No, it's not cruel and unusual punishment. The law punishes the act of being drunk in public, not the 'status' of being an alcoholic. Punishing someone for a disease would be wrong, but punishing them for their actions is okay. We don't have enough medical proof to say that all alcoholics have zero control over their actions, so we can't make a new constitutional rule about it.

No, this is perfectly constitutional. The government needs to be able to make laws to deal with social problems like public drunkenness. It's not the Supreme Court's job to tell states how to handle these issues based on complicated medical theories. Punishing the act of being drunk in public is different from punishing the status of being an alcoholic.

No, his conviction was okay in this specific case. Even if Powell couldn't stop drinking, he didn't prove that he also couldn't stop himself from being in public. Since he had a home, he should have stayed there to drink. To win, he needed to show it was impossible for him to avoid being in public, for example, if he were homeless.

Yes, this is cruel and unusual punishment. Being drunk in public was a direct symptom of Powell's disease, something he couldn't control. The trial judge even said Powell was compelled to be there. Punishing him for this is like punishing a person with epilepsy for having a seizure. You can't punish someone for a condition they are powerless to change.

The Court said it's okay to punish Powell for the action of being drunk in public, even though he is an alcoholic. They said there's a difference between punishing someone for their status (like being an alcoholic) versus their actions (like being drunk in public). They said Powell was punished for his actions, not for being an alcoholic. The Court also said it's not the right time to make a rule about when someone's mental health can excuse their criminal actions, because even doctors and lawyers are still figuring out these complicated issues.

The dissenting judges said it violates the Constitution to punish Powell for being drunk in public because he couldn't control his drinking or showing up in public due to his alcoholism. They pointed to the trial court's findings that alcoholism destroyed Powell's willpower and compared it to an earlier case where the Court said you can't punish someone for being addicted to drugs. They felt the same idea should apply to Powell's situation.

Some judges agreed with the final decision but warned the Court against making strict rules for how local communities deal with alcoholism. They said criminal responsibility rules should be left to the states. They also said this case was different from the drug addict case because Texas was punishing an action (public intoxication), not just the status of being an alcoholic.

One judge said if you can't criminalize an uncontrollable urge to use drugs, you shouldn't be able to criminalize an uncontrollable urge to drink. But he said Powell didn't prove he couldn't stay off the streets that night because of how drunk he was. So he agreed with punishing Powell in this specific case because Powell didn't show his conviction violated the Constitution based on the facts presented.

No. We say it's okay to punish Powell for being drunk in public, even though he is an alcoholic. We see a difference between punishing someone for their status (like being an alcoholic) versus their actions (like being drunk in public). We punish Powell for his actions, not for being an alcoholic. We also say this is not the right time to make a rule about when someone's mental health can excuse criminal actions, because even doctors and lawyers are still figuring out these complicated issues.

Yes. It violates the Constitution to punish Powell for being drunk in public because he couldn't control his drinking or appearing in public due to his alcoholism. We point to the trial court's findings that alcoholism destroyed Powell's willpower and compare it to an earlier case where the Court said you can't punish someone for being addicted to drugs. The same idea should apply to Powell.

No. We agree with the final decision but warn against making strict rules for how local communities deal with alcoholism. Criminal responsibility rules should be left to the states. This case is different from the drug addict case because Texas is punishing an action (public intoxication), not the status of being an alcoholic.

No. If you can't criminalize an uncontrollable urge to use drugs, you shouldn't be able to criminalize an uncontrollable urge to drink. However, Powell didn't prove he couldn't stay off the streets that night because of his level of intoxication. We agree with punishing Powell in this specific case because he didn't show that his conviction violated the Constitution based on the facts presented.

Justice Marshall wrote in his plurality opinion: "We are unable to conclude, on the state of this record or on the current state of medical knowledge, that chronic alcoholics in general, and [appellant] in particular, suffer from such an irresistible compulsion to drink and to get drunk in public that they are utterly unable to control their performance of either or both of these acts …

It is not to be denied that one so adjudged can be committed to a hospital for treatment and custody until he regains his `sanity.'This is not, however, punishment and indeed the state may not constitutionally impose criminal sanctions against persons who have committed no crime.

About six years after Robinson, the United States Supreme Court considered an Eighth Amendment challenge to a Texas statute that made it a crime to " `get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place

The Supreme Court has held that a state law criminalizing status and not conduct violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

Noting that it would do well to bear in mind the Supreme Court's observation that "[t] he doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religions, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the …

The court distinguished its holding in Robinson by observing that the defendant was convicted not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being drunk in public on a particular occasion

—declaring that "criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change

A plurality of the Court agreed that [T] he entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus.

"Nothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.... It is simply not yet the time to write into the Constitution formulas cast in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear either to doctors or to lawyers."

Other state courts have upheld statutes similar to Section (s) 45-2-203, not simply as evidentiary rules, but as legislative redefinitions of the mental-state element.

No, the conviction for public intoxication does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Texas statute punishes the act of being drunk in public, not the mere status of being a chronic alcoholic, thereby distinguishing it from Robinson v. California. The record in this case and the current state of medical knowledge are insufficient to conclude that chronic alcoholics suffer from an irresistible compulsion that renders them completely unable to control their behavior. The Court should not create a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility based on uncertain medical concepts, as this is a role traditionally reserved for the states.

