Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission
494 U.S. 1, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 1052, 108 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990)
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Rule of Law:
A federal statute that potentially effects a taking of private property for public use does not violate the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause if a reasonable and adequate provision for obtaining compensation, such as a claim under the Tucker Act, is available to the property owner. Additionally, regulating disused railroad rights-of-way for preservation and recreational use is a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
Facts:
- Petitioners, the Preseaults, own land in Vermont adjacent to a railroad right-of-way.
- In 1962, the State of Vermont acquired the railroad's interest in the right-of-way and leased it to Vermont Railway, Inc.
- Vermont Railway subsequently ceased using the route and removed all railroad equipment, including tracks and bridges, from the portion of the right-of-way at issue.
- The Preseaults claim that under Vermont state property law, the railroad's easement was extinguished upon the cessation of rail operations, causing the underlying land to revert to them.
- Congress enacted the National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, which authorize the conversion of unused railroad rights-of-way into public recreational trails.
- The Act specifies that this interim trail use shall not be legally treated as an 'abandonment' of the right-of-way, which prevents state-law reversionary interests from taking effect.
- Pursuant to the Act, the State of Vermont and Vermont Railway entered an agreement to transfer the right-of-way to the city of Burlington for use as a public trail.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioners filed a quiet title action in Vermont Superior Court (a state trial court).
- The Superior Court dismissed the action, ruling that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) had exclusive jurisdiction.
- The Vermont Supreme Court (the state's highest court) affirmed the dismissal.
- Petitioners then sought a certificate of abandonment from the ICC.
- The ICC, upon petition from the State of Vermont, issued a Notice of Exemption authorizing the discontinuance of rail service and approving the conversion of the right-of-way to an interim public trail.
- Petitioners sought review of the ICC's order in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals (an intermediate federal appellate court) denied the petition, holding that the Trails Act did not cause a taking and was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does the National Trails System Act, which prevents railroad rights-of-way from reverting to adjacent landowners under state law by converting them into recreational trails, constitute a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and is the Act a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
No. The National Trails System Act does not violate the Fifth Amendment because a remedy for just compensation is available, and Yes, the Act is a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power. The Court holds that the petitioners' takings claim is premature. The Fifth Amendment requires only that a 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation' exists at the time of the taking. The Tucker Act provides jurisdiction in the U.S. Claims Court for property owners to seek compensation for takings by the federal government. Because Congress did not unambiguously withdraw this Tucker Act remedy in the Trails Act, an adequate process for compensation is available, and the Fifth Amendment is satisfied. The Court declines to decide whether a taking actually occurred. Regarding the Commerce Clause, the Act passes the rational basis test. Congress's stated purposes of preserving rail corridors for future railroad use ('rail banking') and encouraging the development of recreational trails are legitimate objectives, and the means chosen are reasonably adapted to achieve those ends.
Concurring - Justice O'Connor
Yes, I agree with the judgment but write to clarify the property rights issue. State law creates and defines the property interests at stake, including the petitioners' claimed reversionary interest. The federal government's power to regulate commerce and preempt state law regarding railroad abandonment does not eliminate these underlying state-created property rights. Rather, the federal action burdens or defeats the enjoyment of those rights. This burden is precisely what may give rise to a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Second Circuit's reasoning that no property interest could ever vest was incorrect because it conflated the government's power to act with the question of whether that action constitutes a taking. Petitioners must have the opportunity to prove the existence of their state-law property interest and seek compensation for its taking in the Claims Court.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle that the Tucker Act serves as a default, constitutionally adequate remedy for takings claims against the federal government unless Congress explicitly and unambiguously withdraws it. The ruling effectively diverts constitutional challenges to federal statutes like the Trails Act into monetary claims for compensation in the U.S. Claims Court. By doing so, it preserves the statute's operation while ensuring a path to compensation for affected landowners. The case also affirms Congress's broad Commerce Clause authority to regulate railroad corridors for purposes beyond active rail service, including preservation and recreation, reinforcing a deferential 'rational basis' standard for such economic regulation.
