No. The prosecutor's comment was perfectly fine. When a defendant decides to testify, they can be questioned and challenged just like any other witness. It's only natural for a jury to think about the fact that the defendant heard everyone else's story first. This is different from punishing a defendant for using their right to remain silent (which is illegal); this is about questioning the truthfulness of what they actually said on the witness stand.

Yes. The prosecutor's comment was unfair. A defendant has a right to be present at their own trial, and they shouldn't be penalized for it by having the prosecutor suggest they are a liar. A truly innocent person's story would also fit with the other evidence, so this type of accusation unfairly hurts both guilty and innocent defendants. Plus, the defendant had no chance to defend himself against this claim because it was made at the very end of the trial.

No. The comment wasn't bad enough to be unconstitutional and throw out the conviction. However, the prosecutor's argument was a cheap shot that was disrespectful to the defendant and the legal process. Even though it doesn't break a major constitutional rule, it's a bad practice that judges should not allow.

No, it's not against the law. The prosecutor can point out that the defendant was there to hear all the other stories. This is because it's natural for the jury to think about this anyway, and it's not unfair to the defendant. It's different from telling the jury to think badly of a defendant for not testifying, which is not allowed. The prosecutor is just talking about whether to believe the defendant, which is okay. Also, there's no promise that being in court won't be used against the defendant, unlike when police tell someone they have the right to remain silent.

Yes, it is unfair and should be against the law. Pointing out that the defendant heard all the other stories doesn't help tell if they're guilty or innocent. All defendants have the right to be in court, so this comment makes that right seem like a bad thing. This hasn't been allowed in the past and goes against other rules we have to protect defendants. It's not more natural for juries to think about this than to think badly of someone for not testifying, which we don't allow. Also, it's especially unfair because the defendant can't respond to this comment at the end of the trial.

While I agree that this isn't so unfair that we need to redo the whole trial, I don't think the prosecutor should have said this. It's disrespectful to the defendant and ignores the idea that people are innocent until proven guilty. We should tell prosecutors not to do this, even if we're not going to throw out the whole case because of it.

No. A prosecutor's comments about a defendant's opportunity to tailor testimony after hearing other witnesses does not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. When a defendant chooses to testify, his credibility may be assailed like that of any other witness. The Court declined to extend the rule from Griffin v. California, which prohibits comment on a defendant's silence, to comments on a testifying defendant's credibility. The Court reasoned that it is natural and unavoidable for a jury to consider the fact that a defendant who testifies last has heard all prior testimony. Furthermore, the comments were not about guilt but about credibility, which is a permissible area for a prosecutor to explore once a defendant takes the stand. The Court also rejected the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, distinguishing it from Doyle v. Ohio by finding no implicit governmental promise that a defendant's presence at trial will not be used to challenge credibility.

Yes. The prosecutor's comments unconstitutionally burdened the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial. This case should be governed by the principle from Griffin and Doyle, which holds that when the exercise of a constitutional right is 'insolubly ambiguous' as between guilt and innocence, the prosecutor may not urge the jury to construe it against the defendant. An innocent defendant's truthful testimony would also cohere with other evidence, so the prosecutor's generic accusation tarnishes the innocent no less than the guilty. The comment was especially unfair because it was made during summation, leaving the defendant with no opportunity to rebut the accusation of tailoring.

No. While the prosecutor's summation did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation requiring the conviction to be set aside, it was an improper argument that should be discouraged. The prosecutor's comments demeaned the adversary process, violated respect for the defendant, and ignored the presumption of innocence. Although the argument survives constitutional scrutiny, states and trial judges retain the power to prevent such arguments or provide juries with curative instructions.

No. The prosecutor's comments on the defendant's presence at trial and opportunity to tailor testimony do not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. This is because such comments do not burden the exercise of a constitutional right in a manner that lacks historical foundation or justification. The comments merely invite the jury to consider a natural inference that arises from the defendant's presence at trial. Unlike in Griffin v. California, where commenting on a defendant's silence at trial was prohibited, here the jury is not being asked to do something they are not permitted to do. Additionally, the comments go to the defendant's credibility as a witness, which is a permissible area for prosecutorial argument. The Court distinguishes this case from Doyle v. Ohio, noting that there is no implicit assurance that a defendant's presence at trial will not be used against him, unlike the implicit assurance given with Miranda warnings. The Court also rejects the argument that the timing of the comments (during summation rather than cross-examination) is constitutionally significant.

Yes, because the prosecutor's comments unfairly burden the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights to be present at trial and confront witnesses. The generic accusation of tailoring does not serve to distinguish guilty defendants from innocent ones, as all defendants have the right and often the requirement to be present at trial. The comments transform the defendant's presence from a right into an automatic burden on his credibility. This practice is not supported by historical precedent and runs counter to the principles established in Griffin v. California and Doyle v. Ohio. The dissent argues that the inference from presence to tailoring is not more 'natural' or 'irresistible' than the inference from silence to guilt, which is prohibited. Furthermore, the dissent contends that the distinction between cross-examination and summation is critical, as the defendant has no opportunity to respond to accusations made during summation.

While I agree that the prosecutor's comments do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation requiring the conviction to be set aside, I must express my disagreement with the Court's implicit endorsement of the summation. The prosecutor's argument demeaned the adversary process, violated respect for the defendant's dignity, and ignored the presumption of innocence. Such comments should be discouraged rather than validated. States and trial judges retain the power to prevent such arguments or provide juries with instructions explaining the necessity and justifications for the defendant's attendance at trial.

Portuondo v. Agard

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