No, the conviction for public intoxication is constitutional. The state has a legitimate interest in using the criminal process to address the social problems caused by public drunkenness, and jailing serves rational purposes such as removing individuals from danger and isolating them from the public. Expanding Robinson v. California to cover conduct 'symptomatic' of a disease would be a revolutionary step, forcing courts to make constitutional judgments based on elusive psychological concepts like 'compulsion,' a matter best left to legislative discretion.

No, the conviction does not violate the Eighth Amendment on this record. To establish a constitutional defense, a chronic alcoholic must show not only a compulsion to drink but also a compulsion to be in public while drunk. Powell failed to demonstrate that he was unable to avoid being in public; he had a home and did not show that he was homeless or that his intoxication was so severe that he lost control of his movements. Therefore, he could be punished for failing to take feasible precautions to avoid committing the public act.

Yes, the conviction constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The principle of Robinson v. California is that criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change. The trial court specifically found that Powell was a chronic alcoholic and that his appearance in public while intoxicated was 'not of his own volition but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease.' Because his public intoxication was an involuntary symptom of his disease, punishing him for it is punishing him for his illness, which violates the Eighth Amendment.

The Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment does not prevent the state from imposing criminal sanctions for public intoxication on a chronic alcoholic. The Court distinguished between criminalizing status, which would be unconstitutional, and criminalizing conduct, which is permissible. The Court found that Powell was not punished for being a chronic alcoholic (a status), but for the act of public intoxication (a conduct). The Court also noted that it was not the time to define an insanity test in constitutional terms, as the understanding of mental illness and its legal implications were still evolving. The Court reasoned that there is no agreement among the medical profession about what constitutes 'alcoholism' or its manifestations. The Court also pointed out the lack of facilities and manpower for the treatment of alcoholics. Therefore, the use of criminal process as a means of dealing with the public aspects of problem drinking can be defended as rational at this time.

The dissent argued that punishing a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication violates the Eighth Amendment when the accused is powerless to avoid drinking and powerless to avoid appearing in public places. The dissent relied on the trial court's findings that alcoholism is a disease that destroys the afflicted person's willpower and that Powell was a chronic alcoholic compelled to drink and appear in public. The dissent compared this to the Court's decision in Robinson v. California, which held that punishing a person for the 'status' of being a drug addict is unconstitutional. The dissent argued the same principle should apply when the condition of public intoxication is part of the pattern of an alcoholic's disease and is occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of that disease.

The concurrence, while agreeing with the majority, cautioned against the Court becoming a 'board of Platonic Guardians' establishing rigid rules for local communities to deal with social problems like alcoholism. The concurrence argued that the doctrines of criminal responsibility should be left to the States to develop and that the Court was ill-equipped to define a constitutional doctrine of mens rea. The concurrence also distinguished Powell from Robinson, arguing that the Texas statute punished an act, not a mere status. The concurrence warned that extending Robinson would lead to a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility that would undermine the States' ability to define crimes.

The concurrence argued that if it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics (as held in Robinson), then it cannot be a crime to yield to that compulsion. However, the concurrence distinguished Powell's conviction for being drunk in a public place. It argued that Powell failed to show that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in question due to his intoxication. Therefore, the concurrence agreed with affirming Powell's conviction because Powell did not show that his conviction violated the Constitution based on the specific facts and lack of evidence in the record of his case.

No. We hold that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment does not prevent the state from imposing criminal sanctions for public intoxication on a chronic alcoholic. We distinguish between criminalizing status, which would be unconstitutional, and criminalizing conduct, which is permissible. Powell was not punished for being a chronic alcoholic (a status), but for the act of public intoxication (a conduct). We also note that it is not the time to define an insanity test in constitutional terms, as the understanding of mental illness and its legal implications is still evolving. There is no agreement among the medical profession about what constitutes 'alcoholism' or its manifestations. We further point to the lack of facilities and manpower for the treatment of alcoholics. Therefore, the use of criminal process as a means of dealing with the public aspects of problem drinking can be defended as rational at this time.

Yes. I dissent. Punishing a chronic alcoholic for public intoxication violates the Eighth Amendment when the accused is powerless to avoid drinking and powerless to avoid appearing in public places. This position relies on the trial court's findings that alcoholism is a disease destroying the afflicted person's willpower and that Powell was a chronic alcoholic compelled to drink and appear in public. This situation is comparable to Robinson v. California, which held that punishing a person for the 'status' of being a drug addict is unconstitutional. The same principle applies when public intoxication results from the compulsion symptomatic of an alcoholic's disease.

I concur. While agreeing with the majority, I caution against this Court becoming a 'board of Platonic Guardians' by establishing rigid rules for local communities dealing with social problems like alcoholism. The doctrines of criminal responsibility should be left to the States to develop, and this Court is ill-equipped to define a constitutional doctrine of mens rea. Powell is distinguishable from Robinson, as the Texas statute punishes an act rather than a mere status. Extending Robinson would lead to a constitutional doctrine of criminal responsibility that undermines the States' ability to define crimes.

I concur. If it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to use narcotics, then it cannot be a crime to yield to that compulsion. However, I distinguish Powell's conviction for being drunk in a public place. Powell failed to show that he was unable to stay off the streets on the night in question due to his intoxication. Hence, I agree with affirming Powell's conviction because he did not demonstrate that his conviction violated the Constitution based on the specific facts and lack of evidence in the record.

Powell v. Texas

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