Premo v. Moore
2011 U.S. LEXIS 910, 178 L. Ed. 2d 649, 131 S.Ct. 733 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
When a state court has rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits, a federal court's review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is 'doubly deferential,' requiring deference to both the attorney's strategic decisions under Strickland and the state court's adjudication of the claim.
Facts:
- Randy Moore and two confederates attacked, bound with duct tape, and kidnapped Kenneth Rogers.
- They drove Rogers to a remote location in the Oregon countryside, where Moore shot him in the temple, killing him.
- After the murder, Moore confessed his involvement to his brother and to his accomplice's girlfriend, claiming the shooting was an accident.
- Moore subsequently confessed again to the police.
- Moore's attorney, aware that prosecutors knew about both confessions, advised Moore to accept a plea bargain for felony murder.
- The attorney did not file a motion to suppress Moore's confession to the police before advising him on the plea offer.
Procedural Posture:
- Randy Moore pled no contest to felony murder in an Oregon state trial court.
- Moore subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief in Oregon state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the court denied after a hearing.
- Moore then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, which was denied.
- On appeal by Moore, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court and granted the writ.
- Premo, the superintendent of the prison, (the petitioner) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state court's rejection of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) when counsel advised accepting a plea bargain without first filing a motion to suppress a confession, given that the defendant had also confessed to two other witnesses?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
No. The state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Federal habeas review of an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim that a state court has already rejected is 'doubly deferential.' This means the court must defer to counsel’s strategic choices under Strickland v. Washington, and also defer to the state court’s reasonable application of that standard under AEDPA. Here, counsel's decision not to file a suppression motion was a reasonable strategic choice; he concluded it would be 'fruitless' because the prosecution had two other witnesses who could testify to Moore's separate, admissible confession. Securing a quick plea for the minimum sentence avoided the risk of a capital murder charge and allowed Moore to take advantage of the state's uncertainty, which was a competent balancing of risks and opportunities. The Ninth Circuit erred by misapplying Arizona v. Fulminante, a direct-review harmless-error case, to the distinct context of an IAC performance inquiry in a plea bargain setting.
Concurring - Justice Ginsburg
No. The petitioner cannot prevail because he failed to meet the prejudice requirement for an ineffective assistance claim in the plea context. Under Hill v. Lockhart, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have rejected the plea and insisted on going to trial. Moore never made such a declaration, and therefore his claim fails on the prejudice prong alone.
Analysis:
This decision significantly heightens the already formidable barrier for petitioners seeking federal habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel claims under AEDPA. By formalizing the 'doubly deferential' standard of review, the Court makes it exceedingly difficult to challenge a state court's finding that counsel's performance was adequate. The ruling provides strong protection for strategic decisions made by defense attorneys during the uncertain, high-stakes plea-bargaining process, emphasizing finality over post-hoc challenges. It effectively narrows the path for defendants who have accepted plea deals to later argue their counsel's pre-plea investigation or motion practice was constitutionally deficient.
