Powers v. Ohio
499 U.S. 400 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a criminal defendant has third-party standing to object to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of their race, regardless of whether the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race.
Facts:
- Larry Joe Powers, a white man, was indicted in Ohio on charges of aggravated murder and attempted aggravated murder.
- During jury selection for his trial, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge to remove a black venireperson.
- Powers objected to the strike, requesting the prosecutor state a reason for the exclusion.
- The prosecutor then used six of his next nine peremptory challenges to remove other black prospective jurors from the panel.
- Each time a black prospective juror was challenged by the prosecution, Powers renewed his objection, citing the principles established in Batson v. Kentucky.
- The record did not indicate that race was otherwise a factor in the underlying crime or trial.
Procedural Posture:
- Larry Joe Powers was indicted in the Franklin County, Ohio trial court.
- During trial, the court overruled Powers' objections to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against black venirepersons.
- A jury convicted Powers, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 53 years to life.
- Powers (appellant) appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing the prosecutor's use of peremptories was unconstitutional, but the court affirmed the conviction.
- Powers (appellant) then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which dismissed the appeal on the ground that it presented no substantial constitutional question.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Powers' petition for a writ of certiorari, limited to the equal protection question.
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Issue:
Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permit a criminal defendant to object to the prosecution's race-based peremptory challenges of potential jurors, even when the defendant and the excluded jurors do not share the same race?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kennedy
Yes. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their race, and a defendant may object to such exclusions even if the defendant and the jurors are of different races. The Court reasoned that race-based jury exclusion harms not only the defendant but also the excluded juror and the entire community by undermining public confidence in the integrity of the justice system. A defendant has third-party standing to assert the juror's rights because: (1) the defendant suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact when the trial's fairness is cast into doubt; (2) the defendant and the excluded juror have a close, common interest in eliminating discrimination from the courtroom; and (3) excluded jurors face significant practical barriers to vindicating their own rights, making the defendant an effective advocate.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No. The Court's long-standing equal protection jurisprudence in the context of jury selection has always required racial identity between the defendant and the excluded juror. The dissent argued that the right established in Batson was the defendant's right not to have members of his or her own race excluded, not a juror's right to sit on a particular case. Justice Scalia contended that the defendant suffers no concrete 'injury in fact,' only a speculative 'injury in perception,' which is insufficient to establish third-party standing. He further argued that applying the Equal Protection Clause to individual peremptory strikes effectively abolishes a centuries-old and valuable tool for ensuring a fair trial, as such strikes are inherently based on group characteristics and stereotypes.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands the holding of Batson v. Kentucky by removing the requirement of shared race between the defendant and the excluded juror. It shifts the legal focus from solely protecting the defendant's personal equal protection right to a broader goal of protecting the rights of jurors and preserving the integrity of the judicial process. This gives any defendant, regardless of race, a tool to combat perceived racial discrimination in jury selection, thereby broadening the enforcement mechanism against such practices. The ruling reinforces that the harm of racial discrimination in the courtroom extends beyond the litigants to the community at large.
