PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board
2003 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 678, 831 A.2d 1269 (2003)
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Rule of Law:
The doctrine of common law marriage is abolished in Pennsylvania prospectively; any marriage purported to be created by common law after the date of this decision will not be recognized as valid.
Facts:
- John Kretz and Janet Stamos began living together around June 1989.
- In 1990, they purchased a house, though the deed and mortgage were in Stamos's name only; they remained financially interdependent but kept separate bank accounts.
- On December 22, 1990, Kretz and Stamos both signed a notarized affidavit for Kretz's union benefit plans to name Stamos as his beneficiary spouse.
- The affidavit stated that on or about June 15, 1988, they had united themselves in marriage with the present intent to live as husband and wife, and acknowledged that a legal divorce would be required to remove Stamos from the plans.
- Kretz later testified that the 1988 date was a mistake and should have been 1989, as Stamos was not divorced from her previous husband until December 1988.
- At some point after moving in together, the couple exchanged rings as a sign of their marriage.
- In 1994, Stamos died in an airplane crash during the course of her employment with PNC Corporation.
- Stamos's official death certificate indicated that she was divorced and had no surviving spouse at the time of her death.
Procedural Posture:
- John Kretz filed a fatal claim petition with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, seeking surviving spouse's benefits from PNC Corporation, the employer of the decedent, Janet Stamos.
- A Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) conducted hearings and issued a decision finding that Kretz was the common law spouse of Stamos, granting his petition for benefits.
- PNC Corporation, as the employer and appellant, appealed the WCJ's decision to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board).
- The Board affirmed the decision of the WCJ.
- PNC Corporation then filed an appeal from the Board's order to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, with John Kretz as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the judicially-created doctrine of common law marriage remain a valid method of forming a marriage in Pennsylvania?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Leadbetter
Yes, but only prospectively. The doctrine of common law marriage is abolished henceforth in Pennsylvania, but this ruling does not invalidate common law marriages, like the one at issue here, that were established before this decision. The historical justifications for common law marriage—such as geographic isolation from officials and the need to protect financially dependent women and legitimize children—are no longer relevant in modern society. The doctrine has become a 'fruitful source of perjury and fraud,' creating uncertainty in legal relationships and disrespect for the law. Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's strong criticism of the doctrine in Staudenmayer, this court is justified in 'anticipatorily overruling' it. However, because many have relied on the long-standing rule, the abolition will apply purely prospectively. Applying the old law to the present case, the signed and notarized affidavit constituted clear and convincing evidence of verba in praesenti, the present intent to be married, thereby establishing a valid common law marriage between Kretz and Stamos.
Dissenting-in-part-and-concurring-in-part - Judge Smith-Ribner
No. The judiciary should not abolish the doctrine of common law marriage; that is a public policy decision reserved for the legislature. The majority usurps the legislative function by abolishing a long-standing common law principle that the General Assembly has explicitly chosen to preserve. The majority misinterprets the dicta in Staudenmayer, as only a minority of Supreme Court justices in that case advocated for abolition. The Supreme Court has consistently shown deference to the legislature in domestic relations matters, and this intermediate court should do the same. It is an abuse of judicial power to ignore clear legislative intent. Therefore, while I concur in affirming the award to Kretz because he proved a valid common law marriage under existing law, I dissent from the majority's decision to abolish the doctrine for future couples.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant change in Pennsylvania domestic relations law by prospectively eliminating the centuries-old doctrine of common law marriage. It aligns Pennsylvania with the overwhelming majority of states that require statutory formalities for a valid marriage. The court’s use of 'anticipatory overruling' demonstrates how an intermediate appellate court may act when it perceives a clear signal from a higher court that a precedent is ripe for reversal. This holding provides a bright-line rule for future unions, aiming to reduce litigation and fraudulent claims, but its prospective-only application preserves the validity of existing common law marriages.
