspiracy charge, and the case proceeded to a jury trial in the Superior Court.
- During the trial, the prosecution introduced testimony from the victim's mother and a police officer about the victim's out-of-court identification of Pressey.
- Defense counsel objected to this testimony as inadmissible hearsay.
- The trial judge overruled the objection, ruling that the victim's statement was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
- The jury found Pressey guilty of Robbery in the First Degree and Resisting Arrest.
- Pressey, as the appellant, appealed the convictions to the Supreme Court of Delaware, arguing the trial judge abused her discretion in admitting the hearsay testimony.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a victim's out-of-court identification of a suspect, made 20 to 60 minutes after a traumatic robbery, qualify as an excited utterance hearsay exception when the victim is still visibly scared, crying, and shaken at the time of the statement?
Opinions:
Majority - Holland, J.
Yes, the victim's out-of-court statement qualifies as an excited utterance. The court held that the admissibility of a statement under this exception hinges on whether the declarant was still under the stress of excitement from the startling event, not solely on the passage of time. To determine this, the court applies a three-part test from Gannon v. State: (1) the excitement was precipitated by an event; (2) the statement was made while the excitement was continuing; and (3) the statement related to the startling event. Here, the robbery was the startling event, and the statement identified the robber. Regarding the second prong, testimony established that Calm was still 'scared,' 'crying,' 'shaking,' and 'nervous' when he identified Pressey. This evidence demonstrated that he remained 'continuously under the influence of the event,' making his statement reliable and admissible despite the 20-60 minute delay.
Analysis:
This decision reaffirms and clarifies the application of the excited utterance exception, emphasizing a flexible, fact-based inquiry over a rigid time limit. The court prioritizes the declarant's subjective state of mind, confirming that as long as the 'stress of excitement' persists, a statement made a considerable time after the event can still be deemed reliable. This reinforces the trial court's discretion to consider all circumstances, such as the declarant's demeanor and the nature of the traumatic event, when determining admissibility. The ruling provides a clear precedent that the continuous influence of a startling event is the key factor, not merely the number of minutes that have elapsed.
