No, to both questions. 1. Pope wasn't guilty of child abuse. The law says you're only legally responsible for a child if you've agreed to be, like a babysitter. Pope was just being a good friend by letting them stay; she never agreed to take over as the baby's guardian. The baby's mom was always there, so she was still in charge. Pope had a moral duty to help, but not a legal one. 2. Pope also isn't guilty of failing to report a crime. That crime, called 'misprision of felony,' is an ancient law from England. The court decided this law is outdated, too harsh, and doesn't fit with modern American life, so they officially got rid of it.

I disagree on the child abuse part, but I agree on getting rid of the old crime. 1. I think the court is wrong about child abuse. The law says 'any person who has responsibility,' and you can take on that responsibility just by your actions, without a parent's permission. The court's decision creates a scary situation where someone could take in a lost child, hurt them, and then claim they weren't legally responsible. 2. I agree with the other judges that the old crime of not reporting a felony should be abolished.

No, there wasn't enough evidence to find Pope guilty of child abuse because she wasn't officially in charge of watching over the child. Also, in Maryland, you can't be guilty of a crime just for not reporting a serious crime you know about. Just because you let a child stay in your home doesn't mean you're responsible for the child like a parent, unless you fully agree to take on that role. Lastly, Maryland courts don't always have to do what federal courts say about federal laws or the U.S. Constitution.

I agree that Pope wasn't guilty of not reporting a crime, and that she wasn't guilty of child abuse for helping the mother hurt the child. But I disagree with how the majority interpreted the child abuse law. The law clearly applies to anyone responsible for a child, no matter how they got that responsibility. The majority's view wrongly narrows an important law.

Although the General Assembly cannot authorize a violation of federal constitutional rights, it is able to abrogate provisions of Maryland common law.

—parent may not impose responsibility for the supervision of his or her minor child on a third person unless that person accepts the responsibility

This Court has previously said that "temporary care or custody" is equivalent to "in loco parentis," a relatively restrictive classification that "arises only when one is willing to assume all the obligations and to receive all the benefits associated with one standing as a natural parent to a child."

We note that, unlike decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, decisions of federal circuit courts of appeals construing the federal constitution and acts of the Congress pursuant thereto, are not binding upon us.

—explaining that "[t] he principal in the second degree differs from the principal in the first degree in that he does not do the deed himself or through an innocent agent but in some way participates in the commission of the felony by aiding, commanding, counseling or encouraging the actual perpetrator

T] he common law is subject to change.... It may be changed by legislative act as Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights expressly provides

This is true even "when that aid can be rendered without danger or inconvenience to" the potential rescuer.

Because Pope had taken the mother and child into her household, as an "act [] of hospitality and kindness, made out of common decency and prompted by sincere concern for the well-being of a mother and her child [,]"

But to generate an accomplice liability instruction, the State must present evidence that Mr. Sweeney "in some way participate [d] in the commission of the felony by aiding...[an] actual perpetrator."

If a principal in the second degree is standing by for the purpose of giving aid to the criminal perpetrator, the principal in the first degree must be aware of the that purpose.

No to both. 1. A person does not have "responsibility for the supervision" of a child under the state's child abuse statute merely by providing temporary shelter and care while the parent is present; such responsibility requires mutual consent where the parent grants and the third party accepts the role. The court reasoned that Pope's actions were those of a Good Samaritan, prompted by kindness and decency, which do not create a legal duty to protect the child from its own parent. Because Melissa Norris, the mother, was always present and never relinquished her parental authority, Pope never legally assumed responsibility. 2. The common law crime of misprision of felony is not a chargeable offense in Maryland. The court determined the crime, which punishes the mere failure to report a known felony, is obsolete, overly harsh, and incompatible with modern jurisprudence and American legal institutions. Its long history of non-use, coupled with its vagueness and potential conflict with constitutional rights, rendered it unsuitable for modern application; any such reporting duty must be created by the legislature.

I dissent as to the child abuse holding but concur as to misprision of felony. 1. The majority's interpretation of the child abuse statute is excessively narrow and violates plain principles of statutory construction. The statutory language "any ... other person who has ... responsibility" is clear and should include individuals who voluntarily assume such responsibility through their actions, without needing formal parental consent. The majority's holding creates a dangerous loophole, potentially immunizing individuals who take in a lost child and then abuse them. 2. I concur with the majority's conclusion that the common law crime of misprision of felony should be abrogated in Maryland.

No. The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain Pope's conviction for child abuse because she did not have responsibility for the supervision of the child. Misprision of felony is not a chargeable offense in Maryland. The court clarified that temporary care or custody does not equate to 'in loco parentis' status, which requires a willingness to assume all obligations associated with a natural parent. Additionally, decisions of federal circuit courts are not binding on the Maryland court when interpreting the federal constitution or acts of Congress.

I concur regarding misprision of felony and that Pope was not guilty of child abuse as a principal in the second degree. However, I disagree with the majority's restrictive interpretation of the child abuse statute. The statute clearly applies to anyone who has responsibility for a child, regardless of how that responsibility was obtained. The majority's interpretation unjustifiably narrows an important piece of legislation.

Pope v. State

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