Potter v. FIRST FEDERAL S & L ASS'N OF SCOTLANDVILLE
615 So. 2d 318, 1993 WL 43907 (1993)
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Rule of Law:
Louisiana Civil Code Article 2703, which limits a lessor's implied warranty against disturbances by third parties not claiming a right to the premises, does not grant lessors absolute immunity and does not preclude a lessee from bringing tort or breach of contract claims against a lessor who is at fault for injuries caused by such third-party acts, especially when the harm occurs in common areas.
Facts:
- Adiana Kathleen Potter resided at the Turtle Creek Apartment complex, which was owned by First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Scotlandville and managed by Kim Knighten and Associates.
- Three to four weeks before the incident, Potter complained to James Coussins, Knighten's assistant manager, about the inadequate lighting in the complex's parking lot, stating she could not differentiate between vehicles at night.
- Coussins assured Potter that the exterior lights were “being taken care of” and that more powerful and numerous lights would be installed.
- Other tenants, including Erin Spaht and Karen Seibert, also complained to management about the poor lighting, describing it as “dark as an unilluminated room.”
- Seibert additionally informed Coussins about her dog finding an unknown male behind a car in the parking lot, who then jumped up from where he was seemingly lurking.
- On February 8, 1989, Potter was raped and robbed by an unknown assailant in the poorly lit parking area of Turtle Creek.
- After the rape, the complex's electrician replaced at least twelve (12) of the twenty-six (26) floodlight bulbs, and the exterior lighting system was upgraded.
- In the year prior to the incident, the eleven-block area surrounding Turtle Creek had experienced a high number of burglaries, batteries, assaults, suspicious persons, prowlers, robberies, and thefts from automobiles.
Procedural Posture:
- Adiana Kathleen Potter filed a breach of contract and tort action in the Trial Court against First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Scotlandville, Kim Knighten and Associates, and State Farm General Insurance Company.
- Defendants, First Federal, Knighten, and State Farm, moved for summary judgment.
- The Trial Court granted summary judgment, dismissing Potter's suit with prejudice, finding that the defendants did not have a legal duty to protect Potter from the harm she sustained.
- Potter appealed the Trial Court's judgment to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal, where she was the appellant and defendants were the appellees.
- The Appellate Court affirmed the summary judgment, determining that a lessor is not liable to its lessees for the intentional torts of third persons under LSA-C.C. art. 2703, and that Potter could not prevail under theories of strict liability or negligence.
- Potter sought a writ of certiorari from the Louisiana Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does Louisiana Civil Code Article 2703, which limits a lessor's warranty against disturbances by third parties not claiming a right to the leased premises, immunize a lessor from liability for a lessee's tort and/or breach of contract claims when the lessor is alleged to be at fault for conditions that allowed a third-party criminal act to occur in a common area?
Opinions:
Majority - Ortique, Justice
No, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2703 does not immunize a lessor from liability for a lessee's tort and/or breach of contract claims when the lessor is alleged to be at fault for conditions that allowed a third-party criminal act to occur in a common area. The court clarified that Article 2703 only limits a lessor's implied warranty of peaceful possession against disturbances by third parties who do not claim a right to the premises, and only when the lessor is otherwise free from fault. It does not affect a lessee's right to pursue claims based on the lessor's own breach of contractual obligations (e.g., under LSA-C.C. arts. 2692, 2695) or tort duties (e.g., negligence under LSA-C.C. arts. 2315, 2316, 2317, or strict liability under LSA-C.C. art. 2317). Furthermore, the court implied that Article 2703 applies only to the leased property itself, not to common areas like parking lots where the lessee has access but not possessory rights. The court found that the lower courts erred in applying Article 2703 as an absolute immunity and that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the lessor and manager's contractual and tort duties to maintain adequate lighting and ensure a reasonably safe condition, thus precluding summary judgment.
Concurring - Calogero, Chief Justice
Chief Justice Calogero concurred with the majority's decision, stating that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the defendant's alleged negligence and that the court of appeal had incorrectly applied Civil Code Article 2703.
Concurring - Watson, Justice
Justice Watson concurred, emphasizing that the court of appeal erred by considering only Civil Code Article 2703. He asserted that the case involved negligence (Article 2315) and strict liability (Article 2317), which are separate grounds for potential lessor liability.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarified the scope of a lessor's liability for third-party criminal acts in Louisiana. By rejecting the 'absolute immunity' interpretation of LSA-C.C. art. 2703, the Louisiana Supreme Court established that landlords can be held liable for their own contractual breaches or tortious fault (negligence or strict liability) that contribute to a tenant's harm, even if the direct cause is a criminal act by a third party. The distinction between disturbances to the leased premises versus common areas also expands the potential for lessor liability in apartment complexes and similar settings, likely leading to increased litigation in such cases where landlord fault can be alleged. This ruling reinforces the idea that landlords have an ongoing duty to maintain safe premises beyond merely guaranteeing peaceful possession against legitimate claims.
