Polay v. McMahon
468 Mass. 379 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
Continuous video surveillance of a neighbor's home, including the interior, constitutes an unreasonable and substantial or serious invasion of privacy when the surveillance is motivated by a purpose to harass, even if the surveillance equipment is on the defendant's own property.
Facts:
- Jane T. Polay and William Morse were neighbors with Joseph S. McMahon, living across the street from each other.
- Around April 2008, McMahon and other neighbors allegedly entered into a common plan to harass Polay and Morse.
- Over the next two years, McMahon filed numerous police reports against Polay and Morse, which they alleged were false, including complaints of stalking and assault.
- Based on these reports, McMahon obtained a harassment prevention order against Polay and Morse, which was later vacated by a judge.
- Around January 2011, McMahon installed several video cameras in his house and pointed them at Polay and Morse's property.
- By May 2011, McMahon had installed an additional camera, also directed at the plaintiffs' property.
- The cameras allegedly recorded the plaintiffs' house on a continuous basis and enabled McMahon to see into the windows of their home.
- Polay and Morse alleged that McMahon's actions, including the surveillance, were done to cause them extreme distress and drive them out of the neighborhood.
Procedural Posture:
- Jane T. Polay and William Morse sued Joseph S. McMahon in Massachusetts Superior Court, alleging five claims including invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- McMahon filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a special motion to dismiss under the state's anti-SLAPP statute.
- The Superior Court judge granted the motion to dismiss for all claims and granted the special motion to dismiss for the abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims.
- The judge subsequently awarded McMahon costs and attorney's fees.
- Polay and Morse (the plaintiffs-appellants) appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, challenging only the dismissal of their invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and the related award of attorney's fees.
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Issue:
Does continuous video surveillance of a neighbor's home, including views into their windows, allegedly for the purpose of harassment, plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief for a claim of invasion of privacy?
Opinions:
Majority - Duffly, J.
Yes. Continuous video surveillance of a neighbor's home for the purpose of harassment can constitute an unreasonable, substantial, or serious invasion of privacy. The court evaluates such claims by balancing the plaintiff's privacy interests against any legitimate purpose the defendant may have for the intrusion. Expectations of privacy are at their highest within the home. While surveillance for a legitimate purpose like security may be permissible, an alleged motive to harass can convert otherwise lawful video surveillance into an unreasonable and tortious intrusion. The question of McMahon's true purpose—security versus harassment—is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim. The conduct did not meet the high standard of being 'extreme and outrageous' or 'utterly intolerable in a civilized community.' McMahon's petitioning activities (filing police reports) were privileged under the anti-SLAPP statute and could not form the basis of the IIED claim. The remaining conduct—a single undescribed 'verbal attack' and the video surveillance—did not rise to the requisite level of atrocity for an IIED claim, even if done with tortious intent.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that motive is a critical factor in determining whether surveillance constitutes an invasion of privacy by intrusion. It establishes that a defendant cannot shield themselves with a pretextual claim of 'security' if evidence suggests the primary purpose of surveillance is to harass a neighbor. The ruling reinforces the heightened expectation of privacy in one's home and shows that modern technology like continuous video recording can create a 'substantial or serious' intrusion even if it captures views also visible from a public way. The case also highlights the distinction between the standard for invasion of privacy and the much higher bar for intentional infliction of emotional distress, demonstrating that conduct can be tortious for one but not the other.
