Powell v. Nevada
128 L. Ed. 2d 1, 511 U.S. 79, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 2655 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A new constitutional rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions must be applied retroactively to all state and federal cases that were pending on direct review or not yet final when the new rule was announced.
Facts:
- On Friday, November 3, 1989, Kitrich Powell was arrested for felony child abuse of his girlfriend's 4-year-old daughter.
- That same day, the arresting officer prepared a sworn declaration detailing the cause and circumstances of the arrest.
- A Magistrate did not make a formal finding of probable cause to hold Powell until Tuesday, November 7, 1989, four days after the arrest.
- On November 7, after being read his Miranda rights and waiving them, Powell made prejudicial statements to the police.
- The child later died from her injuries, and Powell was subsequently charged with murder.
- Powell was not physically brought before a magistrate for his initial appearance until November 13, 1989, ten days after his arrest.
Procedural Posture:
- Kitrich Powell was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury in a Nevada state trial court and was sentenced to death.
- Powell appealed his conviction and sentence to the Nevada Supreme Court, the state's highest court.
- The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
- In its opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that the 48-hour probable cause hearing rule from County of Riverside v. McLaughlin was a 'new rule' and did not apply retroactively to Powell's case.
- Powell petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to review the retroactivity issue.
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Issue:
Does the rule from County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, which requires a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest, apply retroactively to a defendant's case that was pending on direct appeal when McLaughlin was decided?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
No. A state court may not decline to apply a new federal constitutional rule to a case that was not yet final on direct review. Based on the precedent set in Griffith v. Kentucky, a new rule for conducting criminal prosecutions applies retroactively to all cases, state or federal, that are not yet final. Because Powell's conviction was still on direct appeal when County of Riverside v. McLaughlin was decided, his case was not final, and he is entitled to the benefit of McLaughlin's 48-hour rule. The principles of judicial review and equal treatment of similarly situated defendants mandate this outcome. The Court vacates the Nevada Supreme Court's judgment and remands the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate remedy for the violation, expressing no opinion on whether suppression of evidence is warranted.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No, but the judgment should be affirmed. While the majority is correct that Griffith v. Kentucky requires retroactive application of the McLaughlin rule, the Court should affirm the conviction rather than remand. The Court's role is to review judgments, not just opinions. Powell's incriminating statement was not a 'fruit' of the McLaughlin violation because the police had probable cause from the moment of arrest. A timely probable cause hearing would have simply confirmed the legality of his detention and would not have prevented him from making the statement. Therefore, because the delay did not cause the statement to be made, suppression is not an appropriate remedy, and the Nevada Supreme Court's judgment should be affirmed on this alternative ground.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the rule from Griffith v. Kentucky, eliminating any doubt that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure apply to all cases pending on direct review. It prevents state courts from creating a temporal gap in the application of federal constitutional protections. However, by remanding the case without deciding the remedy, the Court left a significant question unanswered: what, if any, remedy (such as the exclusionary rule) applies to a violation of the 48-hour prompt presentment rule established in McLaughlin? This leaves lower courts to grapple with the practical consequences of such a violation, particularly whether evidence obtained during the period of delay should be suppressed.
