Presseisen v. Swarthmore College
442 F.Supp. 593, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1466, 1977 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14181 (1977)
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Rule of Law:
In a Title VII disparate treatment class action, plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination was the defendant's standard operating procedure. Statistical evidence used to establish a prima facie case must be methodologically sound and can be rebutted by showing the analysis is flawed or by presenting more reliable statistical proof.
Facts:
- Barbara Z. Presseisen was employed by Swarthmore College as a part-time Lecturer for the 1970-71 academic year.
- For the 1971-72 academic year, Swarthmore appointed Presseisen as a full-time Assistant Professor of Education for a one-year term.
- Provost Charles E. Gilbert informed Presseisen that her appointment was for one year only because the college was searching for a permanent Director for the Education Program, and a successful search would preclude her reappointment.
- On February 29, 1972, Swarthmore notified Presseisen that her contract would not be renewed for the following academic year, citing "logistical" staffing considerations.
- Presseisen was not considered for the Director position because she did not apply and because she did not meet the requirement of also being qualified to teach in a regular academic department.
- After the search for a Director proved unsuccessful for the 1972-73 year, a personal conflict developed between Presseisen and her colleague, Alice Brodhead.
- Due to this interpersonal conflict, Swarthmore decided not to reappoint Presseisen to the vacant position.
- Swarthmore subsequently hired Robert Pearson, a man, for the assistant professor position previously held by Presseisen.
Procedural Posture:
- Barbara Z. Presseisen filed a charge of sex discrimination against Swarthmore College with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission and the EEOC.
- After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Presseisen filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Swarthmore College and Provost Charles E. Gilbert.
- The court certified a class action on behalf of female faculty and applicants alleging discrimination in hiring, promotion, tenure, and salary, but for declaratory and injunctive relief only.
- The EEOC was granted leave by the court to intervene in the case as a plaintiff.
- The liability portion of the case was bifurcated and tried before the court without a jury.
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Issue:
Does an employer's academic employment practices constitute a pattern or practice of sex-based disparate treatment in violation of Title VII where the plaintiffs' statistical evidence of discrimination is shown to be unreliable and is successfully rebutted by the defendant?
Opinions:
Majority - Bechtle, District Judge.
No. The plaintiffs failed to establish that Swarthmore College engaged in a pattern or practice of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. To prove a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must establish that the employer had a discriminatory motive and that discrimination was its standard operating procedure, not just an isolated occurrence. In this case, Presseisen's individual claim failed because Swarthmore presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her non-renewal, namely the predefined logistical needs of the department and a subsequent interpersonal conflict. The class action claims regarding tenure, promotion, salary, and hiring also failed because the plaintiffs' statistical evidence was fundamentally unreliable. The court found that the plaintiffs' statistical models improperly excluded key variables (like rank in salary analyses), failed to account for crucial factors (like prior experience, publications, and quality of degree), and suffered from methodological flaws such as aggregating distinct faculty groups (junior vs. senior appointments). The defendant successfully rebutted the plaintiffs' statistical case by highlighting these flaws and presenting its own, more persuasive analysis which showed no statistically significant disparities. The anecdotal evidence of discrimination was weak, often concerning pre-Act conduct which has no present legal consequences, and was insufficient to prove a pattern or practice of purposeful discrimination.
Analysis:
This case serves as a crucial lesson on the use and vulnerability of statistical evidence in Title VII disparate treatment litigation. It demonstrates that a plaintiff cannot rely on raw statistical disparities alone; the underlying statistical model must be robust enough to withstand scrutiny regarding its variables and methodology. The decision emphasizes that a defendant can effectively rebut a prima facie case by deconstructing the plaintiff's statistics and showing how they fail to account for legitimate, non-discriminatory factors. This holding reinforces the high bar for proving a 'pattern or practice' claim, requiring evidence of intentional, systemic discrimination rather than just numerical imbalances that may be explained by other factors.
