Pollard v. Lyon
1875 U.S. LEXIS 1352, 91 U.S. 225, 23 L. Ed. 308 (1876)
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Rule of Law:
Spoken words are actionable per se only if they impute to the party an indictable criminal offense involving moral turpitude. If the words do not meet this standard, the plaintiff must specifically plead and prove special damages, meaning a tangible, pecuniary loss, to maintain a cause of action for slander.
Facts:
- The defendant stated, 'I saw her in bed with Captain Denty.'
- On the same day, the defendant also stated, 'I looked over the transom-light and saw Mrs. Pollard in bed with Captain Denty.'
- The act of fornication, which the words might imply, was not an indictable criminal offense in the jurisdiction where the words were spoken.
- The plaintiff's legal complaint did not allege that she was married, a necessary element to establish the crime of adultery.
- The plaintiff did not allege any specific financial or tangible loss (special damage) resulting from the defendant's statements, only general harm to her 'name and fame.'
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff, Pollard, sued the defendant in the trial court (special term) for slander.
- A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding her $10,000.
- The defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment, arguing that the words spoken were not legally actionable.
- The trial court ordered the motion to be heard by the court at general term (an intermediate appellate level).
- The general term sustained the defendant's motion, ruling that the plaintiff's declaration was legally insufficient.
- Final judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant.
- The plaintiff (as plaintiff-in-error) brought a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Are spoken words imputing unchastity to a woman, where the act described is not an indictable criminal offense in the jurisdiction, actionable per se without a specific allegation and proof of special damages?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Clifford
No. Spoken words that impute unchastity are not actionable per se unless they charge the commission of an indictable crime involving moral turpitude; otherwise, a plaintiff must allege and prove specific special damages to recover. The court reasoned that there is a significant distinction between spoken slander and written libel, with slander requiring a higher threshold for a claim to be actionable in itself. Adopting the rule from New York's decision in Brooker v. Coffin, the court held that for slander to be actionable per se, the words must impute a crime for which the party could be indicted and punished. Here, the words did not impute a crime because fornication was not illegal in the jurisdiction, and the plaintiff failed to allege she was married, a required element for the crime of adultery. Furthermore, the plaintiff's general claim of damage to her 'name and fame' is insufficient to meet the requirement of pleading special damages, which must be a specific, tangible, pecuniary loss that is the natural and proximate consequence of the defendant's words.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the strict common law requirements for slander per se in American federal jurisprudence, emphasizing a clear distinction between spoken slander and written libel. It establishes that mere imputations of immorality, without an accusation of an actual crime, are insufficient for a slander claim unless the plaintiff can demonstrate concrete financial harm. The case underscores the critical importance of precise pleading, forcing plaintiffs to either fit their claim into the narrow category of slander per se or specify tangible economic losses. While reflecting the traditional and restrictive view of slander, this ruling also highlights a legal standard that many states would later modify by statute to make false imputations of unchastity against women actionable without proof of special damages.
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