Pratt v. Davis
79 N.E. 562, 224 Ill. 300 (1906)
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Rule of Law:
A surgeon who performs a non-emergency surgical operation without the patient's consent commits a trespass to the person (battery), as consent is a prerequisite unless an emergency makes it impracticable to confer with the patient.
Facts:
- In May 1896, appellee, a married woman suffering from epilepsy, sought treatment from appellant, a physician who ran a sanitarium.
- Appellant examined appellee and found a contracted and lacerated uterus and a diseased rectum.
- On May 13, 1896, appellant performed an initial surgical operation on appellee to address these issues, for which he obtained some form of consent by not telling her the 'whole truth'.
- After the first operation failed to improve her condition, appellee returned home for several weeks.
- On July 29, 1896, appellee's husband had her taken back to the sanitarium.
- On July 30, 1896, appellant performed a second operation on appellee, removing her ovaries and uterus, without her consent.
- A prior conversation between the appellant and appellee's husband, where the husband allegedly gave broad consent, occurred before the first operation.
- Appellee's mental condition worsened after the second operation, and she was later adjudged insane.
Procedural Posture:
- Appellee (plaintiff) sued appellant (defendant) in the circuit court of Cook county for trespass to the person.
- The case was tried before a judge without a jury, who found in favor of the appellee and awarded a judgment of $3000.
- Appellant (as appellant) appealed the decision to the Appellate Court for the First District.
- The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.
- Appellant (as appellant) then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Issue:
Does a surgeon commit a trespass to the person by performing a surgical operation on a patient without her express consent, when no immediate emergency exists and the consent of her husband was not clearly obtained for that specific procedure?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Scott
Yes. A surgical operation performed without the patient's consent constitutes a trespass to the person. The court found no evidence that the appellee consented to the second operation, which involved the removal of her uterus. In fact, the appellant admitted to deceiving her to get consent for the first operation. The court also rejected the appellant's claim that the husband's consent was sufficient, reasoning that any authority given by the husband in a conversation before the first operation was exhausted when the appellee was taken home. Furthermore, the court dismissed the idea that consent could be implied, clarifying that exceptions to the consent requirement only exist for unexpected conditions discovered mid-operation or in true emergencies where obtaining consent is impracticable. Since this was a planned, second operation and not an emergency, the appellant was required to obtain the patient's express consent.
Analysis:
This case is a foundational decision in the development of the doctrine of informed consent. It firmly establishes that a non-consensual medical operation is not a matter of negligence but a trespass, or battery, thereby protecting a patient's right to bodily autonomy. The ruling clarifies that a patient's general submission to treatment does not grant a physician unlimited license to perform any procedure they deem necessary. This precedent forces medical practitioners to obtain specific consent for specific procedures and delineates the very narrow exceptions (emergencies and unexpected discoveries during surgery) where consent might be lawfully bypassed.
