Presley v. Georgia
558 U.S. 209, 175 L. Ed. 2d 675, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 761 (2010)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the jury selection phase (voir dire). Before excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closure, even if no alternatives are offered by the parties.
Facts:
- Eric Presley was on trial in Georgia for a cocaine trafficking offense.
- Before jury selection began, the trial judge noticed Presley's uncle was the sole observer in the courtroom.
- The judge ordered the uncle to leave the courtroom and the entire floor of the courthouse, stating there was not enough space for the public once the 42 prospective jurors arrived.
- Presley's counsel objected to the exclusion of the public and requested an accommodation.
- The judge denied the request, reasoning that the uncle could not sit and 'intermingle' with the jury panel and could return after jury selection was complete.
Procedural Posture:
- Eric Presley was convicted by a jury of a cocaine trafficking offense in the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, a trial court.
- Presley filed a motion for a new trial based on the courtroom closure, which the trial court denied.
- Presley, as appellant, appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, an intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the trial court's decision.
- Presley, as appellant, was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the state's highest court, which also affirmed the conviction.
- Presley petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a trial court violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial by excluding the public from jury selection (voir dire) without first considering reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The trial court's exclusion of the public from jury selection violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial because the court failed its constitutional obligation to consider reasonable alternatives to closure. The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial applies to jury voir dire, just as the First Amendment right of access does. Citing Waller v. Georgia, the Court reiterated the four-part test for courtroom closure, emphasizing the third prong: 'the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding.' This duty is an affirmative obligation of the court and is not dependent on the defendant proposing alternatives. The trial court's justifications—lack of space and a generic risk of juror contamination—were insufficient to override a fundamental constitutional right without first exploring other options, such as reserving a row for the public or instructing jurors not to speak with observers.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No, the Court should not have summarily decided this case. The majority improperly disposes of two significant, unresolved questions. First, Supreme Court precedent has never explicitly held that the Sixth Amendment public trial right extends to jury voir dire; Waller concerned a suppression hearing and Press-Enterprise I was a First Amendment case. Second, the precedents do not unambiguously place a sua sponte burden on trial courts to invent and consider alternatives to closure when none are proposed by the parties. By deciding these complex issues without full briefing and argument, the Court departs from its standards for summary disposition and belittles the lower courts that have struggled to interpret these same precedents.
Analysis:
This per curiam opinion solidifies and clarifies the procedural requirements for closing a courtroom under the Sixth Amendment. It explicitly extends the public trial right to the voir dire phase and, more significantly, places an affirmative, sua sponte duty on trial judges to consider alternatives before ordering a closure. This decision strengthens the public trial right by preventing closures based on mere convenience or unsubstantiated fears, shifting the burden to the court to actively protect public access rather than waiting for the defendant to propose solutions. It makes it substantially more difficult for trial courts to exclude the public from jury selection, a critical stage of a criminal proceeding.
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