Pollard v. Oklahoma City Ry. Co.
1912 OK 732, 128 P. 300, 36 Okla. 96 (1912)
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Rule of Law:
An original negligent act is not the proximate cause of an injury when it is followed by independent, intervening acts of responsible human beings that break the chain of causation and become the direct and efficient cause of the harm.
Facts:
- During a railway extension project, a railway company's workmen carelessly discarded empty powder cans, each containing a small amount of leftover black blasting powder.
- Millard Justes, a boy between fourteen and fifteen years old, discovered the cans on and near the company's right-of-way.
- Over approximately a month, Justes collected powder from these cans, accumulating about half to three-quarters of a can full, and hid it near his father's house.
- Justes's parents knew he possessed the powder for at least three weeks before the incident and warned him of the danger but did not confiscate it.
- Bernie Smith Pollard, aged thirteen, was visiting the Justes family.
- Justes and Pollard took a portion of the collected powder from its hiding place and went to a creek, about half a mile from both the Justes home and the railway cut.
- At the creek, the boys placed the powder on the ground, and Justes successfully lit it with a match.
- The resulting explosion severely burned Pollard, making him a cripple for life.
Procedural Posture:
- Bernie Smith Pollard (plaintiff) sued the railway company (defendant) in the district court of Oklahoma county for damages.
- The defendant answered with a general denial and asserted that the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to the injury.
- At the conclusion of the trial, the court sustained the defendant's motion for a peremptory instruction (directed verdict).
- The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant railway company.
- The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which the court overruled.
- The plaintiff (appellant) appealed the judgment to the state's highest appellate court.
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Issue:
Does a railway company's negligence in leaving discarded powder cans along its right-of-way constitute the proximate cause of a child's injury when another child collected the powder over several weeks, stored it at his home with his parents' knowledge, and later ignited it at a remote location, causing the injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Robertson, C.
No. The railway company's negligence was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury because the original negligent act was superseded by several independent, intervening, and efficient acts of responsible human beings. The court reasoned that the chain of events was so broken that the injury could not be considered a natural and probable consequence of the company's act of leaving the cans. The intervening acts included Millard Justes's deliberate and prolonged collection of the powder, his removal of it far from the defendant's property, his parents' knowledge and failure to act over a three-week period, and finally, the intentional act of the boys lighting the powder at a remote location. These acts, rather than the company's initial negligence, were the direct and proximate cause of Pollard's injuries. Therefore, the defendant's original negligence is considered too remote to establish liability.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the tort law principle of superseding cause, which can sever the chain of legal causation between a defendant's negligence and a plaintiff's injury. The case illustrates that even if a defendant creates a potentially dangerous condition, the subsequent, independent, and unforeseeable actions of third parties can insulate the original tortfeasor from liability. It sets a precedent that courts will look beyond the initial negligent act to the 'last efficient cause,' especially when intelligent and responsible individuals have intervened. This holding narrows the scope of liability for those who create static dangerous conditions by emphasizing that their duty does not extend to preventing harms from a series of unforeseeable, independent human actions.
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