No, that's not okay. The Court said that a work's artistic or scientific value doesn't change when you cross a state line. Something that's considered valuable art in New York City shouldn't become worthless trash just because people in a small town don't like it. The correct test is to ask: 'Would a reasonable person find serious value in this?' However, instead of throwing out the conviction, the Court sent the case back to the Illinois courts to decide if the mistake was 'harmless'—meaning, if the magazines were so obviously lacking in value that any jury would have convicted them anyway.

Yes, I agree with the 'reasonable person' rule, but this whole idea is silly. It's impossible for judges and juries to have a legal standard for what counts as 'good art.' He famously said that trying to argue about taste is pointless, so trying to create a law about it is a bad idea.

Yes, the 'reasonable person' rule is correct, but No, the conviction can't be saved. He agreed with the main opinion that a national standard is needed to protect works that only a minority might appreciate. But he disagreed with sending the case back, arguing that if the jury was told the wrong rule for a key part of the crime, the guilty verdict is invalid and can't be fixed.

Yes, the instruction was wrong, but the bigger problem is that the whole legal concept of 'obscenity' is too vague. He believed that it's impossible to write a law that clearly tells people what is and isn't allowed, so any law banning obscenity for adults is unconstitutional.

Yes, the instruction was wrong, and the convictions should be overturned immediately. First, you can't call this a 'harmless error' because the jury never actually found the clerks guilty of all parts of the crime under the correct law. Second, the 'reasonable person' test isn't good enough; the rule should be that if *any* reasonable person could find value, it's protected. Third, the government shouldn't be in the business of banning books and magazines for adults who choose to buy them.

Yes, it's wrong. The law shouldn't change based on different community opinions. Instead, we should think about whether a reasonable person would find the material valuable.

No, the law on what's considered obscene isn't clear enough, which isn't fair to people who are trying to follow the law.

No, the instructions given to the jury were incorrect and affected the outcome unfairly.

Yes, the decision is right, but deciding what counts as valuable in art or literature is still very subjective.

Yes, I agree with the main decision, but I want to point out that even if only a few people think something has value, it shouldn't be considered obscene.

Yes, a jury instruction directing the application of contemporary community standards to the 'serious value' prong of the Miller obscenity test violates the First Amendment. Unlike the prongs for 'prurient interest' and 'patent offensiveness,' the value of a work does not vary from community to community. The proper inquiry is an objective one: whether a reasonable person would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in the material, taken as a whole. This standard ensures that works are protected even if a majority of people in a given community disapprove of them. However, the Court determined that the convictions were not automatically reversed but should be reviewed by the lower court for harmless error, meaning the convictions could stand if a reviewing court concludes that no rational juror, properly instructed, could have found value in the magazines.

Yes. While concurring with the majority's adoption of a 'reasonable person' test as the most faithful interpretation of Miller, and agreeing with the harmless error analysis, this opinion expresses profound skepticism about the entire endeavor. It argues that it is impossible to come to an objective assessment of literary or artistic value, as taste is inherently subjective ('De gustibus non est disputandum'). The 'reasonable person' standard is of little help in aesthetic judgments, and this entire area of law warrants reexamination.

Yes as to the standard, but No as to the remedy. This opinion joins the majority in holding that a 'reasonable person' standard must be applied to the value prong, interpreting it to mean that even a minority view among reasonable people that a work has value is sufficient for protection. However, it dissents from the decision to remand for harmless error analysis, agreeing with Justice Stevens that when a jury fails to find a required element of the crime due to an erroneous instruction, the conviction cannot be salvaged.

Yes, the instruction was unconstitutional, but the entire concept of obscenity is flawed. This dissent reiterates the view that the legal concept of 'obscenity' is so inherently vague that it fails to provide fair notice and inevitably chills protected speech. Therefore, any regulation of sexually oriented materials for consenting adults is constitutionally defective.

Yes, the instruction was unconstitutional, and the convictions must be reversed for three reasons. First, the instructional error can never be harmless because the jury was never required to find, and therefore did not find, an essential element of the crime; an appellate court cannot supplement a jury's findings. Second, the majority's 'reasonable person' standard is flawed because reasonable people can disagree on value; the proper test should be whether *some* reasonable person could find value. Third, and most fundamentally, the government may not constitutionally criminalize the sale of obscene literature to consenting adults due to the vagueness of obscenity laws and the First Amendment principles protecting the right to receive information.

Yes. The instruction to apply community standards in determining the value of allegedly obscene materials is unconstitutional because it subjects the determination of obscenity to varying community standards, which is not aligned with First Amendment protections. The correct approach is to assess whether a reasonable person would find such material to have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

No, because the concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice and to prevent substantial erosion of protected speech.

No, because the erroneous jury instructions on the value of the material as judged by community standards were not harmless and compromised the defendants' constitutional rights.

Yes, the majority's decision is correct, but emphasizes that the 'reasonable person' standard is still problematic in determining the value of artistic or literary works.

Yes, agrees with the majority but stresses that even minority opinions among reasonable people about the value of a work can protect it from being deemed obscene.

Pope v. Illinois

Case Podcast

Rule of Law:

The Legal Principle

Facts:

Procedural Posture:

How It Got Here

Issue:

Legal Question at Stake

Opinions:

Majority, Concurrences & Dissents

Analysis:

Why This Case Matters

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