Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley
408 U.S. 92 (1972)
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Rule of Law:
A government regulation that restricts expressive activity in a public forum cannot discriminate based on the content or subject matter of the expression, as doing so violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Facts:
- For seven months, Earl Mosley frequently engaged in a solo picket of Jones Commercial High School in Chicago.
- Mosley's picketing was consistently peaceful, orderly, and quiet.
- He carried a sign stating, 'Jones High School practices black discrimination. Jones High School has a black quota.'
- The City of Chicago enacted an ordinance that prohibited picketing or demonstrating on a public way within 150 feet of a school during school hours.
- The ordinance contained a specific exemption, allowing 'the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.'
- The Chicago Police Department informed Mosley that if he continued his picketing after the ordinance became effective, he would be arrested.
- Faced with the threat of arrest, Mosley ceased his picketing activity near the school.
Procedural Posture:
- Earl Mosley sued the Police Department of the City of Chicago in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
- The District Court (a trial court) granted a directed verdict in favor of the City of Chicago, dismissing the complaint.
- Mosley (as appellant) appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Seventh Circuit (an intermediate appellate court) reversed the District Court's decision, finding the ordinance unconstitutional on grounds of overbreadth.
- The Police Department of the City of Chicago (as petitioner) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a city ordinance that prohibits all picketing within 150 feet of a school, but explicitly exempts peaceful picketing related to a labor dispute, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Marshall
Yes, the ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause. A government regulation of expressive activity cannot be based on the content or subject matter of that expression. The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter, allowing peaceful labor picketing while prohibiting all other peaceful picketing. This creates a content-based distinction, as the permissibility of the protest depends on the message on the picket sign. The First Amendment's core principle is that government cannot restrict expression due to its message or ideas. By favoring one topic (labor disputes) over others, the city is engaging in impermissible censorship. While the city has a legitimate interest in preventing school disruptions, this interest does not justify the content-based discrimination, as peaceful non-labor picketing is no more disruptive than the peaceful labor picketing the ordinance permits.
Concurring - Chief Justice Burger
Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional. However, the majority's statement that people 'are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship' should not be read as absolute. The right to freedom of expression is subject to certain qualifications and limitations, as established in prior cases dealing with unprotected speech categories like obscenity or fighting words.
Analysis:
This case establishes the foundational principle that government regulations of speech in a public forum must be content-neutral. By applying the Equal Protection Clause to a First Amendment context, the Court subjected content-based restrictions to a high level of scrutiny. This decision significantly limits the government's ability to favor certain viewpoints or subjects over others when regulating public expression. It creates a strong precedent that any law distinguishing between types of speech based on their message will be viewed as presumptively unconstitutional, impacting future cases on protest rights, campaign finance, and regulations of public spaces.
