Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, Riverside County
464 U.S. 501 (1984)
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Rule of Law:
The guarantees of a public trial under the First Amendment cover the voir dire examination of potential jurors. This presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
Facts:
- Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., was charged with the rape and murder of a teenage girl.
- Before the jury selection (voir dire) for his trial began, the Press-Enterprise Co., a newspaper publisher, moved that the process be open to the public and press.
- The State opposed the motion, arguing that the presence of the press would make prospective jurors less candid.
- The trial judge closed the majority of the voir dire to the public.
- The voir dire process lasted for six weeks, with all but approximately three days being conducted in private.
- After the jury was selected, Press-Enterprise moved for a complete transcript of the closed proceedings, which the trial judge denied, citing the privacy interests of the jurors regarding sensitive personal matters discussed.
Procedural Posture:
- In the California Superior Court (trial court) case of Albert Greenwood Brown, Jr., petitioner Press-Enterprise Co. moved that the jury voir dire be open to the public.
- The trial court denied the motion for the bulk of the voir dire.
- After the jury was empaneled, Press-Enterprise Co.'s motion for a release of the voir dire transcript was denied by the trial court.
- After Brown's conviction and sentencing, the trial court again denied the petitioner's motion for the transcript.
- Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate court), which was denied.
- The California Supreme Court (the state's highest court) denied petitioner's request for a hearing.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the First Amendment right of public access to criminal trials extend to the voir dire examination of potential jurors?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Burger
Yes, the First Amendment right of public access to criminal trials extends to the voir dire examination of potential jurors. The historical tradition of open criminal trials in both England and America has presumptively included the process of jury selection. This openness enhances the fairness of the trial and the appearance of fairness, which is essential to public confidence in the justice system. The presumption of openness can be overcome only by an overriding interest, such as the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial or a prospective juror’s privacy interests. However, to justify closure, the trial court must make specific findings on the record demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. In this case, the trial court's closure was unconstitutional because it failed to articulate specific findings justifying such a broad suppression of the proceedings and did not consider less restrictive alternatives, such as questioning certain jurors in camera or redacting sensitive portions of the transcript.
Concurring - Justice Marshall
Yes. Justice Marshall agreed with the judgment but wrote separately to emphasize that the constitutional right of access is most critical when sensitive information is involved, as this is when public scrutiny is most needed to ensure juror impartiality. He argued that closure should only be permitted if it is the 'least restrictive means available' for protecting compelling interests. He also strongly disagreed with the majority's criticism of the six-week length of the voir dire, arguing that in a complex and racially charged capital case, such extensive questioning may be necessary to seat a fair jury, and the Court lacked the authority to lecture state courts on the matter.
Concurring - Justice Blackmun
Yes. Justice Blackmun agreed with the Court's holding but wrote to clarify that the decision does not formally establish a constitutional 'right to privacy' for prospective jurors. He expressed concern that recognizing such a right would complicate voir dire proceedings. He argued that jurors' privacy interests can be adequately protected through the state's and defendant's shared interest in encouraging candid answers, without needing to create a new, separately assertable constitutional right for the juror.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Yes. Justice Stevens wrote to underscore that the right of public access to voir dire is grounded in the First Amendment, not the Sixth Amendment's public trial provision. He emphasized that the First Amendment's purpose is broader than just judicial administration; it serves the societal function of preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs, allowing citizens to oversee the judicial branch. While acknowledging that juror privacy can be a valid reason for limited closure, he stated that access allows for critical public examination of judicial processes, including lengthy voir dire proceedings.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and extends the public's First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, first articulated in Richmond Newspapers. By applying this right to the voir dire process, the Court established that the entirety of a criminal trial, from jury selection to verdict, is presumptively open. The decision created a stringent, multi-part test that trial judges must satisfy before closing any part of a trial, requiring specific on-the-record findings and consideration of alternatives. This makes it substantially more difficult to conduct secret proceedings and strengthens the media's role in overseeing the justice system, promoting transparency and public confidence.
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